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Executive summary 
 
Information and Communications Technology (ICT) plays an integral role in terms of facilitating 
economic growth in both developed and developing countries. It is important that economic 
participants have confidence in the security and reliability of their partners’ ICT infrastructure. As 
such, at a national level, a secure and reliable ICT infrastructure is seen as a national asset [1]. To 
facilitate the securing of the ICT infrastructure, as well as information security related services 
offered to citizens, nations need a National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS). The NCS should 
prescribe national cybersecurity functions1 needed to secure the nation’s cyberspace. 
 
Our experience with national cybersecurity projects showed that the management of cybersecurity 
at national level includes the tasks of identifying, selecting and prioritising cybersecurity functions, 
as well as the implementation of those functions. We conducted detailed research, and could not 
find existing frameworks that could be used to assist nation-states during the identification, 
selection, prioritisation, and implementation of national cybersecurity functions. Therefore the 
purpose of this thesis is to develop a National Cybersecurity Management Framework that could 
be used by nation states to manage its national cybersecurity functions. This framework will be 
broad enough to be applied by both developed and developing countries. The illustrative application 
of the framework in this thesis is presented in the context of developing countries, building on our 
experience in applying national cybersecurity solutions in South Africa as a developing country. 
 
Effective cybersecurity function management at national level requires that the identified, selected 
and prioritised cybersecurity functions are implemented and offered from existing cybersecurity 
structures, or where no structures exist, a newly developed national cybersecurity structure. We 
will illustrate the application of the implementation part of our framework through the establishment, 
and implementation of a new national cybersecurity structure. This structure will be described with 
three models. The first model describes how to build the structure, the second model describes the 
operation of the structure, and the third model describes the monitoring of the structure’s maturity.  
 
Figure 3 on page 31 shows that development of our framework and the three models describing 
the structure was done in alignment with the plan-build-run-monitor (PBRM) organisational 
approach. The framework was developed using existing standards and frameworks, as well as 
using input based on our experience, and lessons learnt during cybersecurity work done at national 
level. Using existing and scalable standards and framework, coupled with our experience at   
 
                                                     
1 The terms “national cybersecurity functions”, and “cybersecurity functions” and “functions” are used interchangeably, 
and will be discussed in more detail in this document. 
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implementing national cybersecurity solutions will ensure that our framework can scale to national 
level, and that it can be implemented successfully. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
1.1 Introduction 
 
To facilitate the identification, selection, prioritisation and implementation of national cybersecurity functions, 
the National Cybersecurity Management Framework (NCMF) is developed. The significance of the NCMF is 
that it would improve a nation state’s cybersecurity posture and that it offers value in terms of cost and skills 
saving. This thesis presents one framework, with the purpose to assist nation states with the national 
cybersecurity management tasks of identifying, selecting, prioritising, and implementing national cybersecurity 
functions. In developing the framework, the plan-build-run-monitor (PBRM) organisational approach is 
followed as an overall guiding framework. The aim of the framework and structure is to improve the national 
cybersecurity posture of developing countries. This framework is developed keeping in mind the unique 
requirements and constraints of developing countries. Developing countries have unique requirements in 
terms of the burden placed on available financial and skills resources where it concerns their national 
cybersecurity efforts.  
 
The NCMF satisfies the “Plan” function of the PBRM organisational approach, and we will apply the NCMF in 
Chapter 4 to identify, select and prioritise general1 cybersecurity functions. An illustrative application of the 
implementation part of the NCMF will be provided through a proposed best practice guide for the 
implementation of national cybersecurity structures in Part 2 of this thesis. Our best practice guide describes 
the establishment of a new national cybersecurity structure by selecting two of the identified cybersecurity 
functions to be used for the development of an initial cybersecurity structure. The two selected functions are 
the incident handling, and the monitoring and evaluation function. The functions are realised by services 
offered from national cybersecurity structures. The incident handling function is offered from a computer 
security incident response team (CSIRT) structure, while the monitoring and evaluation function is offered from 
a security operation centre (SOC) structure. CSIRTs and SOCs offer multiple cybersecurity services to realise 
the incident handling and monitoring and evaluation functions.  
 
Our best practice guide describes the establishment of a new structure called the Early Cybersecurity 
Monitoring and Incident Response Center (E-CMIRC), from where the services of the two functions are 
combined to realise a cost and skills saving for developing countries. The newly conceived E-CMIRC structure 
is described with three models. To satisfy the "build" function of the PBRM organisational approach, the             
E-CMIRC Capability Development Model (E-CMIRC CDM) is developed. The E-CMIRC CDM is a symbolic 
model describing the building of the E-CMIRC structure. The E-CMIRC Operations Model (E-CMIRC OM) is a 
symbolic model describing E-CMIRC operations and satisfies the "run" function of the PBRM organisational 
approach. The E-CMIRC CDM and the E-CMIRC OM is presented as a single integrated model. The "monitor”  
 
                                                     
1 General cybersecurity functions are by definition non-mandatory 
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function of the PBRM organisational approach is satisfied through the development of the E-CMIRC Capability 
Maturity Model (E-CMIRC CMM) which is a symbolic model describing how the maturity of the E-CMIRC can 
be measured, and improved on.  
 
1.2 Background 
 
Where it concerns the establishment of a secure ICT infrastructure, the needs of developing countries are 
different from those of developed countries. During the establishment of an ICT infrastructure, security and 
reliability must be considered throughout the whole process.  
 
Most developed countries, such as the Office of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) nation-
states, have developed and implemented National Cybersecurity Strategies (NCSs). Examples of developed 
countries with existing National Cybersecurity Strategies are the United States of America (USA), with their 
“National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace” [2] and the United Kingdom (UK) with their “National Cybersecurity 
Strategy 2016 to 2021” [3].   
 
Some developed nation-states, such as the USA, augments its National Cybersecurity Strategy (NCS) with 
Presidential Directives and national cybersecurity policies. These National Cybersecurity Strategies, policies 
and directives govern cybersecurity activities at national level. They also list national cybersecurity functions 
applicable to their specific countries. A list of the OECD nation states (all developed countries) with their         
NCSs may be found by following this link https://goo.gl/stoUct, and a list of European Union (EU) countries 
(also developed countries) with their NCSs may be found here https://goo.gl/1EN6GE. 
 
Developing countries have unique challenges in that they often do not have sufficient funds, or resources 
available to secure their ICT infrastructure. It is further our experience that developing countries often have not 
yet developed NCSs. There are however exceptions, such as Kenya with their “Cybersecurity Strategy” [4], 
Nigeria with their “National Cybersecurity Strategy” [5] and South Africa with their “National Cybersecurity 
Policy Framework” (NCPF) [6].  
 
The NCSs and policies of developed and developing countries all describe different elements making up a 
nation’s cybersecurity efforts. One of the elements described in the NCSs, is national cybersecurity functions. 
National cybersecurity functions are provided by cybersecurity services that deliver on a function. 
Cybersecurity services,2  in turn, consists of national cybersecurity capabilities.3 The relationship between 
national cybersecurity functions, services, capabilities and structures is shown in Figure 1.  
 
 
                                                     
2 In this thesis, the terms “cybersecurity services” and “services” are used interchangeably. 
 
3 In this thesis, the terms “cybersecurity capabilities” and “capabilities” are used interchangeably. 
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Figure 1 shows that national cybersecurity functions are realised through national cybersecurity services. 
National cybersecurity services, in turn, are made up of national cybersecurity capabilities that consist of 
people, processes and technology. The national cybersecurity functions and their enabling cybersecurity 
services are offered from national cybersecurity structures. Where no national cybersecurity structures exist, 
new national cybersecurity structures must be conceived and developed. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Relationship between cybersecurity functions, services, capabilities and 
structures [7] 
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1.3 Motivation 
 
Based on our experience, we have identified four tasks that need to be executed during the management of 
national cybersecurity functions. Going forward in this thesis, the term “management” – in the context of the 
development of the national cybersecurity management framework – must be understood to serve as an 
umbrella term that includes the four tasks. The four national cybersecurity management tasks will now be 
introduced in the text below. 
 
• Task 1: To identify national cybersecurity functions. 
 
To achieve the “identification of national cybersecurity functions” task, a nation-state should have a framework 
to follow, to identify mandatory or non-mandatory national cybersecurity functions. Such a framework should 
be broad enough to identify cybersecurity functions for both developed and developing countries. The 
framework should further be broad enough to identify cybersecurity functions at a national and organisational 
level. Our experience showed that most often nation states will focus their national cybersecurity efforts on 
critical infrastructures, and these are most often state owned entities (SOEs). The identification task identifies 
all elements that influence and inform the identification of national cybersecurity functions. Some of these 
elements are national and international normative and authoritative sources, dimensions, domains and 
mandates. This task then uses the elements to identify a nation’s mandatory, or non-mandatory cybersecurity 
functions. 
 
• Task 2: To select national cybersecurity functions for implementation. 
 
This task uses the elements identified in Task 1 to guide the “selection of national cybersecurity functions”. 
Task 1 results in a list of cybersecurity functions identified for possible implementation at the national level. 
From this list, it is recommended that nation-states select functions for implementation. Nations with limited 
capacity and capability may use existing national and international normative and authoritative sources, 
dimensions, domains and mandates to guide the selection of their national cybersecurity functions for 
implementation. Most nation states and specifically developing countries will not have the necessary resources 
to implement a multitude of the identified functions. Therefore, we recommend that one, or at most two, national 
cybersecurity functions are selected for implementation. During Task 2, functions are selected for 
implementation at the national level. 
 
• Task 3: To prioritise national cybersecurity functions. 
 
Once a list of selected cybersecurity functions has been compiled, their implementation needs to be prioritised. 
Task 3 assists with the “prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions” for implementation. This task may be 
executed by following a National Strategic Risk and Threat Assessment approach, such as the strategy 
described in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework, or  
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standards such as ISO/IEC 27005:2011 [8], [9] or ISO/IEC 3100:2009 [10]. While the outcome of the National 
Strategic Risk and Threat Assessment influences the selection of national cybersecurity functions, its primary 
purpose is to prioritise the national cybersecurity functions for implementation.  
 
There is a reciprocal relationship between the selection and prioritisation tasks. The National Strategic Risk 
and Threat Assessment approach influences the selection, and prioritises the national cybersecurity functions 
for implementation, while the dimensions, mandates and domains may also influence the selection and 
prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions for implementation.  
 
• Task 4: To implement national cybersecurity functions. 
 
The fourth task, “national cybersecurity function implementation”, is the implementation of national 
cybersecurity functions. The implementation task should be broad enough to guide the implementation of any 
nation state’s mandatory or general cybersecurity function. The tasks are displayed in Figure 2. Figure 2 shows 
that the dimensions, mandates and domains may influence and inform the identification of national 
cybersecurity functions. As an example, the national cybersecurity function requirements will differ when a 
nation is at war (the Offensive domain) or in time of peace (Defensive domain). The dimensions, domains and 
mandates may also influence the selection and prioritisation tasks. The arrows looping between the selection 
and prioritisation tasks show that the selection task of the NCMF will be influenced mainly by the National 
Strategic Risk and Threat Assessment approach. It also shows that the prioritisation task is influenced by the 
cybersecurity dimensions, mandates and domains (introduced in Chapter 3).  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: National Cybersecurity Management Framework Tasks 
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In an ideal situation, there would be guidance in the form of a national framework to direct, steer and drive 
nation-states during the management of their national cybersecurity functions. Detailed research conducted 
by us have shown that no national cybersecurity management framework is publicly available.  
 
The lack of a national framework to guide nation-states during the management of national cybersecurity 
functions could lead to disjointed efforts between state departments and actors. Also, not using a framework 
when managing national cybersecurity functions could result in outcomes that are not relevant to a nation 
state’s cybersecurity functional requirements or outcomes, and results that are inconsistent, and not repeatable 
or measurable. It could further lead to elements related to the management of national cybersecurity functions 
being overlooked. It is also difficult to demonstrate national cybersecurity intent and effort if there is no 
framework to measure progress against.  
 
The Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) [11], CiteSeerx [12], Google Scholar [13], Institute of 
Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) [14] and Microsoft Academic Research [15] were consulted in this 
research, all being strong sources of literature in this area. No national cybersecurity management framework 
could be found. Neither could a best practice guide describing the implementation of national cybersecurity 
structures that offer a combination of services from multiple functions, be found.  
 
Considering the motivation for a national cybersecurity management framework to direct, steer and drive 
nation-states during the management of their national cybersecurity functions, a strong case can be made that 
nation-states need: 
 
1. A National Cybersecurity Management Framework (NCMF) that assists them during the identification, 
selection, prioritisation, and implementation of national cybersecurity functions and its structures.  
 
2. A best practice guide that describes the implementation of national cybersecurity structures from where 
the selected and prioritised national cybersecurity functions, identified through the application of the 
National Cybersecurity Management Framework, are offered from. 
 
A framework that can be used during the management of cybersecurity functions, at the national level, would 
be helpful and is advantageous in that following a framework ensures that all elements playing a role in the 
management of national cybersecurity functions are considered. Examples of elements influencing the 
identification, selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions are national and international 
authoritative and normative sources, the dimensions (actors and stakeholders), domain of national cyber 
operations, and the national mandate to act in a specific way.  
 
Such a National Cybersecurity Management Framework would further provide a systematic and structured 
approach during the management of national Cybersecurity functions and provide a mechanism to facilitate 
budgeting estimates for the implementation of national cybersecurity functions. Nation-states thus need a  
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National Cybersecurity Management Framework to guide and steer them during the identification, selection, 
prioritisation, and implementation of national cybersecurity functions that are applicable, and specific to their 
countries. The aim of such a NCMF will be to improve a nation’s national cybersecurity posture. A NCMF 
should also be broad enough to be used by both developed and developing countries, and it should be flexible 
enough to be applied at both national and organisational level. Based on our experience, some of the 
characteristics that we would like to attribute to a NCMF are: 
 
• A NCMF must be able to scale to national level, while keeping international influences into consideration. 
• A NCMF must be flexible in order for it to adjust to changes in the nation states’ national, geopolitical and 
cybersecurity environment and resulting requirements. 
• A NCMF must be agile to guarantee a timeous response to cyber threats and changes in the nation state’s 
cybersecurity posture, and cybersecurity function requirements. 
 
With our experience in implementing frameworks at the national level, we have realised that any national 
framework with too many levels or steps are cumbersome and difficult to implement. Our experience, and 
coupled with these characteristic, impose a limit on the number of levels or steps that makes up an NCMF. 
Many levels or steps open up the framework for misinterpretation and make it difficult to implement the 
framework and measure progress.  
 
Experience further indicated that national frameworks need to be kept as simple as possible. This must be 
done in order to simplify its understanding and to allow the nation-state using the framework to quickly show 
progress and gains where it concerns the improvement of its national cybersecurity. Our NCMF intends to 
consider the needs and constraints of developing countries. Where it concerns the securing of national ICT 
assets and infrastructure, developing countries are constrained in terms of fiscal and skills resources. 
 
It may thus not be possible for developing countries to implement all the national cybersecurity functions that 
they identify with an NCMF. It is our experience that developing countries should start small, and follow a 
structured and phased approach when securing their national ICT assets and infrastructure. Taking into 
consideration their constraints, and based on our experience, it is recommended that developing countries 
only select one, or at most, two national cybersecurity functions for implementation at a time.  
 
Developing countries should further attempt to identify the overlapping services and technologies of their 
national cybersecurity functions, and combine these. Combining the services and technologies allows for one 
set of skills to be used to implement more than one function, and possibly use a single technology to enable 
more than one function. The cybersecurity services and technologies common to the selected national 
cybersecurity functions could be offered from a single, initial or start-up national cybersecurity structure to 
realise savings in terms of cost and skills needed.  
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Developing countries thus also need a best practice guide describing the implementation of an early or start-
up national cybersecurity structure from where common service processes and technologies are offered, 
which realises one, or two at the most, national cybersecurity functions. Combining common processes and 
technologies results in a cost saving. In doing so, developing countries will improve their national cybersecurity 
posture, while taking into consideration their fiscal and skills resource constraints.  
 
As part of this study, we will develop such a best practice guide. We call this structure an “early” structure 
since, for many developing nations, this will be the first national cybersecurity structure to be established. The 
intention is further that more functions may be added to, and offered from the “early” structure as the nation 
state’s cybersecurity journey matures. The implementation of this early or start-up national cybersecurity 
structure may be guided, and governed by a framework such as the NCMF.  The best practice guide describing 
the structure may use a model or models. A common denominator across all models is that some elements of 
the actual concept, or system to be constructed, are abstracted, or mapped onto the model [16]. Models can 
thus be used to define or imitate the mechanism and operation of a cybersecurity structure.  
 
Using a reference model during the implementation of a national cybersecurity structure may assist with 
budgeting for the national cybersecurity structure and its services. Another advantage of using a model is that 
it provides a baseline to measure the structure’s maturity against, and to ensure that consistent, repeatable 
and predictable results are achieved. A model describing such an initial or start-up national cybersecurity 
structure, offering services from multiple national cybersecurity functions - in the context of developing 
countries - could not be identified from existing literature. The discussion above leads to our Problem 
Statement. 
 
1.4 Problem statement 
 
Research problem 
A framework, dedicated to developing countries, to assist them with the national cybersecurity 
management tasks of the 
• identification,  
• selection 
• prioritisation, and 
• implementation 
of national cybersecurity, functions could not be identified from existing literature. We have consulted 
existing literature sources for reference models describing developing country-specific, initial or start-up 
national cybersecurity structures from where their national cybersecurity functions can be offered from. Our 
literature study did not reveal any such models. It is important to follow a reference framework or model 
during the execution of national cybersecurity management tasks. Not following a framework or model may 
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lead to disjointed efforts, misalignment between organs of state and state departments makes budgeting 
difficult, and lead to inconsistent, and non-repeatable results. This ultimately leads to wasted expenditure 
and a poor national cybersecurity effort. 
 
1.5 Objectives 
 
The problem statement defined in Section 1.4, leads to the following objective for this study. To address the 
problem, we have identified a Primary objective and a secondary objective. The two objectives are defined as 
follows: 
 
Objective 
Primary Objective: 
To develop a scalable and flexible framework (the NCMF) that can be used by developing countries to 
• Identify, 
• Select, 
• Prioritise, and 
• Implement national cybersecurity functions. 
 
We will illustrate the implementation part of the NCMF by proposing a best practice guide to be used during 
the implementation of new, national cybersecurity structures. This best practice guide will describe the national 
structure with three models. This leads to our Secondary Objective. 
 
Secondary Objective: 
To develop a comprehensive best practice guide that may be used during the implementation of national 
cybersecurity structures. We will develop three models as part of this best practice guide to describe the 
implementation of national cybersecurity structures. 
 
1.6 Approach 
 
The primary aim of this study is to provide a framework that can be used by developed and developing 
countries to improve their national cybersecurity posture in an effective, and cost and skills-efficient way. This 
framework is called the National Cybersecurity Management Framework (NCMF), and provides a framework 
to assist with the national cybersecurity management tasks.  
 
To illustrate the application of the implementation part of the NCMF, and as a secondary objective, a 
comprehensive best practice guide is developed that describes the implementation of national cybersecurity 
structures. The best practice guide will describe a newly conceived national cybersecurity structure with three  
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reference models: a capability development model (CDM), an operational model (OM) and a capability maturity 
model (CMM). This new structure is called the E-CMIRC (developed in Part 2 of this thesis). The plan-build-
run-monitor (PBRM) organisational approach is used as an overall guide to group the NCMF and E-CMIRC 
development activities. The approach is displayed in Figure 3.  
 
 
4 
 
 
Figure 3: Relationship Between NCMF and E-CMIRC 
 
Figure 3 illustrates that the NCMF will be applied to identify general or non-mandatory cybersecurity functions 
that are general in nature. We will use the NCMF in Chapter 3 to identify the general cybersecurity functions.  
We also illustrate that we will select two of the general functions, and identify their services and technologies 
with the intention of combining them, and then offer them from a newly envisioned national cybersecurity 
structure. This new structure, called the E-CMIRC, is described with three reference models. The first model  
                                                     
4 The general cybersecurity functions are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
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is the E-CMIRC Capability Development Model (CDM), describing the development of the structure. The 
second model is the E-CMIRC Operations Model (OM), describing the E-CMIRC operations. The third model 
is the E-CMIRC Maturity Model, describing the monitoring of the E-CMIRC structure’s maturity.  
 
We will now, in Section 1.7 introduce the approach we will follow to develop the NCMF. Our approach consist 
of five high-level steps, and these are discussed in more detail in the section following. 
 
1.7 NCMF development approach 
 
The NCMF will be developed using the approach described in the following five steps. 
 
Step 1: Identify an overarching, high-level organisational approach to be used to guide, but also constrain 
the development and scope of the NCMF. This overarching organisational approach will guide and 
steer the development of the NCMF and national structures. Our selected approach is discussed in        
Section 2.3. 
 
Step 2: Identify primary elements that could serve as input into the NCMF to aid in the identification of 
national (mandatory and non-mandatory) cybersecurity functions. These elements are national and 
international authoritative and normative sources applicable to the nation-state that applies the 
NCMF. The primary elements are introduced in Section 2.6. 
 
Step 3: Consider secondary elements that may influence the identification, selection and prioritisation of 
national cybersecurity functions. These are elements such as cybersecurity dimensions, mandates 
and domains. Dimensions describe the element or factor making up an entity, such as national 
cybersecurity, as well as its actors, while domains describe what actions can take place in a nation’s 
cyber environment. Mandates give the nation-state the authority to act in a specific way on its 
cybersecurity effort. Cybersecurity dimensions, mandates and domains are discussed in detail in 
Chapter 3 and influences, and informs the selection and prioritisation tasks 
  
Step 4: Consideration has to be given to the implementation, and monitoring of the NCMF as a framework 
itself, as well as the implementation of national cybersecurity functions. To achieve this, a national 
coordinating and controlling body needs to be put in place to manage the implementation and 
monitoring of the framework at the national level, and also to oversee the coordination of the 
implementation of national cybersecurity functions. The overall controlling body is introduced and is 
discussed in Section 5.4. 
 
Step 5: The development of the NCMF satisfies the plan function of the PBRM organisational approach in 
that the NCMF provides a framework that can be used to plan the execution of the cybersecurity 
management tasks. The mapping of the NCMF to the PBRM organisational approach is shown in  
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Figure 6 and described in Section 1.9. Once the national cybersecurity functions are identified, 
national cybersecurity structures are needed to offer those functions from. Step 5 identifies these 
national cybersecurity structures, and where none exists, envisions new national cybersecurity 
structures. The national cybersecurity structures are identified and discussed in Section 5.3.3. 
 
Our NCMF development approach is shown in Figure 4.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4: NCMF development approach 
 
1.8 Best practice guide for implementing national cybersecurity structures 
 
Our best practice guide will be used to illustrate and explain the implementation part of the NCMF by 
demonstrating the implementation of a new national cybersecurity structure. The E-CMIRC is such a newly 
envisioned, national cybersecurity structure. We will use the NCMF implementation part as guidance for the 
implementation of the E-CMIRC, while following the PBRM organisational approach.  The NCMF satisfies the 
Plan function of the PBRM organisational approach while the E-CMIRC will be described with three models, 
satisfying the Build, Run and Monitor functions of the PBRM organisational approach. We will describe our     
E-CMIRC with three models. The E-CMIRC and its descriptive models are developed using the approach 
described in the following steps. 
 
Step 1: Through the application of the NCMF, the most general cybersecurity functions will be identified. This 
will be achieved by identifying mandatory prescripts in national and international authoritative 
sources, as well as non-mandatory recommendations in national and international normative 
sources. From the functions identified, we will then identify the most commonly occurring functions 
to compile a list of general cybersecurity functions. The general functions are identified in Chapter 4.  
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In Section 1.3, we made the statement that it would not be viable for developing countries to 
implement all the identified national cybersecurity functions at once. The recommendation was made 
that developing countries should start small and follow a phased approach. Following these 
recommendations, only two of the general cybersecurity functions that will be identified during an 
illustrative application of the NCMF will be selected to develop the E-CMIRC by merging their 
services and technologies. The two selected functions are introduced in Sections 4.6.7 and 4.6.8, 
and are discussed in detail in Appendix B and Appendix C. 
 
Step 2: Existing cybersecurity structures offering the two selected national cybersecurity functions’ services 
are identified. The two structures’ functions are identified, analysed, and a combination of their 
functions is selected for the E-CMIRC. The identification of the two structure’s functions are done in 
Appendices B and C and combined for the E-CMIRC in Appendix D. 
 
Step 3: The services and technologies that deliver the functions offered from the two existing structures 
(which we will identify in Step 2) are identified and merged in Appendix D and a new national 
cybersecurity structure, the E-CMIRC is developed from where the merged cybersecurity services 
are offered from. In following the PBRM organisational approach, three models are developed to 
describe the E-CMIRC. The three models satisfy the build, run and monitor functions of the PBRM 
organisational approach as displayed in Figure 3. 
 
Step 4: In the fourth step, we will develop the first model. This model describes the development of the             
E-CMIRC structure and is called the E-CMIRC Capability Development Model (E-CMIRC CDM). This 
model satisfies the build function of the PBRM organisational approach and is developed in    
Appendix E. 
 
Step 5: In the fifth step, we develop the second model, and it describes the operationalisation of the                  
E-CMIRC. This model is named the E-CMIRC Operations Model (E-CMIRC OM), and satisfies the 
Run function of the PBRM organisational approach. This model is developed in Appendix F. 
 
Step 6: The third model is developed in step 6, and it describes how to measure and monitor the E-CMIRC’s 
capability maturity. This model is named the E-CMIRC Capability Maturity Model (E-CMIRC CMM). 
We develop this model in Appendix G. 
 
Our best practice guide development approach is shown in Figure 5.  
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Figure 5: E-CMIRC development approach 
 
Step 1 in Figure 5 shows that we will select two functions from the general and non-mandatory national 
cybersecurity functions we will identify in Chapter 3, to be used during the development of our E-CMIRC. In 
step 2 we will identify the two existing cybersecurity structures that deliver on the two selected national 
functions. Once we have identified the two structures, we will identify the structure-specific functions, and make 
a selection of the two structure’s functions to be offered by our E-CMIRC. In step 3 we identify the services 
that enable the structures functions, and make a selection of services to be offered from our E-CMIRC. We 
develop the E-CMIRC descriptive models during step 4 to step 6. 
 
1.9 Deliverables 
 
The primary deliverable to realise the objectives in Section 1.5 will, therefore, be an NCMF that can be used 
during the identification, selection, prioritisation, and implementation of cybersecurity functions. The framework 
provides a methodology to be followed during the management of cybersecurity functions. The NCMF 
identification part will be used to identify sources describing mandatory and non-mandatory cybersecurity 
functions.  
 
Primary deliverable 
The primary deliverable is a national cybersecurity management framework, the National Cybersecurity 
Management Framework (NCMF).  
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To illustrate the application of the “national cybersecurity function implementation” part of the framework (See 
Task 4), two of the identified general cybersecurity functions will be selected, and a best practice guide is 
proposed that describe the implementation of our new national cybersecurity structure, the E-CMIRC. Our 
implementation guide will describe this newly proposed national cybersecurity structure, with three models. 
The three models will be developed to describe the building, running and monitoring of the E-CMIRC structure.  
 
Secondary deliverable 
The secondary deliverable is comprehensive a best practice guide that describes the implementation of 
national cybersecurity structures. We will describe the implementation of a new structure called the Early 
Cybersecurity Monitoring and Incident Response Center (E-CMIRC). It is described using three reference 
models.  
 
The primary and secondary deliverables are displayed in Figure 6.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6: Primary and secondary deliverables 
 
Figure 6 shows that the primary deliverable is the NCMF. The development of the NCMF satisfies the Plan 
function of the PBRM organisational approach in that the NCMF provides a framework that can be used to 
plan the execution of the cybersecurity management tasks.  It further shows that the secondary deliverable is  
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a best practice guide that illustrates the implementation part of the NCMF. Our best practice guide will illustrate 
the implementation of a newly conceived national cybersecurity structure called the E-CMIRC. Three models 
describe the E-CMIRC structure. Once the national cybersecurity functions are identified, national 
cybersecurity structures are needed to offer those functions from.  
 
1.10 Research design and methodology 
 
We will be following three approaches during our research. The three approaches are: 
 
• Conduct a thorough and comprehensive literature study. 
• Develop an artefact, the NCMF. 
• Illustrate the application of the NCMF’s implementation part through the development of a best practice  
guide to implementing national cybersecurity structures. This guide will demonstrate the implementation 
of a newly conceived national cybersecurity structure called the E-CMIRC and is our second artefact. 
 
This study will utilise the following research methodologies described next [17]. 
 
1.10.1 Theory building research 
 
The research will focus on the availability of existing sources that are available for use during the identification, 
selection, prioritisation, and implementation of national cyber security functions, and applicable to developing 
countries. In terms of the E-CMIRC structure’s models that will be developed as part of our best practice guide, 
research will be conducted on available models that can be used for the implementation of an early, or initial 
national cybersecurity structure in developing countries. From this research, the required elements for 
constructing a framework and a new structure, with descriptive models, will be identified. 
 
1.10.2 Theory testing research 
 
Applying this methodology, existing national cybersecurity functional prescripts, and its influencing elements 
will be identified from the sources identified during the theory-building research. This will provide a starting 
point for us to identify some of the function’s complementary structures, with its services and technologies 
needed, to allow us to develop the E-CMIRC’s models. In the absence of existing national cybersecurity 
prescripts that are applicable to developing countries, industry best practices, standards and frameworks will 
be identified and analysed to assist with the development of the initial or early national cyber defence 
monitoring and incident response structure. 
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1.10.3 Theory application research 
 
We will then construct the framework and models that make up our best practice guide using the elements 
identified. The framework and E-CMIRC models will be developed using existing and proven publicly available 
frameworks, standards and best practices.  
 
1.11 Structure of this thesis 
 
The remainder of this study is structured according to the visual representation provided in Figure 7. This figure 
will be inserted at the beginning of every Chapter to contextualise our progress. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Study roadmap 
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Figure 7 shows that this study is divided into two parts. Part 1 covers the development of the NCMF. 
The NCMF satisfies the plan function of the PBMR organisational approach, and it will be used to 
identify, select and prioritise national cybersecurity functions. During the discussion of Part 1, we will 
apply the NCMF to identify some of the most general cybersecurity functions that are found across 
national and international authoritative and normative sources (describing non-mandatory and 
mandatory cybersecurity functions). We will then select two of these functions to be offered from a 
new structure. 
 
Part 2 covers the development of our best practice guide that can be used during the implementation 
of national cybersecurity structures. Our best practice guide will demonstrate the implementation of 
a newly conceived national cybersecurity structure, the E-CMIRC. The E-CMIRC is described with 
three models, and in Appendix A, we propose a model to be used during the building of the structure 
from where the two selected general functions will be offered from. In Appendix B, we propose a 
model to be used during the running of the structure built in Appendix A. Appendix C covers the 
monitoring function, and we propose a model to monitor and improve the processes of the structure 
we have built.  
 
Part 1: NCMF 
 
In this thesis, we will focus, and spend more time on Part 1. Our motivation is as follows: 
 
• Our aim, and primary deliverable is to develop a framework that can assist with cybersecurity 
management tasks at the national level.  
• The framework satisfies the plan function of the PBMR organisational approach. Planning for the 
management of national cybersecurity functions is the first function to be completed, and is of paramount 
importance. We will develop a best practice guide to illustrate the implementation part of the NCMF. Our  
best practice guide will demonstrate the implementation of the E-CMIRC. This demonstration will be done 
through the development of three models describing the building, running and monitoring parts of the 
PBRM organisational approach. Nation states might however choose their own approach where it 
concerns the building, running and monitoring of cybersecurity structures. This is our secondary 
deliverable, and the best practice guide and E-CMIRC are not discussed in as much detail as the NCMF.  
 
Chapter 2 – The NCMF: This chapter introduces and motivates the development of the NCMF. We introduce 
and define the terms “cybersecurity functions,” “services,” “capabilities” and “structures.” We illustrate some of 
the benefits to be gained by using a framework such as the NCMF, as well as the sources to be consulted by 
the NCMF during the identification of national cybersecurity functions. The NCMF is briefly introduced in this 
chapter. 
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Chapter 3 – The NCMF Level 1: Chapter 3 is dedicated to the development of level 1 of the NCMF. We start 
with a motivation for the existence of the NCMF’s first level, as well as introducing authoritative and normative 
sources. Elements that could further influence the identification of national cybersecurity functions are 
identified and discussed. These elements are the dimensions, domains and mandates the NCMF could 
operate in. In Chapter 3, we also propose a stakeholder and actor identification template, as well as a domain 
function, structure and actor identification template to assist with the identification of national actors.                    
Chapter 3 ends with a high-level introduction to general cybersecurity functions. 
 
Chapter 4 – General Cybersecurity Functions: This chapter introduces and describes the general 
cybersecurity functions that we have identified using level 1 of the NCMF. Two of these functions will be 
selected, and their services and technologies combined to be offered from a newly envisioned national 
cybersecurity structure. This is done to illustrate the application of level 4 to level 6 of the NCMF. 
 
Chapter 5 – The NCMF Level 2 to Level 6: Chapter 5 starts with motivating the existence of level 2 to level 
6 of the NCMF. We then continue with the development of level 2 to level 6, with each level discussed 
individually.  
 
Chapter 6 – Sample application of the NCMF in South Africa: Here we provide a sample application of the 
NCMF in the context of South Africa as a developing country. We end the chapter by proposing an 
implementation plan to be followed during the implementation of the NCMF. 
 
Chapter 7 – Closure: This chapter provides an overview on the NCMF and maps the objectives to the 
outcomes. We will also be introducing our future work here. 
 
Part 2: National Cybersecurity Structure Best Practice Implementation Guide 
 
In this study, and during the development of our best practice guide, we will treat the E-CMIRC structure as a 
system. The development thereof could thus be done according to systems engineering (SE) principles, or by 
using an enterprise architecture (EA) approach. Whether an SE or EA approach is followed it depends on the 
outcomes we want to achieve. If the outcome is a new system, we will use SE principles. If the outcome is to 
integrate services, processes and technologies into existing services and processes, we will follow an EA 
approach. It is our experience that SE is useful in the development of specific technologies or systems, and 
EA is useful when developing and integrating new or existing cybersecurity services, processes and 
technologies into existing business processes.  
 
Because we view the E-CMIRC as a system, we will follow SE principles to identify its functional requirements. 
An EA approach may be followed to integrate E-CMIRC services, processes and technologies after its 
establishment. In following an SE approach, the E-CMIRC structure’s functional requirements will be identified, 
based on the national requirements of developing countries, and as expressed in prescripts found in legislation,  
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adopted standards and regulations. These national cybersecurity structure functional requirements are unique 
for each developing country. 
 
Appendix A – Introduction to SOCs and CSIRTs: Appendix A introduces SOCs and CSIRTs at a high level. 
We are doing this to provide the reader with a better understanding of the SOC and CSIRT structures, 
functions, types and authority levels that follows in Appendices B and C. 
 
Appendix B – SOCs: This appendix introduces the monitoring and evaluation function’s structure. This 
structure is normally the security operations centre (SOC). The SOC is a most often a team of people, using 
specific technologies and processes to monitor for, and react to threats. We will introduce and identify the 
SOC’s functions in this appendix. 
 
Appendix C – CSIRTs: This appendix introduces the incident handling cybersecurity function’s structure. The 
structure from where the incident handling cybersecurity function is offered from, is normally the            
Computer Security Incident Response Team (CSIRT). The CSIRT is a team of people using technology and 
processes to perform cybersecurity incident handling. The CSIRT functions are identified in this Appendix. The 
SOC and CSIRT functions are compared and similarities are identified. This provides us with a list of SOC and 
CSIRT functions. From this list, functions are selected for the E-CMIRC. 
 
Appendix D – E-CMIRC cybersecurity services: This appendix identifies the complementary services of the 
E-CMIRC functions. Common and unique services and technologies are identified, and from these, some 
services are selected to be offered from the E-CMIRC structure. 
 
Appendix E – Build: E-CMIRC Capability Development Model: The E-CMIRC CDM is developed in this 
Appendix. We introduce capability development models, and one model is selected, and its use for the 
development of the E-CMIRC CDM is motivated. The E-CMIRC CDM and E-CMIRC OM are presented as a 
single model. 
 
Appendix F – Run: E-CMIRC Operations Model:  In this appendix, the E-CMIRC Operations Model is 
developed. The available operational models are introduced, and one model is selected and motivated for use 
in the development of the E-CMIRC OM. The rationale for presenting the E-CMIRC CDM and OM as a single 
model is that E-CMIRC services will be prescriptive regarding the capability development requirements, which 
in turn influences the operations model. 
 
Appendix G – Monitor: E-CMIRC Capability Maturity Model: We will develop the E-CMIRC Capability 
Maturity Model in this appendix. This appendix introduces available capability maturity models, and one is 
selected and motivated for use in the development of the E-CMIRC CMM.  
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Appendix H – National Cybersecurity Risk Management Guide: This appendix proposes a national 
cybersecurity risk management guide. This guide may be useful for nation states that do not have an existing  
national cybersecurity risk management strategy and process. The intention is for our national cybersecurity 
risk management guide to be used to select and prioritise national cybersecurity functions for implementation. 
 
Appendix I – NCMF implementation plan for South Africa: In this appendix, we propose a plan on how to 
implement the NCMF in South Africa. We also provide critical success factors to consider when implementing 
the NCMF. 
 
1.12 Research output  
 
In this section, we introduce our research output at the point of submission. The focus of our past research 
had mainly been on SOCs and the development of SOC models. Research not directly related to this study 
contributed in terms of the knowledge we have gained on frameworks and models, as well as operational 
aspects of security management. 
  
1.12.1 Articles and presentations by the author directly related to this study  
 
Our study resulted in the articles and presentations listed below. The knowledge gained during this research 
was used in the writing of this thesis, and we also used it as a mechanism to validate our models with peers. 
These articles influenced our thesis, and valuable knowledge was gained in terms of SOC and CSIRT 
functions, as well as the development of frameworks and models. The articles below is a direct result of this 
study.  
 
1. Framework for the implementation of business cybersecurity 
 
Author(s):  PC Jacobs (Presenter), MM Grobler, SH von Solms 
Date:   12 - 13 May 2016 
Type: Conference 
London, United Kingdom: International conference on Business and Cyber Security (ICBCS) 
Article: 
(https://www.researchgate.net/publication/305769629_Towards_a_framework_for_the_ 
development_of_business_cybersecurity_capabilities) 
DOI: 10.13140/RG.2.1.5110.0406 
Relevance Chapter 2 and 4: This article applied the NCMF in an organisational environment, thus 
demonstrating its breadth and flexibility. 
Abstract Information and communications technology is often seen as a critical organisational asset. 
To prevent loss of revenue and money, as well as to protect organisational reputation, this 
asset must be protected from threats and vulnerabilities. Organisations use different  
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standards, frameworks and best practices when addressing cybersecurity. These 
governance documents could be chosen based on legislative or corporate governance 
requirements, and are most often industry specific. These documents typically prescribe sets  
of controls to be implemented, such as technical controls, administrative controls and physical 
controls. Most of these documents also describe very specific capabilities that a business has 
to develop in securing their cyber domain. Capabilities, consisting of people, processes and 
technology, are meant to achieve outcomes or effects, and are applicable to the operational 
domain. Initial research has shown that no cybersecurity capability development framework 
applicable to the business domain exists. In this article, a framework called the Business 
Cybersecurity Capability Development Framework (BCCapDev framework) is proposed. In 
developing the BCCapDev, a modular approach is followed, starting with the identification of 
requirements for such a framework. Input into the BCCapDev framework such as legal 
requirements and business governance requirements are identified. Existing standards, 
frameworks and best practices are consulted, and capabilities identified, as well as actors 
and stakeholders. Mechanisms to align BCCapDev processes with business are identified, 
as well as a methodology to build the capability. The framework is developed in such a way 
that it is modular, reusable, and independent to changes in standards, frameworks or best 
practices. The BCCapDev is also developed flexible enough to be industry neutral. 
  
2. E-CMIRC – Towards a model for the integration of services between SOCs and CSIRTs 
 
Author(s):  
 
PC Jacobs (presenter), SH von Solms, MM Grobler 
Date:   25 – 26 July 2016 
Type: Conference 
Munich, Germany: 15th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (ECCWS-
2016) (Refereed and Published) 
DOI: 978-1-910810-96-5 
Relevance Appendix D: This article presented an integrated services model for SOCs and CSIRTs. This 
knowledge was used during the identification and selection of services to be offered from the 
E-CMIRC. 
Abstract Security Operation Centres (SOCs) and Computer Security Incident Response Teams 
(CSIRTs) or Computer Emergency Response Teams (CERTs) can play a pivotal role in the 
monitoring of, and response to threats, attacks and vulnerabilities in organisations, including 
governments. While the focus of a SOC is on the monitoring of technical security controls and 
critical assets, and the response to attacks and threats, CSIRTs’ main focus is on response 
and incident management. One postulation is that a CSIRT or CERT is a highly specialised 
sub-capability of a SOC, whereas another postulation could be that a SOC serves as an input 
mechanism into CSIRTs and CERTs. In this paper, the differences between SOCs, CERTs 
and CSIRTs are established, and synergies between them are defined. This leads to an  
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integrated services model for the establishment of an initial SOC and CSIRT capability in 
developing countries. Developing countries have unique challenges facing them where it 
concerns cybersecurity. Aspects such as Information Communication and Technology (ICT) 
Infrastructure is often a challenge, and so is funding for ICT as well as skills. Political instability 
could also influence the cybersecurity posture of developing countries by leaving developing 
nations open to malicious state-sponsored attacks. This SOC and CSIRT capability are made 
viable and possible through the savings in cost and resources by identifying overlapping 
services, as well as the application of the proposed model. This emergent SOC and CSIRT 
combined capability is called the Embryonic Cyberdefense Monitoring and Incident Response 
Centre (E-CMIRC). The purpose of this paper is to identify a high-level integrated services 
model for the E-CMIRC in order to reduce cost and resources which serves as a barrier to 
entry in developing countries. A scalable operational framework is identified, and for the 
management of the effectiveness and efficiency, and also to ensure that all aspects of service 
delivery are considered, the Information Technology Information Library (ITIL) is proposed. 
 
3. Towards a National Cybersecurity Capability Development Model 
 
Author(s):  PC Jacobs (presenter), SH von Solms, MM Grobler 
Date:   28 – 30 July 2017 
Type: 
 
 
 
Conference 
Dublin, Ireland: 16th European Conference on Cyber Warfare and Security (ECCWS) 2017 
(Refereed and Published) 
ISBN: 2048-8602 
Relevance Appendix E: The knowledge gained with this article was applied during the development of 
the E-CMIRC CDM. 
Abstract Nations need to develop cybersecurity capabilities at the national level in order to facilitate 
the requirements expressed through national authoritative and normative documents. These 
national cybersecurity capabilities typically consist of people, processes and technology or 
tools. From the research conducted, no publicly available models or frameworks for national  
cybersecurity capability development could be found. In this paper, the authors identify and 
compare existing military capability development models and propose a national 
cybersecurity capability development model based on these models. Military capability 
development frameworks are a comprehensive way to define work deliverables and work 
standards and provides a way to measure the work deliverables (eWorks Moodle, 2016). The 
use of such a national cybersecurity capability development model is advantageous during 
the planning phase of the national cybersecurity capability. For example, the using of a model 
allows for a capability to be broken down into its components; a model serves as a blueprint 
to ensure that those building the capability considers all components, allows for cost 
estimation and facilitates the evaluation of trade-offs. One national cybersecurity capability –  
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the incident management cybersecurity capability - is selected to illustrate the application of 
the national cybersecurity capability development model.  
 
This model was developed as part of previous research and is called the Embryonic 
Cyberdefence Monitoring and Incident Response Centre (E-CMIRC) (P. Jacobs; S.H. von 
Solms & M.M. Grobler, 2016). The characteristics of national incident management 
cybersecurity incidents have to be determined, as these would affect each component of the 
military-based national cybersecurity capability development model. Once the national 
cybersecurity capability components are identified using the military-based cybersecurity 
capability development model, it also has to be operated. To achieve this requirement, 
available organisational, operational models are identified and compared, and one operating 
model is selected to augment the national cybersecurity capability development model. The 
fusion of the military-based national cybersecurity capability development model with the 
operations models results in the national military-based cybersecurity capability development 
model. This paper has three outcomes in mind: firstly, to determine the characteristics of 
national cybersecurity incidents, secondly, the development of the national cybersecurity 
capability development model, and thirdly, the development of a national cybersecurity 
capability operational model. This paper describes the methodology followed in describing 
the E-CMIRC structure using a capability development framework, and organisational, 
operational models. The national cybersecurity capability development model – using a 
military capability development framework - and the national cybersecurity capability 
operational models derived from existing organisational frameworks, are presented as a 
single, integrated model. 
 
1.12.2 Articles and presentations by the author relevant to this study  
 
The articles and presentations below is not a direct result of this study, but the knowledge gained here was 
used during the writing of this thesis. 
 
4. Classification of security operations centres 
 
Author(s):  PC Jacobs (Presenter); A Arnab; B Irwin 
Date:   14-16 August 2013 
Type: Conference 
Pretoria, South Africa 
Article 
DOI: 978-1-4799-0808-0 
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Relevance 
 
Appendix G: Monitoring and evaluation function: This article identified SOC functions and 
services, and proposed a framework to be used for classifying SOCs. This information is used 
in Appendix G. 
Abstract Security Operation Centers (SOCs) are a necessary service for organisations that want to 
address compliance and threat management. While there are frameworks in existence that 
address the technology aspects of these services, a holistic framework addressing 
processes, staffing and technology currently do not exist. Additionally, it would be useful for 
organisations and constituents considering building, buying or selling these services to 
measure the effectiveness and maturity of the provided services. In this paper, we propose a 
classification and rating scheme for SOC services, evaluating both the capabilities and the 
maturity of the services offered. 
 
5. Towards a Secure Datacenter Model 
 
Author(s):  PC Jacobs; B van Niekerk 
Date:   01 August 2015 
Type: Journal Article 
ISACA Journal Volume 3  
Article: (https://www.isaca.org/Journal/archives/2015/Volume-3/Documents/Toward-a-
Secure-Data-Center-Model_joa_Eng_0515.pdf) 
ISSN: 1944-1967 
Relevance Appendix E, F and G: The knowledge we gained in developing models is applied in Appendix 
E, F and G. during the development of the E-CMIRC models. 
Abstract According to a survey by Infonetics Research, companies operating their own data centres 
spent an average of US $17 million on security products in 2013. The top drivers, according 
to respondents, were the need to protect virtualised servers, upgrade security products to 
match network performance and obtain new threat protection technologies. Most modern data 
centres use virtualised servers. This technology allows multiple servers to run on a single  
hardware instance. The fact that all server instances, as well as databases, are now flat files 
dramatically increases the attack vector. It also opens up additional avenues of attack that 
could not be used in normal data centres (such as dark virtual machines [VMs] and VM  
sprawl). It is also true that virtualisation drives cloud, and cloud, in turn, enables and drives 
mobility. This has unique challenges in a military environment or high-security organisational 
setting where the security requirements are more stringent than those in the majority of 
organizations in the private sector. 
 
While this article focuses on military-grade data centres, this does not exclude corporate data 
centres. For certain projects, defence contractors are required to maintain military-grade 
security for data centres relevant to the project. Many other corporate entities that handle  
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sensitive or critical information or services may also choose to implement military-grade 
security in their data centres. Such entities may include financial companies and critical 
infrastructure providers such as telecommunications or power companies. Pharmaceutical 
companies that conduct research and development can benefit from implementing military-
grade data centre security to protect their intellectual property. Many of these types of 
companies are targeted by cyberespionage campaigns using advanced persistent threats 
(APTs) 
 
6. Cloud-based security mechanisms for critical information infrastructure protection 
 
Author(s):  B van Niekerk (Presenter); PC Jacobs 
Date:   25-27 November. 2015 
Type: Conference 
Pretoria, South Africa: 2013 International Conference on Adaptive Science and Article 
(Published). 
ISBN: 978-1-4799-3067-8 
Relevance Chapter 4, Appendix B, C and D: The article presented cloud-based monitoring and incident 
handling function. The knowledge gained here was applied in Chapter 4 during the 
identification of national cybersecurity functions, as well as the identification of the services 
supporting the incident handling function and monitoring and evaluate function. 
Abstract In this paper, the suitability of cloud-based security services (SECaaS) for critical information 
infrastructure protection (CIIP) is discussed. A background of cloud-based security services  
is provided. The suitability of these services for CIIP is discussed, and it is concluded that a 
mixed cloud and traditional solution is best. A model for providing cloud-based protection to 
critical infrastructure in this manner is proposed. 
 
7. SOCs and CSIRTs - a view from a SAPS perspective 
 
Author(s):  PC Jacobs (presenter) 
Date:   16 January 2016    
Type: Conference 
Irene, Centurion:  South African Police Service (Hawks) Cybercrime Conference Presentation  
TOdB Pub 
number: 
(TOdB Pub number: CSIR/DPSS/ISG/EXP/2015/0102/A) 
Relevance Appendix D: The knowledge gained here was used during the identification of SOC and 
CSIRT services in Appendix D. 
Abstract A classification guide will allow SOCs as well as prospective clients the opportunity to 
measure themselves and to improve where necessary, and will supply consumers of SOC 
services with a reference as to the effectiveness of the service that they procure. We present  
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a model to measure the effectiveness and capabilities of a SOC, through three aspects. 
These are the functional requirements of SOC services; the measures of effectiveness of 
functional requirements; and the maturity of SOC functional requirements. 
 
8. Threat mitigation and detection of cyber warfare and terrorism activities 
 
Author(s):  MM Grobler, PC Jacobs, B van Niekerk 
Date:   28 – 30 July 2017 
Type: Chapter 2 p 21 - 51: Cyber Security Centres for Threat Detection and Mitigation 
DOI: 
ISBN: 
10.4018/978-1-5225-1938-6 
9781522519386 
Relevance Appendix B to G: The knowledge gained during the writing of his book chapter was applied 
during the identification of monitoring and incident handling services at national level, and 
during the development of the E-CMIRC reference models. 
Abstract Technology provides numerous opportunities for positive developments in modern society; 
however, these venues inevitably increase vulnerability to threats in online environments. 
Addressing issues of security in the cyber realm is increasingly relevant and critical to society. 
Threat Mitigation and Detection of Cyber Warfare and Terrorism Activities is a comprehensive 
reference source for the latest scholarly perspectives on countermeasures and related 
methods to enhance security and protection against criminal activities online. Highlighting a 
range of topics relevant to secure computing, such as parameter tampering, surveillance and 
control, and digital protests, this book is ideally designed for academics, researchers, 
graduate students, professionals, and practitioners actively involved in the expanding field of 
cyber security. 
 
1.13  Conclusion 
 
Developing countries face unique challenges where it concerns their national cybersecurity function 
management tasks. Some of these challenges are a lack of skills, and not enough fiscal resources. During a 
comprehensive literature survey, no framework to assist with the national cybersecurity management tasks of 
identification, selection, prioritisation and implementation of national cybersecurity functions, could be 
identified. In this study, a conceptual Framework is developed to assist with the management tasks associated 
with national cybersecurity functions. The Framework is the NCMF, and it satisfies the plan function of the 
PBRM organisational approach. This Framework will be developed in Part 1. 
 
In this thesis, the framework process to identify nation state mandatory cybersecurity functions that are  specific 
and applicable to nation states in nature, as well as general cybersecurity functions that are non-mandatory in 
nature is explained. The NCMF will then be applied to identify the most general cybersecurity functions from  
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national and international authoritative and normative sources (describing non-mandatory and mandatory 
cybersecurity functions). To illustrate the implementation part of the NCMF, a new national cybersecurity 
structure is envisioned to offer some of the identified general cybersecurity functions. 
 
From the identified general cybersecurity functions, we will select two, and their services and technologies are 
merged. A single, new national cybersecurity structure is developed from where the merged services are being 
offered. This new national cybersecurity structure is called the E-CMIRC. The E-CMIRC is developed in         
Part 2. 
 
The building, running and monitoring of the E-CMIRC will be described through the development of three 
reference models. These are the E-CMIRC Capability Development Model, the E-CMIRC Operations Model 
and the E-CMIRC Capability Maturity Model. These three models satisfy the build, run and monitor functions 
of the PBMR organisational approach. 
 
Chapter 2 introduces the NCMF at a high level. The NCMF will be used as a guide during the national 
cybersecurity function management tasks of identification selection, prioritisation, and implementation of 
national cybersecurity functions. 
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Chapter 2: The National Cybersecurity Management Framework (NCMF) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
The main objective of Chapter 2 is to provide a high-level introduction of the NCMF. The aim is to 
aid the reader to obtain a better understanding the detailed discussion of the NCMF in the following 
Chapters. The NCMF is a layered framework, consisting of six sequential levels. Due to its 
foundational nature, level 1 is introduced and discussed in detail in its own Chapter - Chapter 3, 
while level 2 to level 6 are introduced and discussed in Chapter 5.  
 
This chapter will introduce a high-level organisational framework that we will use to guide us during 
the development of the NCMF. To understand the NCMF, it is important to have an understanding 
of the terminology used during its development, such as functions, services, capabilities and 
structures. The statement was made in Section 1.3 that the NCMF is developed as a framework to 
manage national cybersecurity functions, and that there are four tasks associated with the 
management of national cybersecurity functions. These four tasks are the: 
 
• Task 1: Identification,  
• Task 2: Selection, 
• Task 3: Prioritisation, and, 
• Task 4: Implementation of national cybersecurity functions. 
 
It will be explained in Section 2.4 that national cybersecurity functions consist of services, and that 
these services are made up of capabilities. The services realising these functions are offered from 
national cybersecurity structures. It is thus necessary to have a good understanding, and a common 
definition of the terms “cybersecurity functions”, “cybersecurity services” and “cybersecurity 
capabilities” before introducing the high-level overview of the NCMF. Chapter 2 starts by motivating 
the development of an NCMF, and then introduce, and define the terms cybersecurity functions”, 
“cybersecurity services” and “cybersecurity capabilities” since an understanding of these terms is 
key to the understanding the NCMF. Chapter 2 is structured as follows: 
 
Section 2.2 - This section provides a motivation for the development of an NCMF. 
 
Section 2.3 - Introduces and motivates our high-level organisational framework for use during the 
development of the NCMF. 
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Section 2.4 - This section introduces and defines the terms cybersecurity function, cybersecurity 
service and cybersecurity capabilities to foster a common understanding of the framework terms, 
and its elements. 
 
Section 2.5 - Contextualises functions, services and capabilities for South Africa as a developing 
country. 
 
Section 2.6 - This section provides background information on frameworks in general, and the 
benefits realised by using them. The terms authoritative and normative sources are also introduced 
in this section. These sources contain important national and international cybersecurity prescripts, 
and they serve as the primary source from where mandatory national cybersecurity functions are 
identified from. 
 
Section 2.7 - Introduces and advances the understanding of mandatory and non-mandatory 
cybersecurity functions. 
 
Section 2.8 - Introduces elements such as dimensions, mandates and domains that may influence 
the NCMF, and the identification, selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions. 
 
Section 2.9 - This section introduces the six levels of the NCMF, and it provides a high-level 
overview of each of the six levels. The NCMF’s six levels are mapped back to the four national 
cybersecurity management tasks of the NCMF. 
 
Section 2.10 - Provides an overview of the differences between NCMF levels 5 and 6 prescripts. 
 
Section 2.11 - Provides a mapping of the NCMF levels to its explicit functions. 
 
Section 2.12 - Concludes this chapter. 
 
Section 2.2 will provide a motivation for the development of the NCMF. The term “framework” is 
defined, and we then highlight some of the benefits realised by using a framework during the 
identification of national cybersecurity functions. 
 
2.2 Motivation for the development of an NCMF 
 
In Section 1.3 the necessity for a National Cybersecurity Management Framework (NCMF) was 
motivated. Such a framework can assist to guide and steer both developed and developing  
 
A National Cybersecurity Management Framework for Developing Countries 
 
33 
  
The National Cybersecurity Management Framework 
 
countries during the cybersecurity management tasks of identifying, selecting, prioritising, and 
implementing cybersecurity functions.  
 
The Oxford dictionary defines a framework as "a set of beliefs, ideas or rules that are used as the 
basis for making judgements, decisions, etc.” [18]. A frameworks is intended to be used as a 
reference when planning or building something [19]. Frameworks do not provide instructions on 
how to plan or develop something, but it serves as guidance during the planning and development 
process. Accordingly, frameworks should be flexible and fluid in terms of situational                  
requirements [19].  
 
Using an NCMF to assist with the cybersecurity management tasks reduces costs,  in that only 
applicable and relevant national cybersecurity functions are selected for implementation. The use 
of an NCMF will also lead to repeatable, consistent and sustainable results when implementing 
national cybersecurity functions. Advantages of using a framework such as the NCMF are that            
it [19]: 
 
• Provides a mechanism to consider - and align with - all relevant national legislation and 
regulations when identifying national cybersecurity functions. 
• Allows for the consideration of national and international ICT security and cybersecurity best 
practices and allow for the maximisation of the strengths of each where appropriate. 
• Provides a mechanism for nation states to demonstrate their security efforts, and in the process, 
foster trust between trade partners. 
• Ensures a consistent experience for the population interacting with national cybersecurity 
functions and structures. 
• Promotes consistent service delivery from national cybersecurity structures to the population. 
• Provides a common language when referencing aspects of the cybersecurity function under 
planning, or during implementation. 
• Allows repeatable and consistent delivery and outcome of the cybersecurity functions during 
implementation. 
• Promotes predictable budgeting. 
 
Now that we have discussed the benefits to be gained by using an NCMF, we will discuss and 
select a high-level organisational approach to guide us during the development of the NCMF. 
 
2.3 Selecting a high-level organisational approach 
 
An organisational structure is usually associated with how the lines of authority, duties and channels 
of communication within an organisation are arranged. It determines the assignment of roles and  
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responsibilities, and also coordination and control structures. The organisational structure is 
influenced by the organisation’s strategy and objectives [20]. Structuring an organisation thus 
provides stakeholders with different perspectives to view their organisation from [21].  
 
Organisational structures help to define the parameters that are needed at government or 
organisational level to achieve the organisation or national objectives. A high-level organisational 
approach should describe the distribution of authority, the assignment of responsibility and 
departmental involvement that is needed during the development and national implementation of 
cybersecurity functions. This high-level organisational approach should also prioritise the tasks 
needed to realise an end-goal, and determine the tasks ranking [22]. 
 
Using an organisational approach based on technology when developing national IT systems has 
limitations in terms of scalability, changes in technology, innovation, and expectations of 
stakeholders. It is, therefore, preferable to use an organisational approach based on functions. 
Using a functional instead of a technological approach addresses the limitations of following a 
technological approach. Such a functional approach is the Plan-Build-Run-Monitor approach [23]. 
 
The build function of the plan-build-run-monitor approach describes the technology and resources 
needed to build structures, and we will use the Build function to describe a national cybersecurity 
structure. The run function of the plan-build-run-monitor approach describes the operation and 
management of structures, and we will be using the build function to describe the operation and 
management of a national cybersecurity structure. Both the build and run functions may be 
described with a model, and due to the overlap between some structure’s technology and resources 
(build function), and its supportive processes and procedures (run function), it is possible to 
describe them using a single, integrated model.  
 
The monitor function of the plan-build-run-monitor approach describes the continuous monitoring 
and improvement of structures such as national cybersecurity structures. We will be using the 
monitor function to describe the continuous monitoring and improvement of a national cybersecurity 
structure. This function may also be described with a model [24].  
 
To achieve the advantages mentioned in Section 2.2, and after our description of the PBRM 
organisational approach in Section 2.3, it is important to now foster a common understanding of the 
terms cybersecurity functions, services and capabilities. This allows the reader to accurately 
understand and interpret the intention and meaning of the terms as they are used throughout the 
thesis. This needs to be done early, and before introducing the NCMF in detail. Therefore, Section 
2.4 defines cybersecurity functions, services and capabilities. These concepts are pivotal to 
understanding and interpreting the NCMF. 
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2.4 Defining cybersecurity functions, services and capabilities 
 
In this section, the terms “cybersecurity functions,” “cybersecurity services,” “cybersecurity  
capabilities” and “cybersecurity structures” are introduced and defined. To foster a common 
understanding, and to avoid ambiguity in the interpretation of the terms functions, services, 
capabilities and structures, these terms are now defined. 
 
2.4.1 Cybersecurity functions 
 
A function describes work or operations that must be performed to achieve a mission, or accomplish 
a national responsibility [25], [26]. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines a function as “the action 
for which a person or thing is specially fitted or used or for which a thing exists” [27]. 
BusinessDictionary defines a function as "an action performed by a device, department, or person 
that produces a result. Function remains more or less fixed whereas the purpose (which indicates 
intention or objective) generally changes." [28] Synonyms for the meaning of the word “function”, is 
“objective” or “purpose” [29].  
 
Using a SOC as an example, one of a SOCs functions is to monitor for threats and vulnerabilities. 
For the purpose of this study, and to create a common understanding, the term national 
cybersecurity function is defined as follows to ensure a constant interpretation, and to prevent 
ambiguity when referring to the term cybersecurity function: 
 
National cybersecurity function 
A national cybersecurity function describes work to be performed by governments, and their 
responsibilities in securing the national cyberspace. National cybersecurity functions are 
enabled through national cybersecurity services.  
 
2.4.2 Cybersecurity services 
 
Considering the definition of a national cybersecurity function, we see that national cybersecurity 
functions are realised through cybersecurity services. Our understanding is supported by Graves 
[7]. The cybersecurity services are offered from national cybersecurity structures. A service 
describes work that supports functions. Services thus realise functions. National cybersecurity 
functions consist of national cybersecurity services. 
 
In keeping with using a SOC as an example, some of the services provided by a SOC in support 
of the monitoring function, is the monitoring and review the logs of security controls, or to review  
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sources for threat intelligence, and then to report on this information. In the development of the 
NCMF, and during its implementation, the term national cybersecurity service is defined as follows: 
 
National cybersecurity service 
A national cybersecurity service is work performed at national level to enable a national 
cybersecurity function. Cybersecurity services are intangible, and can be described as a 
valuable effort or action that satisfies a function, need or demand. National cybersecurity 
services consist of capabilities. 
 
2.4.3 Cybersecurity capabilities 
 
At a more granular level, a service consists of capabilities [7]. Capabilities, in turn, are made up of 
people, processes and technology [30]. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines a capability as 
“the facility or potential for an indicated use or deployment” [31] while the Systems Engineering 
Body of Knowledge (SEBoK) defines a capability as “a range of systems, processes, people, 
information and organizations.” [32]. A capability refers to the ability of a system or structure to 
perform certain actions, and achieve specific outcomes. The SOC monitoring and reporting services 
thus consist of the people (SOC engineers), technology (the technology most commonly found in a 
SOC is the security incident and event monitoring technology) and processes (the monitoring and 
reporting process). The following definition is provided to ensure a common understanding of the 
term cybersecurity capability. 
 
National cybersecurity capability 
A national cybersecurity capability refers to the achievement of specific actions and outcomes 
in the cybersecurity domain. National cybersecurity capabilities support national cybersecurity 
services. A national cybersecurity capability consists of people, processes and tools or 
technology6, and is performed from a system or structure. 
 
2.5 Contextualising functions, services and capabilities 
 
Figure 8, as taken from Graves [7], illustrates that a function is realised through services. It shows 
further that service consists of capabilities, and that a capability is made up of people, processes 
and technology. The coloured arrows show that there exist flow and exchanges between services. 
The national cybersecurity functions will thus require services to fulfil them. In order to provide these  
 
                                                     
6 The term “capabilities” from hereon should be understood to include people, processes and technology. 
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national cybersecurity services, its complementary capabilities need to be developed or 
implemented. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 8: Relationship between service, function and capability [7] 
 
Figure 9, which repeats Figure 3, contextualises cybersecurity functions, services, capabilities and 
structures. Figure 9 shows that national cybersecurity functions consist of national cybersecurity 
services that are made up of cybersecurity capabilities. National cybersecurity functions are offered 
from national cybersecurity structures. 
 
We will illustrate Figure 9 in the context of South Africa. The South African National Cybersecurity 
Policy Framework (NCPF) [6] prescribes the establishment of a South African national 
cybersecurity incident handling function. This national incident handling function is enabled through 
the implementation of national cybersecurity services. To contextualise this statement, the national 
incident handling function may be enabled by an incident management service and an incident 
escalation service.  
 
The incident management and incident escalation services consist of capabilities, such as the 
incident management capability. The incident management capability consists of people, or staff 
managing and acting on the incident (people). They will follow a process, such as a defined incident 
management process (processes). The incident management process is captured by, or the 
investigation thereof enabled by helpdesk or incident management software (tools or technology). 
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Figure 9: Relationship: Functions, services, capabilities and structures 
(Figure 1 repeated) [7] 
 
Our discussion of the national incident handling function with its services and capabilities is 
illustrated in Figure 10 that shows that the national incident handling function may consist of two 
services, the incident management service, and the incident escalation service. These two services, 
in turn, consist of capabilities that are made up of people, processes and technologies.  
 
The two services may make use of the same, or similar technologies. They may also have similar 
or overlapping processes. These similar technologies and overlapping processes may then be 
combined to realise a cost benefit. As an example, Figure 10 shows that the incident management 
service may use a technology called the “incident management software”. This software may 
provide functionality that can also deliver on the Incident Escalation Service. Furthermore, the 
incident management process and the incident escalation process may have overlaps in terms of 
sub-processes or steps. 
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Figure 10: National Incident Handling Function, Services and Capabilities 
 
Section 2.6 provides background to the NCMF, and it introduces the concepts of ‘national and 
international authoritative and normative sources’. These sources are important in that they provide 
mandatory prescripts and recommendations for cybersecurity functions. 
 
2.6 Authoritative and normative sources related to the NCMF 
 
It is our experience that any national framework must have a starting point or a foundation from 
where elements influencing the framework are identified. We have experienced that in the 
development of a framework at the national level, and applicable to national cybersecurity, some 
considerations need to be taken into account. One of the considerations is that it must operate 
within the ambit of the nation state’s legal and regulatory structure and that it must consider the 
prescripts described in the national legal and regulatory structure.  
 
Sources that prescribe mandatory national cybersecurity functions are called authoritative sources. 
Some sources only make recommendations, and these are called normative sources. It is important 
though to understand that authoritative sources prescribe mandatory national cybersecurity 
functions, and the normative sources recommend general cybersecurity functions. Mandatory 
functions have to be implemented. Failing to implement them could lead to sanctions, such as fines, 
audit findings or expulsion from international bodies. General cybersecurity functions that are Non-
mandatory in nature, may be implemented, and no sanctions are associated with not implementing 
them.  
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Authoritative sources thus prescribe, (mandatory) and normative sources recommend general 
cybersecurity functions that are non-mandatory in nature. 
 
We will thus consult two types of sources. The two types of sources are: 
 
• National authoritative and normative sources - describing national mandatory and non-
mandatory cybersecurity functions. 
• International authoritative and normative sources - describing international mandatory and non-
mandatory cybersecurity functions. 
 
These two types of sources provide us with two categories of cybersecurity functions. The first 
category is mandatory national cybersecurity functions that are specific to  a nation state, and the 
second category is general cybersecurity functions that are non-mandatory in nature. These two 
categories are discussed in more detail in the text following. 
 
• Nation-state mandatory, specific and applicable national cybersecurity functions are identified 
form national and international authoritative sources. Nation states have the option to augment 
their specific and mandatory national cybersecurity functions with the general (non-mandatory) 
cybersecurity functions. Since we have experience working on South African national 
cybersecurity efforts, only   South African mandatory functions described in South African 
authoritative sources will be considered in this thesis. 
 
• The general cybersecurity functions that are non-mandatory in nature, are identified from 
national and international normative and authoritative sources provide nation states with a pre-
defined list of cybersecurity functions that are general in nature, and from which they may select 
one, or many from, for implementation. General cybersecurity functions are by definition non-
mandatory. 
 
A nation-state without its own authoritative sources may make use of a different country’s 
authoritative source documents, and from there, identify general cybersecurity functions for itself. 
Normative sources are documents such as standards, frameworks and best practices. Mandatory 
and general cybersecurity functions are discussed in more detail in the following sub-sections. 
 
2.6.1 Mandatory cybersecurity functions 
 
The sources providing mandatory prescripts at the national level are collectively known as 
authoritative sources. Authoritative sources are documents such as acts, regulations, national 
cybersecurity policy (NCS) and international treaties. These sources should be the starting point  
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and should be consulted first during the development of national cybersecurity frameworks. They 
would prescribe mandatory requirements from a legal and regulatory perspective to be included in 
the framework. During a nation state’s national cybersecurity function management journey, the 
following elements need to be identified for it to determine mandatory national cybersecurity 
functions. 
 
• National and international authoritative sources specific and relevant to the nation-state. 
• Mandatory prescripts and requirements for national cybersecurity functions expressed in the 
nation state’s relevant authoritative sources.  
 
Mandatory prescripts are found mainly in authoritative sources. A prescript is a rule, directive, 
command or law. From a cybersecurity function perspective, and at the national level, a prescript 
will express mandatory requirements that have to be included, or considered during the 
identification of national cybersecurity functions.  
 
Some examples of South African authoritative sources are the NCPF [33], the South African 
Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34] and the Regulation of Interception of Communications and 
Provision of Communication-Related Information Act, 2002 (Act 70 of 2002) [35]. Identifying all 
these sources and following their prescripts ensure that the mandatory national cybersecurity 
functions, specific to the nation-state are identified.  
 
One of the core tenets of the first level of our NCMF is that it first identifies, and then consults nation 
state specific, national and international authoritative sources that prescribe mandatory 
cybersecurity function requirements. We will now show in Section 2.6.2 that it is also possible to 
use an NCMF to identify general cybersecurity functions that are non-mandatory in nature.  
 
2.6.2 General cybersecurity functions 
 
The identification of general (non-mandatory) cybersecurity functions is done by considering only 
the general recommendations in national and international normative sources. Nations may also 
select to use the authoritative sources from other countries, and apply those as their normative 
sources.  
 
The following needs to be considered during the identification of non-mandatory cybersecurity 
functions. These functions are, by definition, general in nature. 
 
• National and international normative sources need to be identified. 
• General recommendations for cybersecurity functions need to be identified.  
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2.7 General discussion of cybersecurity functions 
 
Other than a country’s legal and regulatory framework, an NCS is of paramount importance as an 
authoritative source to steer cybersecurity activities at national level. A well thought through NCS 
will have considered national and international acts and regulations, and have their prescripts and 
recommendations captured.  
 
Therefore, the national cybersecurity prescripts found in a nation-state’s NCS serve as our primary 
source to assist with the identification of mandatory national cybersecurity functions. With the 
application of the NCMF, the NCS is seen as a document of the highest authority, and the primary 
source of information on how cybersecurity matters at the national level should be conducted.  
 
National and international authoritative source documents and their prescripts differ between 
countries, and this implies that mandatory national cybersecurity functions will differ from country 
to country. As an example, the national cybersecurity functions needed to support the Saudi 
Arabian National Cybersecurity Strategy “Developing National Information Security Strategy for the 
Kingdom of Saudi Arabia”  [36] will differ from the national cybersecurity functions needed by South 
Africa, as prescribed in their “National Cybersecurity Policy Framework” [33].  
 
The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia restricts social media, and in some instances, social media platforms 
are blocked in the country as prescribed by their NCS [37]. This differs from South Africa’s open 
and tolerant stance on social media. The Saudi Arabian restrictive social media policy necessitates 
the requirement for an additional national cybersecurity function, which is one of being able to 
monitor, and block social media platforms at the national level.  
 
Another additional national cybersecurity function requirement is a cyberwarfare function. Saudi 
Arabia is actively engaged in a cyberwar with Iran and Yemen [38], and a cyberwar function is thus 
a requirement.     
 
South Africa is not at war, or engaged in cyberwar with other nations, and has no requirement for 
a cyberwarfare function. These two national cybersecurity functions are not currently a requirement 
in South Africa. 
 
There might, however, be exclusions, in that mandatory national cybersecurity functional prescripts 
and requirements could be similar between nation states. Such an example is the South Africa 
Protection of Personal Information (POPI) Act [39], which is based on the United Kingdom’s Data 
Protection Act of 1998 [40]. In this example, there may be similarities between the United Kingdom’s  
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and South African national cybersecurity function prescripts and requirements needed to give effect 
to these two similar acts. 
 
Table 1 shows that we may use national and international authoritative and normative sources to 
identify mandatory and non-mandatory cybersecurity functions. From these functions, we can 
identify the most commonly occurring functions to provide us with a list of general cybersecurity 
functions. We will do this in Chapter 4. 
 
Table 1: General CSFs from mandatory and non-mandatory CSFs 
 
 
 
 
2.8 Other elements influencing the NCMF 
 
Other elements such as the actors and stakeholders that are present and interacting with the 
NCMF, its dimensions, as well as the mandates and domains where the NCMF operates in, 
influences the identification, selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions. These 
elements are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. The dimensions, mandates and domains also reside 
at the first level of the NCMF, and together with authoritative and normative sources, influence the 
consecutive levels of the NCMF. As a brief introduction, and to contextualise the dimensions, 
domains and mandates, they influence the following tasks: 
 
• Dimensions describe the scope of something [41], such as the scope of national cybersecurity. 
Dimensions can be used to identify national and international actors and stakeholders (actors 
and stakeholders are introduced and discussed in Section 3.5). The availability of actors and 
stakeholders, and their skills, skills level and experience, in turn, influences the selection and 
prioritisation tasks. 
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• Cybersecurity activities can take place in the offensive, or defensive domains. Domains 
influence the selection and prioritisation task, in that different functions are needed to satisfy 
the offensive, or defensive domains’ requirements. 
 
• Mandates influence the selection and prioritisation task. The mandate describes the nation’s 
authority to act in a certain way where it concerns national cybersecurity, and this, in turn, 
influences the functions selected and prioritised to satisfy the national cybersecurity mandate.  
 
In conclusion, a country’s national and international authoritative sources thus prescribe mandatory 
national cybersecurity functions, and it is our experience that developing countries often lack 
national authoritative sources, such as an NCS. In instances where nation states lack national 
authoritative sources, they may wish to identify non-mandatory cybersecurity functions by 
consulting recommendations in national and international normative sources.  
 
They may further choose to augment their normative sources with mandatory prescripts found in 
other nations’ authoritative sources. In other words, they may use other nation’s mandatory 
functions as their non-mandatory functions. This approach provides nation states with a list of 
general cybersecurity functions. From this list of general functions, they may then select one or two 
functions for implementation at the national level.  
 
The selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity functions for national implementation, are also 
influenced by the cybersecurity dimensions, domains and mandates. We will discuss this in        
Chapter 3. The authoritative source prescripts, the normative source recommendations, as well as 
the influencing dimensions, domains and mandates all reside at the first level of the NCMF.   
 
2.9 A high-level overview of the NCMF levels 
 
The identification of cybersecurity functions happens at the first level of the NCMF. This is done by 
consulting national and international authoritative and normative sources. The selection and 
prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions for implementation are described, and achieved at 
the second level of the NCMF. This is achieved by following a national risk management approach.  
 
The selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions for implementation may be further 
guided by the NCMF domains and mandates. The implementation of national cybersecurity 
functions and their structures is described in levels 3 to 6 of the NCMF. This concept is shown in 
Figure 11. 
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Figure 11: NCMF purpose to level mapping 
 
During the identification of the NCMF levels, we drew from our experience in developing 
cybersecurity frameworks and architectures for the South African Government, as well as for the 
industry. Our experience includes a national collaborative project that was executed in terms of the 
national cybersecurity capability deployment strategy for South Africa [42].  
 
As stated in Section 1.3, some of the characteristics of the NCMF is that it should be able to scale 
at the national level, and it should be flexible, and agile. With regard to satisfying these 
requirements, we have made a conscious decision to keep the NCMF lean and compact. 
Furthermore, it is our experience that a framework with more than ten levels becomes complicated, 
and it makes the implementation and execution thereof difficult. Experience has shown that 
frameworks with ten or fewer levels are easier to implement, monitor and manage.  
 
Thus, we initially decided to constrain the development of the NCMF to ten levels, but less than ten 
are preferable to make it less complex, and to streamline its implementation. After having 
considered all the elements needed to provide an input into the NCMF to identify, select, prioritise, 
and implement national cybersecurity functions, we ended up with the six levels.  
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Our NCMF thus consists of six sequential levels, starting at level 1 and ending at level 6. Figure 11 
shows that level 1 has as its purpose, the identification of cybersecurity functions, and that the 
purpose of level 2 is to select and prioritise the functions for implementation. Levels 3 to  6 describe 
the implementation of cybersecurity functions. Our NCMF’s six levels that will be discussed in detail 
in the following Chapters. We will provide a brief introduction to the NCMF’s six levels in the sub-
sections following. 
 
2.9.1 First level – Level 1 (L1) 
 
The purpose of the first level, named level 1, is to identify national cybersecurity functions. This 
is done by identifying national and international authoritative and normative sources, and the 
cybersecurity function prescripts and recommendations expressed in them. The authoritative 
source prescripts identify mandatory national cybersecurity functions, while the normative source 
recommendations describe non-mandatory cybersecurity functions. Additional elements, 
influencing the cybersecurity management tasks, as well as their impact on cybersecurity functions, 
are also considered here.  
 
The additional influencing elements are the dimensions, mandates and domains in which the 
framework will operate. These additional influencing elements are discussed in detail in Chapter 3. 
The outcome of level 1 of the NCMF is a list of mandatory and non-mandatory national cybersecurity 
functions, from which a selection may be made for national implementation. Level 1 also identifies 
and lists NCMF actors. The identification of NCMF actors is discussed in Chapter 3. 
 
From the list of NCMF actors, some can be selected to be held responsible for the application and 
implementation of the NCMF. Responsibility for the national implementation of the cybersecurity 
functions may also be assigned to the actors identified and presented in the list — the mandates 
and domains selected at level 1 further influences the selection and prioritisation of national 
cybersecurity functions for implementation.  
 
Level 1 is foundational in nature, in that is must be completed first, before any of the other NCMF 
levels can be completed. It will not be possible to progress with levels 2 to 6 unless level 1 is 
completed, since the rest of the framework depends on the outcomes of level 1. The outcomes of 
level 1 feed into the rest of the NCMF levels.  
 
Due to its foundational nature, level 1 of the NCMF is discussed in detail on its own in Chapter 3. 
The next step is to do the actual selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions for 
implementation. This step is described in level 2 of the NCMF. 
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2.9.2 Second level – Level 2 (L2) 
 
The purpose of the second level of the NCMF, named level 2, is to select and prioritise national 
cybersecurity functions for implementation. To ensure implementation of the NCMF, and to execute 
the selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions for implementation, an overall 
controlling and coordinating body must be established. The selection and prioritisation of 
cybersecurity functions for national implementation may be facilitated by following a national risk 
management approach. The second level describes the establishment of: 
 
• A national, overall cybersecurity controlling and coordinating body, with the purpose of 
implementing the NCMF, and to drive the selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity functions 
for national implementation, as well as, 
• A national risk management approach to guide the selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity 
functions for national implementation. 
 
The purpose of the national overall controlling body would be to manage, drive and apply the NCMF, 
and to steer, coordinate and assign responsibilities for the implementation of national cybersecurity 
functions. The establishment of the overall controlling body is key to the success of not only 
implementing and driving the NCMF and its efforts, but also the national implementation of the 
cybersecurity functions. The overall controlling body will only be successful with the implementation 
of the NCMF and the cybersecurity functions if appointed by government, allocated adequate 
funding and resources, and provided with a clear mandate. The national overall controlling body 
will also oversee the implementation of a national risk management approach and process.  
 
From experience, we propose that a risk management approach and process is followed to help 
with the selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity functions at the national level. Following a risk 
management approach where it concerns the management of national or organisational 
cybersecurity risk, is also recommended by international standards such as the International 
Organization for Standardization and the International Electrotechnical Commission                    
(ISO/IEC) 27001:2013.  
 
The outcome of the national risk management process may inform the selection of cybersecurity 
functions, and will primarily prioritise national cybersecurity functions for implementation. The 
NCMF mandates and domains may also influence the selection and prioritisation of national 
cybersecurity functions, while the NCMF dimensions are used to identify NCMF actors and  
stakeholders. The outcome of level 2 of the NCMF is a list of selected and prioritised national 
cybersecurity functions to be considered for implementation. Level 2’s primary function is to 
prioritise national cybersecurity functions for implementation. This is achieved by developing a  
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national cybersecurity risk management strategy that describes a risk management framework and 
process. This strategy and process are driven by the overall cybersecurity controlling body. 
 
2.9.3 Third level – Level 3 (L3) 
 
The third level of the NCMF, named level 3, serves to consolidate the national cybersecurity 
functions selected and prioritised in level 2. The intention is for this level to be used to group a 
nation’s national cybersecurity functions logically. The existing cybersecurity structures offering the 
cybersecurity functions are also identified here. In the absence of existing structures, new structures 
should be envisioned and implemented.  
 
Level 3 is also the demarcation point in the NCMF where the implementation of national 
cybersecurity functions starts. In our NCMF, the implementation of national cybersecurity functions 
will be guided by the Build, Run and Monitor functions of the PBMR organisational approach. 
 
2.9.4 Fourth level – Level 4 (L4) 
 
Level 4, the fourth level of the NCMF, identifies and provides a placeholder to consolidate the 
national cybersecurity structures that will be used to offer the national cybersecurity functions (from 
level 3) and its services. The national cybersecurity structures are identified using the cybersecurity 
functions found in level 3, as input. The outcome of level 4 is a list of national cybersecurity 
structures, and the services they need to offer to enable the national cybersecurity functions. This 
list could be used by developing countries to identify overlapping and similar services and to 
combine their processes and technologies to realise a cost and skills saving. 
 
2.9.5 Fifth level – Level 5 (L5) 
 
The fifth level, named level 5, of the NCMF is used to identify the prescripts expressed in 
regulations and normative sources that are applicable to the cybersecurity structures that were 
identified in level 4. The outcome of level 5 is a list of prescripts that the cybersecurity structures 
from level 4 need to comply with. These prescripts will influence the level 4 structures’ operational 
and technical requirements.  
 
Where this is a new structure, these regulations and normative sources may need to be developed. 
Level 5 of the NCMF determines the level 4 cybersecurity structures’ applicable authoritative and  
normative source prescripts. The level 4 structures need to comply with these, and other regulatory 
requirements identified in level 5. One authoritative source example applicable to South African 
organisations, is the Occupational Health and Safety Act (No. 85 of 1993) [43]. 
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2.9.6 Sixth level – Level 6 (L6) 
 
The sixth level, named level 6, is used to identify operational policies, processes and procedures 
to govern and manage the national cybersecurity structure. Level 6 addresses the operational 
elements of the national cybersecurity structure, and the outcome of level 6 is the cybersecurity 
structure’s operational policies, processes and procedures.  
 
2.10 Difference between level 5 and level 6 prescripts 
 
The reader needs to have a clear understanding of the difference between the authoritative and 
normative source prescripts needed at level 5 (Section 5.3.4), and level 6 (Section 5.3.5).  We will 
now describe this distinction in more detail. 
 
• Level 5 prescripts: The national cybersecurity structures are identified in level 3, and their 
services in level 4. The prescripts that are relevant to national structures structure are identified 
in level 5. These are prescripts found in national or international authoritative and normative 
sources and are strategic in nature.  
 
To contextualise this, we will use as an example a nation that wants to establish a CSIRT to 
offer the Incident Handling function. Since this is a national structure, prescripts from the 
following international and national authoritative sources may apply: 
 
o To join the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) [44] community, the 
national CSIRT has to comply with their mandatory requirements [45]. 
o Being a national, government structure, the CSIRT has to comply with the nations’ 
environmental health and safety acts, and possible national physical security regulations 
if the CSIRT is seen as a critical national asset. 
o The CSIRT, falling under the auspices of government would need to comply with 
departmental recommendations, such as the use of COBIT 5. 
 
• Level 6 prescripts: The prescripts and recommendations that need to be developed, at level  
6 are operational in nature. These operational sources are typically the policies, processes 
and procedures that govern the day to day operations of the national structure. 
 
 
Whereas the prescripts at level 5 may be applicable to all government structures, the prescripts 
at level 6 are structure specific. These source prescripts are usually developed by the structure 
management. Keeping with the CSIRT example, the following may need to be developed: 
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o Incident classification policy. 
o Incident management and escalation process. 
o Backup-up process and technology specific back-up procedure. 
 
2.11 NCMF levels and level purpose 
 
The NCMF levels and their explicit purpose are listed in Table 2. Table 2 shows that the primary 
function of level 1 of the NCMF is to identify national and international authoritative and normative 
sources and consult those sources to identify mandatory, and non-mandatory cybersecurity 
functions.  
 
Level 2 is used to select and prioritise the identified national cybersecurity functions for 
implementation. Level 3 is used as a container to consolidate the national cybersecurity functions 
logically.. Level 3 also serves as the demarcation point where the implementation of national 
cybersecurity functions starts.  
 
Level 1 and level 2 correspond to the plan function of the PBMR organisational approach, while 
level 3 to level 6 correspond to the Build, Run and Monitor functions of the PBMR organisational 
approach. Level 4 identifies existing structures that can offer the selected and prioritised functions 
or envision new structures where none exists.  
 
Level 4 also identifies the functions offered by existing structures or identify functions for new 
structures. Level 5 identifies the services that support the level 4 structure’s functions, as well as 
authoritative and normative source prescripts applicable to the level structures. Level 6 describes 
the operational elements such as policies, processes and procedures needed to make the level 4 
structure work.  
 
These levels may be used to implement any cybersecurity structure, but in this thesis, we will use 
it to implement our newly envisioned national cybersecurity structure. The concept that levels 3 to 
6 may be used for any national cybersecurity structure is explained in more detail in Section 5.2.  
 
Table 2: NCMF level explicit purpose 
NCMF Level Explicit Purpose 
National cybersecurity identification function 
NCMF Level 1 
(L1) 
• This is the NCMF foundational level.  
• This level identifies national and international authoritative and normative 
sources, with their mandatory and non-mandatory cybersecurity function 
prescripts and recommendations.  
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• The mandates and domains that are considered at level 1 assist to identify 
national cybersecurity functions. 
• The dimensions identify actors. Level 1 is used to identify national 
cybersecurity functions and provide a list of actors responsible for the 
NCMF, and for the implementation of the cybersecurity functions. 
National cybersecurity selection and prioritisation function 
NCMF Level 2 
(L2) 
• Prescribes an overall national controlling body that will implement, guide 
and steer the NCMF application, as well as the national cybersecurity 
function implementation. 
• Also prescribes a national cybersecurity risk management approach with 
the purpose of selecting and prioritising national cybersecurity functions. 
• Selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions for 
implementation happen here. 
National cybersecurity function implementation 
NCMF Level 3 
(L3) 
• Serves as a placeholder to logically group and consolidate the selected 
and prioritised national cybersecurity functions. 
NCMF Level 4 
(L4) 
• Identifies the existing national cybersecurity structure that will be used to 
offer the services of the cybersecurity functions identified in Level 3.  
• Where no existing structures exist, new structures need to be envisioned 
and implemented.  
NCMF Level 5 
(L5) 
• Identifies the services offered by these structures. 
• Identifies authoritative and normative documents, and the national 
prescripts applicable and specific to the national cybersecurity structures 
identified in level 4. 
NCMF Level 6 
(L6) 
• Describes the governance and operational management of the national 
cybersecurity structures.  
• Identifies all structure specific, operational policies, processes and 
procedures. 
 
Table 2 also serve to provide the reader with a brief overview of Part 1 of this thesis. The levels 
introduced and briefly described in Table 2 are revisited and discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 
and Chapter 5. 
 
2.12 Conclusion 
 
The prescripts for national cybersecurity functions are expressed in national authoritative and 
normative sources, and is used by the NCMF’s first level for the identification of the mandatory 
cybersecurity functions. The recommendations found in national and international normative 
sources, allows the NCMF to identify non-mandatory cybersecurity functions.  
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The NCMF mandates and domains may influence and inform the identification, selection and 
prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions, while the NCMF dimensions are used to determine 
actors at level 1 of the NCMF. These influencing elements are introduced and discussed in     
Chapter 3. 
 
The second level of the NCMF prescribes an overall national controlling body, and the following of 
a national cybersecurity risk management approach. The second level serves to select and 
prioritise national cybersecurity functions for implementation. The third to sixth levels of the NCMF 
prescribe a methodology to be followed for the implementation of national cybersecurity functions.  
 
Taking into consideration the importance and foundational nature of level 1 of the NCMF, and the 
fact that the success and relevance of the identified, selected and prioritised national cybersecurity 
functions rely on accurate and applicable information from level 1, it will be discussed in a chapter 
on its own. Chapter 3 presents level 1 of the NCMF, with its building blocks and influencing elements
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Chapter 3: The national cybersecurity management framework level 1 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 introduces the elements that inform and influence the identification of mandatory national, 
and general cybersecurity functions. We have introduced elements such as national and 
international authoritative and normative sources, and their mandatory and general prescripts and 
recommendations in Section 2.6. Examples of other elements influencing the identification of 
cybersecurity functions are the dimensions and domains that the NCMF operate in, as well as its 
mandates. These influencing elements reside, and are considered at the first level of the NCMF - 
which is called level 1. These elements are discussed in the following sections. 
 
These elements are applicable and specific to the nation applying the NCMF, and must be 
considered for guidance. The dimensions describe who is involved with national cybersecurity, such 
as the actors that can be found in each dimension. The domains describe where national 
cybersecurity activities take place. The mandates stipulate in what way a nation should act to 
ensure cybersecurity at the national level. The rest of Chapter 3 is structured as follows: 
 
Section 3.2 provides a motivation for the existence of level 1 of the NCMF, and its overall purpose 
in the NCMF. 
 
Section 3.3 introduces and discusses the concepts of national and international authoritative and 
normative sources. 
 
Section 3.4 motivates for the early discussion and identification of general cybersecurity functions. 
 
Section 3.5 introduces and discusses the three cybersecurity dimensions.  
 
Section 3.6 introduces two cybersecurity domains.  
 
Section 3.7 contextualises the Domains and Actors in the South African environment. 
 
Section 3.8 introduces five cybersecurity mandates.  
 
Section 3.9 contextualises the dimensions and mandates in the South African environment. 
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Section 3.10 concludes and summarises level 1 of the NCMF, and the elements making up          
level 1. The elements are the authoritative and normative sources, dimensions, domains and 
mandates. 
 
It needs to be mentioned here that Chapter 3 is quite a long chapter. We have made a conscious 
and intentional decision to keep all the level 1 elements under discussion, grouped in this chapter 
so that the flow of the level 1 elements under discussion is not disrupted. 
 
3.2 Motivation 
 
Level 1 of the NCMF serves as the starting point for the NCMF, and is the foundation on which the 
rest of the NCMF levels are developed. Level 1 of the NCMF provides input into, and drives the rest 
of the NCMF. The quality of the information provided by level 1 determines the relevance, accuracy 
and effectiveness of the identified, selected and prioritised national cybersecurity functions. 
 
It further influences the successful application of the NCMF’s subsequent levels, and how effective 
the NCMF will be in improving a nation’s cybersecurity posture. In short, and to repeat what we 
have said in Section 2.5, level 1 is used to identify national and international authoritative and 
normative sources, and from those sources, identify prescripts for mandatory cybersecurity 
functions, or recommendations for non-mandatory cybersecurity functions. Level 1 also considers 
additional influencing elements such as dimensions, domains and mandates. 
 
Providing accurate and relevant information at level 1 of the NCMF is of paramount importance. 
Inaccurate information at level 1 will cause level 2 to level 6 to be flawed, and thus irrelevant and 
ineffective in terms of the cybersecurity functions identified. The result could be that national 
cybersecurity functions that is not priority, or even irrelevant to the nation state’s needs and 
requirements, are identified and selected for implementation. This could lead to national cyber risk 
not being addressed properly, and provide nation states with a false sense of security that may 
negatively affect their national cybersecurity posture and readiness.  
 
Many elements can influence the quality of information at level 1. One of these is the authoritative 
and normative sources applicable to the nation-states. These authoritative and normative sources 
could be international or, national in origin. Some examples are: 
 
• International authoritative 
o International law such as the Tallinn Manual is applying international law to cyberspace 
[46]. 
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o Treaties and agreements, such as treaties and international agreements on                      
Cyber Crime [47]. 
• National authoritative 
o National cybersecurity strategies. 
o A national policy such as the South African National Cybersecurity Policy Framework [6]. 
o Acts such as the South African Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34] and the Protection 
of Personal Information Act [39]. 
• Normative 
o Standards such as ISO/IEC 27001:2005 [48]. 
o Frameworks such as COBIT [49], NIST SP 800-53 [50], and SANS Critical Security 
Controls [51]. 
o Guides such as the ITU-T X.805 National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide [52]. 
o Models such as the United Kingdom’s Cyber Security Capability Maturity Model (CMM) 
[53].  
 
From authoritative sources, prescripts for mandatory national cybersecurity functions are identified. 
From normative sources, recommendations for non-mandatory cybersecurity functions, are 
identified.  
 
Once the mandatory and non-mandatory cybersecurity function requirements and 
recommendations expressed in these sources are identified, additional elements such as the 
dimensions, mandates and domains within which the NCMF will operate, need to be considered. 
These additional elements inform and influence the selection and prioritisation of both mandatory 
national cybersecurity functions, and non-mandatory cybersecurity functions.  
 
The elements used to identify cybersecurity functions were introduced in Section 2.6. These are 
national and international authoritative and normative sources. Elements informing and influencing 
the selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity functions are the dimensions, mandates and 
domains. All these elements reside at level 1 of the NCMF. 
 
To make it easier for the reader to understand and follow this chapter, our progress during the 
development of level 1 of the NCMF and its influencing elements is illustrated using Figure 12. 
Figure 12 shows the four elements making up level 1 of the NCMF, and each element will be 
highlighted during its discussion. 
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Figure 12: Chapter 3 Section orientation 
 
Section 3.3 introduces the concept of ‘authoritative and normative sources.’ Under the authoritative 
sources, mandatory national cybersecurity prescripts are identified, and from the normative 
sources, general cybersecurity recommendations are identified. These sources could be national 
or international in origin.  
 
3.3 NCMF Level 1 – Identify authoritative and normative sources 
 
Figure 13 serves to orient the reader, and shows that this section will be used to discuss the NCMF 
authoritative and normative sources. Figure 13 shows that the authoritative and normative sources 
are the first element that makes up level 1 of the NCMF and that the authoritative and normative 
sources are used to identify mandatory and non-mandatory national cybersecurity functions. 
 
Level 1 serves to identify authoritative and normative sources and its cybersecurity functional 
requirement prescripts and recommendations. These sources prescribe mandatory national 
functions or recommend        non-mandatory cybersecurity functions. This level indicates the starting 
point of the NCMF, and serves as a flexible placeholder for input into the rest of the framework.  
 
Level 1 is flexible in that authoritative and normative source prescripts and recommendations that 
are specific and unique to each nation-state, are identified and used here. Level 1 will be updated 
as and when a nation’s authoritative and normative sources and their prescripts or 
recommendations change. The foundational character of this level is indicated by it's name,       
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“Level 1”, and it has to be considered before any of the following levels of the framework can be 
used. 
 
 
 
Figure 13: Section 3.3 Orientation – Authoritative and normative sources 
 
An example of legal authoritative sources is shown in Figure 14 as taken from [54]. Figure 14 shows 
that a nation state’s authoritative legal prescripts originate from rules, regulations and acts which 
then becomes law.  
 
To illustrate the concept of a mandatory prescript, we will use the NCPF as an example of a South 
African authoritative source. A prescript found in the NCPF is that South Africa should have a 
national incident handling function [6]. Nation states must comply with authoritative sources. This 
is done to give effect to national policy prescripts, to avoid sanctions, to promote the national 
cybersecurity policy and strategy, and to comply with treaty obligations. 
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Figure 14: Examples of authoritative sources [54] 
 
The responsibility for enforcing compliance to these laws, policies, strategies and treaties, resides 
with the government, and is achieved through the parliamentary processes applicable to the 
development of national policy, strategy and treaties. We will use level 1 of the NCMF to identify 
two types of cybersecurity functions. The two types are: 
 
• Nation-state specific and mandatory cybersecurity functions. 
• General or non-mandatory cybersecurity functions. 
 
3.3.1 Identify mandatory national cybersecurity functions 
 
To use level 1 of the NCMF to identify nation state specific and mandatory cybersecurity functions, 
we should start with: 
 
• Identifying all national and international authoritative sources applicable and relevant to the 
natio- state. 
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• Identify mandatory, and nation-state specific, cybersecurity function prescripts expressed in 
these sources. The outcome is a list of mandatory national cybersecurity functions. 
 
3.3.2 Identify non-mandatory cybersecurity functions 
 
In the absence of national and international authoritative sources, nation-states may choose to 
identify  non-mandatory cybersecurity function recommendations that can be found in national and 
international normative sources. This provides them with a list of cybersecurity functions from which 
they may select one, or two for implementation at the national level.  
 
Another very good source that can be consulted to identify non-mandatory cybersecurity functions, 
are the NCSs of both developed and developing countries. Nations consulting the NCSs of foreign 
countries’ in this way thus use the consulted foreign county’s authoritative source as their normative 
source.  
 
To use level 1 of the NCMF to identify non-mandatory cybersecurity functions, we should start with: 
 
• Identifying national and international normative sources. 
• Identify non-mandatory cybersecurity function recommendations. The outcome is a list of non-
mandatory cybersecurity functions. 
 
3.4 Motivation for early identification of general cybersecurity functions 
 
We will illustrate the application of level 1 of the NCMF in Chapter 4 to identify general cybersecurity 
functions. We will do this by identifying prescripts in authoritative sources, and recommendations 
in non-mandatory sources. From these prescripts and recommendations, we will identify the most 
commonly occurring cybersecurity functions across international and national authoritative and 
normative sources to give us a list of general cybersecurity functions.  
 
This predetermined list of general cybersecurity functions then provides us with a list of 
cybersecurity functions that is available to nation states to make a selection from for 
implementation. Our motivation for doing this early, and before the discussion of level 2 to level 6 
of the NCMF is as follows: 
 
• Our list of general cybersecurity functions are non-mandatory in nature, and will be used to 
illustrate and  explain the application of the rest of the NCMF. From the list of general 
cybersecurity functions, we will select two functions to illustrate and explain level 2 to level 6  
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of the NCMF. This allows us to use real-life examples, and contextualise our discussion of 
levels 2 to 6. 
• The process followed during the identification of mandatory and non-mandatory cybersecurity 
functions are the same, only the sources differ. The illustrative application of level 1 of the 
NCMF in Chapter 4 could thus be referenced for the identification of both mandatory and non-
mandatory cybersecurity functions. Describing the identification process early informs and 
guides the discussion of the rest of the NCMF levels. 
• Identifying general (which is by definition non-mandatory) cybersecurity functions provide     
nation-states that do not have their own authoritative sources, with a predetermined list of 
cybersecurity functions. They may then select and prioritise one or many functions from this 
list for implementation at the national level. This allows nation states that are applying the 
NCMF to make a selection of cybersecurity functions for implementation early on. 
 
Now that the concepts of ‘authoritative’ and ‘normative’ sources have been introduced, other 
elements informing and influencing the selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity 
functions need to be described and considered. These elements are the dimensions, mandates 
and domains in which the NCMF can operate. Section 3.5 introduces the national cybersecurity 
dimensions.  
 
The cybersecurity dimensions in which the NCMF can operate, are the government dimension, the 
national dimension and the the international dimension. The dimensions have actors and 
stakeholders, and we will use the dimensions to identify the NCMF actors and stakeholders.  
 
From the list of actors and stakeholders, responsibilities should be assigned for the establishment 
of the national, overall controlling body residing at level 2, and introduced in Section 5.4. The 
national, overall controlling body would be responsible for the implementation of the NCMF, and 
also the implementation of the cybersecurity functions identified through the application of the 
NCMF. 
 
3.5 Cybersecurity dimensions actors and stakeholders  
 
Figure 15 serves to orient the reader, and shows that this section will be used to discuss the 
NCMF Dimensions. The three Dimensions as taken from NATO, are: 
 
• Government 
• National 
• International 
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A dimension describes the element or factor making up an entity, such as national cybersecurity, 
or describe the range or degree to which national cybersecurity stretches [55]. The cybersecurity 
dimensions are important since it will be used to identify nation state specific actors and 
stakeholders, and also inform the selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions.  
 
 
  
 
Figure 15: Section 3.4 Orientation - dimensions 
 
The dimensions are the government dimension, the national dimension and the international 
dimension, and each dimension has state actors, non-state actors and non-state actors abroad. 
The identification of the actors allows nation states to assign responsibilities for the implementation 
of the NCMF, as well as responsibility for the implementation of national cybersecurity functions to 
them. Some of these actors may be selected to establish, and participate in the national overall 
controlling body. 
 
The activities in these dimensions are influenced by stakeholders, and performed by actors. Each 
dimension has its own actors and stakeholders, and the government, national and international 
dimensions allow national cybersecurity to be viewed from the perspective of different actors and 
stakeholders such as political actors, and law enforcement or military stakeholders.  
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Before we introduce the three dimensions with its actors and stakeholders, it is important to 
understand the difference between them. The terms actor and stakeholder are often incorrectly 
used interchangeably, but they do differ. Actors can be either human or non-human, and are entities 
that perform activities, and interact with a project, system or product. An actor’s behaviour is non-
deterministic. Stakeholders are individuals or groups with an interest in a project, system or product. 
Stakeholder’s behaviour is human, and they are deterministic. All stakeholders are actors, but not 
all actors are stakeholders.  
 
Examples of stakeholders in the context of the NCMF are government departments, hacker groups 
and the public. They determine, influence or effect the outcome of the NCMF. All these mentioned 
stakeholders can also be acting on the NCMF, but additional actors for the NCMF could be the IT 
systems supporting the planning, building, running and monitoring of the NCMF implementation 
and also the cybersecurity function implementation [56] [57] [58] [59] [60]. 
 
The dimensions identify the actors and stakeholders, and in turn, the availability of actors and 
stakeholders, and their skills may influence the selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity 
functions. Nation states may want to prioritise the implementation of cybersecurity functions for 
which actors and stakeholders with experience and skills are readily available, or use this 
information to align their training and certification requirements. To assist with the identification of 
actors and stakeholders, we will propose an Actor and Stakeholder Identification Template in 
Section 3.5.4. 
 
Together with the authoritative and normative prescripts and recommendations, the dimensions 
thus informs and influences the selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity functions for 
implementation. It also assists with the identification of actors and stakeholders. NATO, in their 
National Cybersecurity Framework Manual document [1], described three dimensions of 
cybersecurity activity. These three dimensions describe the actors and stakeholders across five 
different mandates (see Section 3.8). In turn, the five mandates can take place in two cyber 
domains- [1] (see Section 3.6). The three cybersecurity dimensions are: 
 
• Dimension 1: Government dimension. 
• Dimension 2: National dimension. 
• Dimension 3: International dimension.  
 
During the presentation of the NCMF levels, we will identify both stakeholders and actors, but the 
focus will be on actors only, since responsibility for the execution of the NCMF, and implementation 
of national cybersecurity functions are assigned to them. Furthermore, actors include systems 
(technology), as well as products. The NCMF actors are all the entities (human, IT and other  
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systems) interacting with the NCMF. The following actor types are found across all three 
dimensions and must be considered during the application of the NCMF. We now provide a 
description of the actor types, and illustrate that all three actor types are found across the 
dimensions in Table 3: 
 
• State and government actors -  these are inclusive of all state and government sector entities, 
as well  as public sector entities existing within a country's borders [1].  
• Organised non-state actors - these are groups such as hackers, cyber militia, (state-
sponsored or individual), and cyber-crime organisations. Vendors, security and defence 
contractors supporting the cybersecurity endeavours of states are also included in this           
group [1]. 
• Non-organised non-state actors - this group typically consists of individuals launching crime 
campaigns and hacktivism activity.  
 
Table 3 visualises all the actor types can be found across all three the dimensions: 
 
Table 3: Dimensions and actor types 
Government Dimension National Dimension International Dimension 
State and government actors  State and government actors  State and government actors  
Organised non-state actors  Organised non-state actors  Organised non-state actors  
Non-organised non-state 
actors  
Non-organised non-state 
actors  
Non-organised non-state 
actors  
 
At a national level, the state needs to foster relationships with cybersecurity vendors, service 
providers and contractors, as well as critical infrastructure providers. These are called non-state 
actors, but they may play a role in securing the national cybersecurity domain [1]. These actors will 
be mapped to the NATO cybersecurity dimensions in Section 3.5.1 to Section 3.5.3.  
 
This mapping will be done in the context of South African actors. We do this in order to provide us 
with a template that can be used to identify actors interacting with national projects, systems or 
products, such as the NCMF, as well as the national cybersecurity functions identified through the 
application of the NCMF. 
 
The NCMF operates across all three NATO dimensions, and being a national framework, actors 
are present in all three dimensions, and need to be considered. Section 3.5.1 to Section 3.5.3 
introduces the dimensions in a South African context [1]. 
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3.5.1 Dimension 1: Government 
 
The government dimension is known as Whole of Government (WoG), and it aims to improve co-
ordination between different state departments. In the context of using South Africa as the reference 
developing country, this dimension includes the three spheres of the South African government. 
The three spheres are national, provincial and local government. Each sphere has its own 
legislative, executive and administrative structures.  
 
The legislatures are elected members, and their purpose is to oversee the activities of the 
executives and administrative departments. They also approve law and national policies. The 
executive is the cabinet, and their role is to synchronise the development of law and national 
policies.  
 
They further supervise the implementation of the law and national policies by the government 
departments. The government departments execute the tasks of government. They are 
accountable to the executive. The South African government spheres and their structures are 
shown in Table 4 as taken from [61]: 
 
Table 4: South African government spheres and their machinery [61] 
Sphere Legislature Executive Administration 
National Parliament  President and cabinet  Directors general and 
departments  
Provincial  Provincial 
legislative 
Premier and executive 
council  
Heads of department (HoD) 
and staff  
Local Council  Mayor and mayoral 
committee  
Municipal manager, HoDs and 
staff  
 
We have mentioned earlier that national cybersecurity may be viewed from three dimensions, and 
that there are actors and stakeholders operating in the three dimensions. The concept that the 
dimensions consist of actors is shown in Table 5.  
 
Keeping in mind that the actors were defined as being either human or non-human, and are entities 
that interact with a project, system or product (see Section 3.5), it might in some instances happen 
that the state and government actors, organised non-state actors and non-organised non-state 
actors may be the same across all three dimensions.  
 
A good example of this is the Anonymous Hacking Group that may, or may not, interact with 
projects, systems or products across the actors in all three dimensions. Hacking groups and  
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hacktivists are, by definition, always non-organised non-state actors across all three dimensions. 
Some of the South African state and government actors, organised non-state actors and non-
organised non-state actors in the government dimension are shown in Table 5. 
 
We further show in Table 5 that the state and government actors which could possibly act on the 
South African cyber domain, are typically government departments interacting with cybersecurity 
projects, systems, or products. It also shows that organised non-state actors are typically civil 
society groupings such as universities and research councils, and that non-organised non-state 
actors are any actor that has no organised structures.  
 
The location of these actors could be national, or international, and their interaction on cybersecurity 
with projects, systems or products cannot be denied or overlooked. Due to the interconnected 
nature of nations and governments, international actors may inadvertently interact with, and 
influence cybersecurity projects, systems or products across all three dimensions.  
 
Table 5: Example of possible South African Government actors 
Actors Possible South African Government Actors 
State and government 
actors 
• Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (JCPS), 
• Department of Defence (DOD),  
• South African Police Service(SAPS),  
• State Security Agency (SSA),  
• Department of and Postal and Telecommunications Services 
(DTPS)  
• Department of Justice (DoJ),  
• Electronic Communications Security -  CSIRT (ECS-CSIRT), 
• Cybersecurity Hub. 
Organised non-state 
actors 
• Information Security Group Africa (ISG Africa).  
• South African Cyber Security Academic Alliance (SACSAA).  
• Centre for Cyber Security at the University of Johannesburg (UJ).  
• South African Centre for Information Security (CIS). 
• Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) cybersecurity 
centre of innovation for South Africa. 
• IT security vendors, and ISPs. 
• Mobile operators.  
• IT service providers.  
Non-organised         
non-state actors     
• Anonymous hacking group.  
• LulzSec hacking group. 
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3.5.2 Dimension 2: National 
 
The national dimension is also known as the Whole of Nation (WoN), and the emphasis is on civil 
society, academia, ICT and security specialists and critical infrastructures. The aim is to establish 
and improve co-operation in terms of national and international cybersecurity matters. 
 
Table 6 shows that the national dimension considers state and government actors, organised non-
state actors and non-organised non-state actors which may interact with cybersecurity projects, 
systems or products at national level. The type of actors will differ from nation to nation, and depend 
on a nation’s political make-up and organisation. Using South Africa as a reference country, State 
and Government Actors are provincial and local government structures. This includes Heads of 
Departments (HoDs) and municipalities as we have shown in Table 4. The different possible 
national actors from a South African perspective are shown in Table 6. 
 
Table 6: Example of possible national actors 
Actors Possible South African National Actors 
State and government actors • Provincial and local government structures such as 
national disaster management centres (NDMCs) and their 
HoDs 
Organised non-state actors • Information security group africa (ISG Africa),  
• South African Cyber Security Academic Alliance 
(SACSAA),  
• Centre for Cyber Security at the University of 
Johannesburg (UJ), South African Centre for Information 
Security (CIS),  
• Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) 
cybersecurity. centre of innovation for South Africa. 
Non-organised non-state actors • Anonymous and LulzSec hacking groups. 
 
3.5.3 Dimension 3: International 
 
The international dimension is also known as Whole of Systems (WoS). Actors operating in the 
international dimension are diplomats, international technical work groups and internet governance 
stakeholders. The aim is to establish and facilitate collaboration. The different possible international 
actors from a South African perspective are shown in Table 7. 
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Table 7 shows that international actors could be foreign nation-states, as well as their departments 
concerned with cybersecurity. Examples are the United States Federal Bureau of Investigation 
(FBI) cybercrime investigative capability [62]  and the United States Department of Homeland 
Security [63]. 
 
Table 7: Example of possible international actors 
Actors Possible International Actors 
State and government actors • The other Nation States, Foreign Departments of Defence, 
Foreign Security Agencies, such as the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI), United States Department of Homeland 
Security 
Organised non-state actors • Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST),  
• Vendors such as Microsoft and Cisco 
Non-organised non-state actors • Anonymous  and LulzSec Hacking Groups 
 
3.5.4 Rationale and sample application of dimensions 
 
The main purpose for the consideration of the dimensions is thus to provide a mechanism to assist 
with the identification of NCMF actors specific to the nation-state applying the NCMF. The 
identification of NCMF actors will result in a list of possible actors to be considered, and to be made 
responsible for the application of the NCMF. 
 
 Responsibility for the implementation of cybersecurity functions may also be assigned to the actors 
identified. In Table 8 we propose an actor and stakeholder identification template that can be used 
to assist with the identification of national actors and stakeholders.  
 
The intention is for entities applying the NCMF to use this template to identify their specific actors 
and stakeholders across the three dimensions, for each national cybersecurity function. Each entity 
making use of the Actor and Stakeholder Identification Template will populate the template with 
their actors and stakeholders across the three dimensions that are applicable to a specific national 
cybersecurity function.  
 
We show in Table 8 a sample application of our Actor and Stakeholder Identification Template for 
the National Incident Handling function.  Table 8 is populated with the actors identified in Table 5, 
Table 6 and Table 7. In our example, the actors identified n Table 8 will be assigned the 
responsibility to plan, build, run monitor, and interact with the National Incident Handling function. 
In some instances, where no suitable actors and stakeholders can be identified by using our 
template, nations may consider creating new roles, and assign responsibilities to new actors.  
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Table 8: Actor and stakeholder identification template for national incident 
handling function 
 Dimension 1 
Government 
Dimension 2 
National 
Dimension 3 
International 
State and Government Stakeholders and 
Actors 
SSA, DTPS NDMC FBI 
Organised Non-State Stakeholders and 
Actors 
Universities,  ISPs FIRST 
Non-Organised Non-State Stakeholders 
and Actors 
Nation Vendors Consultants 
 
An example of a new role could be that of executive cyber leadership, with the responsibility to 
initiate and construct the national cybersecurity mission and vision, and to steer and guide the 
national cyber resources and operations. For guidance on roles and responsibilities in terms of ICT, 
the Skills Framework for the Information Age (SFIA) [64] or NIST's National Initiative for 
Cybersecurity Education (NICE) Cybersecurity Workforce Framework described in                          
NIST SP 800-181 [65] may be consulted.  
 
The national, overall controlling body (residing at level 2 of the NCMF, and introduced in Section 
5.4) will be established by actors that are identified by using our template. Also, some of these 
actors will be selected to serve on the national overall controlling body. The responsibility for the 
implementation of selected and prioritised national cybersecurity functions is also assigned to the 
actors that are identified using our template.  
 
Now that the discussion on dimensions is concluded, we will introduce and discuss the cyber 
domains in Section 3.6. We will introduce two domains: the Offensive and Defensive domains, and 
their lifecycle phases.  
 
3.6 Cybersecurity domains – offensive and defensive 
 
Figure 16 serves to orient the reader, and shows that this section will be used to discuss the two 
NCMF Domains as mentioned in NATO. The two domains are the offensive and defensive domains. 
The defensive domain lifecycle phases of prevent, detect, respond and recover are displayed. 
 
The defensive domain lifecycle phases allow us to identify actors, functions and structures, and 
influences the selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity functions for implementation. As our 
intention is to illustrate the application of the NCMF in context of the defensive domain, we have 
only included the defensive domain lifecycle phases in Figure 16. 
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Figure 16: Section 3.5 Orientation - Domains 
 
NATO identifies two domains in which cyber actions can take place. These are the offensive domain 
and the defensive domain. The lifecycle phases of the domains assist with the identification of 
cybersecurity structures from where cybersecurity functions are offered.. The offensive domain 
describe offensive actions in cyber, and the defensive domain describes defensive actions in     
cyber [1].  
 
The offensive domain is typically the responsibility of a nation state’s army, or intelligence agency. 
Cyber defence is the action of defending organisational or national ICT assets against attacks, 
discovering attacks, and to respond to, and recover from attacks and cybersecurity incidents. Both 
the offensive and defensive domains consist of lifecycle phases (see Section 3.6.1 and Section 
3.6.2). The lifecycle phases serve to group the cybersecurity activities found in the domains 
logically, and this, in turn, provides input into the selection, and prioritisation of national 
cybersecurity functions.  
The discussion of the lifecycle phases is important since they could influence the selection and 
prioritisation of both mandatory and non-mandatory cybersecurity functions. More importantly, the 
lifecycle phases could assist us with the identification of the cybersecurity structures needed to offer 
the national cybersecurity functions. Our rationale for introducing and discussing the cybersecurity 
domains is: 
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• Rationale 1: The cybersecurity domain in which the NCMF operate, will inform and influence 
the selection and prioritisation of mandatory national, and general cybersecurity functions. This 
is because the national cybersecurity functions needed, and its urgency for implementation will 
differ depending on whether the NCMF is applied in the context of the offensive or defensive 
domains.   
 
As an example, in the offensive domain, the focus could shift to national cybersecurity functions 
such as the establishment of a military cyber function, consisting of cyber warfare services, 
whereas in the defensive domain the focus could be on functions such as a national incident 
Handling function that consists of incident response services. In times of war, cybersecurity 
functions in the offensive domain will receive priority implementation over functions in the 
defensive domain. 
 
• Rationale 2: The exploration of the activities taking place in the cybersecurity domain lifecycle 
phases assist with the identification of cybersecurity structures needed to offer national 
cybersecurity functions from. Different cybersecurity functions are needed during the different 
lifecycle phases, and these functions may be offered from different cybersecurity structures. 
Furthermore, as a complementary function to the dimensions, selecting an NCMF cybersecurity 
domain assists with the identification of actors.  
 
Different actors are associated when comparing the offensive and defensive domains with each 
other, and this is illustrated in Table 10. To illustrate this in context of South Africa, the government 
actors in the offensive domain could be the South African Department of Defence (DOD), while 
government actors in the defensive domain could be the South African Department of 
Telecommunications and Postal Services (DTPS). Actors were introduced and discussed in    
Section 3.5. 
 
Our intention is to illustrate the application of the NCMF in context of the Defensive domain since 
we have experience working in this domain. The purpose for the selection of a domain in which the 
NCMF operate, is thus to: 
 
• Provide input into the selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity functions. 
• Complement the identification of actors identified by the dimensions. 
• Use the domain’s lifecycle phases to assist with the identification of relevant national 
cybersecurity structures and its services, from where national cybersecurity functions, relevant 
to the domain lifecycle phases, will be offered from.  
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In Section 3.6.1. we will Introduce the offensive domain and its lifecycle phases briefly, and in 
Section 3.6.2, we introduce the defensive domain lifecycle phases. Analysis of the defensive 
domain lifecycle phases has two purposes.  
 
Purpose 1: The first purpose is to assist us with the identification of existing cybersecurity 
associated functions and services. Identification of the cybersecurity structures allows us to identify, 
and to analyse the structure’s functions and services. This, in turn, allows us to identify overlapping 
services and technologies which then could potentially be combined to realise a saving in terms of 
cost, and skills. 
 
Purpose 2: The second purpose is to identify gaps in the existing structures. Each lifecycle phase’s 
cybersecurity services may be offered from a different cybersecurity structure. Identifying the 
cybersecurity structures is important since this allows a nation-state to identify existing structures 
which could be used to offer national cybersecurity functions from. Where the ideal structure does 
not exist, or where there are gaps in the existing structures, the outcome of the analysis can form 
the basis for a gap analysis to drive the development and establishment of new national 
cybersecurity structures. 
 
Section 3.6.1 briefly introduces and discusses the offensive domain.  
 
3.6.1 Offensive domain 
 
The purpose of offensive actions in cyber is to disrupt, destroy, steal and deny access to an 
adversary's systems. The NCSs of more than 30 countries describe dedicated offensive warfare 
programmes [1]. A well written NCS will describe the roles and responsibilities of actors in both the 
offensive and defensive domains. 
 
Offensive actions are often framed as "attack". The offensive goals and actions differ between 
actors. As an example, non-state actors will launch cyber-attacks in order to steal information that 
can be sold (that is, credit card information), or to improve their status within their group. The actions 
of state actors may include spying, or theft of military or industrial secrets. 
 
During armed conflict, state actors may also use cyber weapons in support of kinetic weapons, or 
in some cases to replace kinetic weapons. The offensive domain lifecycle phases are 
reconnaissance, initial compromise, command and control, lateral movement, target attainment, 
exfiltration, corruption, and disruption [66][67]. 
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We will now be spending all our focus on the Defensive domain, since this is our domain of 
experience. The Offensive domain will not be discussed in further detail, and our illustrations and 
examples will be in context of the Defensive domain. Section 3.6.2 introduces and discusses the 
Defensive domain’s four lifecycle phases, and identifies some of the existing structures from where 
the lifecycle phases’ functions services may be offered from. 
 
3.6.2 Defensive domain 
 
Defensive actions in cyber has as purpose to protect organisations and nations’ cyberspace against 
attacks. Activity in the defensive domain typically happens within the organisation, or nations 
networks [68]. The NATO proposes four cyber defence lifecycle phases. The four lifecycle phases 
proposed by NATO [1] are echoed by the United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission [69],     
NIST [70], and the United States National Security Agency (NSA) [71]. Furthermore, it corresponds 
to the NIST incident handling lifecycle phases [72] [73] [74]. The four lifecycle phases proposed by 
NATO, and others, are [1] [72] [73] [74]: 
 
• Protecting phase. 
• Detection phase. 
• Responding phase. 
• Recovering phase. 
 
The discussion of the defensive domain’s lifecycle phases is valuable in terms of identifying 
national, organisational, or commercial cybersecurity structures, and the cybersecurity services 
they offer during each of its lifecycle phases. Different structures offer different cybersecurity 
services across the different defensive domain lifecycle phases. It is our experience that 
commercial organisations often use a single structure to offer all the cyber defence life cycle 
phases.  
 
As an example, a SOC can offer cybersecurity services to protect, detect, respond and recover 
from cybersecurity attacks and incidents at organisational level. However, at national level, different 
structures are often used to facilitate each of the individual defensive lifecycle phases such as using 
a national CSIRT to facilitate only the respond phase of the cyber defence lifecycle phase. The four 
defensive domain lifecycle phases, with their cybersecurity structures, are now introduced. 
 
Phase 1: Protect 
 
Phase 1 refers to the protection of national assets. A taxonomy may be used to categorise the 
security controls needed to protect national infrastructure. An example of such a taxonomy is  
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technical controls, administrative controls, and physical controls [75]. Technical controls describe 
controls that are technical in nature. Examples of technical controls are access control enforcers 
(firewalls) and end-point protection, such as anti-malware, while administrative controls are controls 
such as policies, processes, procedures, standards, best practices and guidelines.  
 
Physical controls describe controls that are needed to enforce physical security. Examples are 
biometric access controls, guards and gates. Administrative controls are supported, and where 
possible, enforced by technical and physical controls. These protective actions are sometimes 
referred to as information assurance which describes the act of protecting all information, 
irrespective of which media it resides on [76].  
 
It is important to establish a relationship between technical controls and the processes that they 
support to allow alignment with business, and the effective use of resources [77]. This is where 
disciplines such as Enterprise Information Security Architecture (EISA) comes into play [78] [79]. 
The cybersecurity operational services during the protect phase are commonly offered from a SOC 
structure at organisational level, and a Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) or CSIRT7 
at national level. 
 
Phase 2: Detect 
 
Phase 2 presumes that something has already happened. It is impossible to detect attacks before 
they have occurred, but attacks may be predicted. At a national level, intelligence and counter 
intelligence (CI) can assist with the prediction of attacks before they happen, and also detect attacks 
in progress, but when considering critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP), it is difficult to 
predict attacks before they happen.  
 
This is because Intelligence and CI activities typically have a military application [1], and are used 
at national level to detect cyber attacks against nation states. Intelligence and CI activities are rarely 
part of the organisational cybersecurity effort. Experience has shown that organisations typically 
use cyber threat intelligence as a mechanism to predict attacks against the organisational assets. 
 
Technical controls such as intrusion prevention systems (IPS), and intrusion detection systems 
(IDSs) typically provide a preventative function in that they use signatures to block attacks. They 
may also provide a detective function in that their logs can be analysed to detect attacks. This is 
an example of a technical control providing functions across the preventative and detective lifecycle.  
 
                                                     
7 The terms CERT and CSIRT refers to the same structure. 
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The monitoring of these types of control logs typically happens in a SOC, and may be done by 
using Security Incident and Event Monitoring (SIEM) tools. SIEM tools can also be used to monitor 
ICT assets during all lifecycle phases. Another example of a technical control providing a detective 
function is automated vulnerability scanners, or penetration testing. The organisational ICT 
infrastructure should also be scanned pro-actively with vulnerability management tools to discover 
vulnerabilities that must then be mitigated.  
 
Another detective control is file integrity monitoring (FIM) controls that monitor for, and reports on 
file changes and changes to operating systems (OSs) which could indicate compromised systems 
[80]. FIM controls may also be deployed in a preventative function. The detection phase can also 
provide an assurance that the technical controls deployed in the protect phase is working properly, 
and doing what it is supposed to do (namely, rules and filters are working, and attacks and malware 
are blocked).  
 
Phase 3: Respond  
 
Phase 3 is initiated once a breach is discovered, and at national and organisational level, this is 
typically the task of a CERT, or CSIRT [81]. In South Africa, this phase is supported by the 
Cybersecurity Hub [82] that looks after national interests, and the Electronic Communications 
Security Computer Security Incident Response Team (ECS-CERT) [83] looking after government 
interests. A CERT or CSIRT co-ordinates, and supports response to cybersecurity incidents.  
 
The respond phase has its own sub-phases. The SysAdmin, Audit, Networking, and Security 
(SANS) Institute describes the respond sub-phase as identification, containment, eradication, 
recovery and lessons learned [84], while NIST lists them as preparation, detection and analysis, 
containment, eradication and recovery, and post-incident activity [72].  
 
Phase 4: Recover 
 
This phase starts as part of the “respond” phase, and involves business continuity management 
(BCM) and the business continuity plan (BCP). BCM is defined as “the capability of the organization 
to continue delivery of products or services at acceptable predefined levels following a disruptive 
incident.” [85]. BCM is more holistic than IT disaster recovery in that service and functions are 
recovered inclusive of the IT, and systems supporting those services and functions. It includes 
aspects such as people, facilities, telephony and networks.  
 
Although the defensive domain can include sub-domains such as strategic cyber operations [86] 
and battlefield cyber capabilities, not all of these are applicable to all states and nations [1]. The  
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application of the  NCMF is illustrated in context of the defensive domain and each of the cyber 
defence lifecycle phases proposed by NATO [1] has its own cybersecurity functions and services, 
and could be offered from different cybersecurity structures.  
 
The defensive domain also has its own unique actors. These actors may be government actors and 
may include public actors in the public space. Table 9 shows possible actors interacting with the 
defensive domain. The actors are South African actors, and we have identified them based on our 
experience, and using the stakeholders and actor identification template that we proposed in      
Table 3.8. 
 
Table 9: Defensive domain lifecycle actors 
 Government National International 
S
ta
te
 a
n
d
 
G
o
v
e
rn
m
e
n
t 
A
c
to
rs
 DTPS, SAPS, South African 
Reserve Bank (SARB), SSA, 
DOD, DTPS, ECS-CSIRT. 
Cybersecurity hub, State 
Information Technology 
Agency (SITA), 
Cybersecurity Hub 
None - State and 
government actors 
by definition exclude 
International actors. 
O
rg
a
n
is
e
d
 N
o
n
-S
ta
te
 
A
c
to
rs
 None - Organised non-state 
actors by definition excludes 
government. 
South African Banking Risk 
Information Centre 
(SABRIC) as the financial             
sector-CSIRT, IT Industry, 
ISP's fixed and mobile 
operators, service 
providers, information 
security group. 
US-CERT, FIRST, 
Vendors. 
N
o
n
-O
rg
a
n
is
e
d
 
N
o
n
-S
ta
te
 
A
c
to
rs
 None - Non-organised non-
state actors by definition 
excludes government. 
Public, South African Cyber 
Security Academic Alliance, 
Centre for Cybersecurity at 
UJ, South African Centre 
for Information Security. 
Hacking groups. 
 
In Section 3.6, we mentioned that the overall purpose for considering the domains is to provide 
input into the selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity functions, and assist with the identification 
of cybersecurity structures from where cybersecurity functions could be offered from. We further 
mentioned that the domains might provide input into the identification of actors.  
 
We have proposed and presented the actor and stakeholder identification template in Table 8. The 
actor and stakeholder identification template will assist us with the identification of actors across  
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the three dimensions, and the result is a list of all possible national actors. From this list of actors, 
some of them will be assigned the responsibility of implementing and managing: 
 
• One or more national cybersecurity functions 
• National cybersecurity structures, and, 
• Domains. 
 
It would thus be helpful if we had a template that could assist us to map the actors to a cybersecurity 
function, structure, and domain lifecycle phases. To assist with this, we propose a function, 
structure and actor identification template for domains in Table 10. This template may be used to 
map the actors identified in Table 9 as input. Our function, structure and actor identification template  
for domains may be used to identify lifecycle actors for the defensive as well as the offensive 
domains. 
 
Table 10 shows an illustrative application of the template. It needs to be noted that the general 
cybersecurity functions are identified in Chapter 4. It may happen at national level that one function 
may be offered from a single structure with a single government entity responsible for the function, 
or a single function may be offered from multiple structures, under the auspices of multiple 
government entities. 
 
Table 10: Function, structure and actor identification template for 
domains 
 Prevent Detect Respond Recover 
National 
Cybersecurity 
Function 
Military cyber / 
cyber warfare 
Monitoring and 
evaluation 
Incident 
handling 
Incident 
handling 
Structure DOD Cyber 
Command 
SITA Cybersecurity 
Hub, ECS-
CSIRT 
Cybersecurity 
Hub, ECS-
CSIRT 
Actors DOD DOD / DTPS / 
SSA 
DTPS / SSA / 
DOD 
SABRIC / 
CIIP 
 
This ends our discussion on the defensive domain. Section 3.7 contextualise the cybersecurity 
domains and actors that were introduced in Section 3.6.1 and Section 3.6.2 for South Africa. 
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3.7 Contextualising the domains and actors  
 
The NCMF actors, and the domains they operate in, are shown in Figure 17, and is contextualised 
for the South African environment. The figure was taken from NATO [1] and adapted by the author. 
The figure shows the offensive and defensive domains as described in NATO’s National 
Cybersecurity Framework Manual [1].  
 
Figure 17 is a visual representation of the possible actors in the offensive and defensive domains. 
The stakeholders and actors identification template presented in Section 3.5.3 in Table 8 was used 
to populate Figure 17. The actors in the defensive domain are shown in more detail than the actors 
in the offensive domain since the decision was made and motivated in Section 3.6 to illustrate the 
application of the NCMF in context of the defensive domain. The three dimensions of government, 
national and international, with their actors and stakeholders were introduced in Section 3.5. The 
defensive and offensive domains with their actors is shown in Figure 17. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 17: NCMF actors and associated domains as taken from NATO [1],  
adapted by the author 
A National Cybersecurity Management Framework for Developing Countries 
 
79 
  
The NCMF Level 1 
 
Figure 17  shows that the state and government actors in the defensive activity domain from a 
South African perspective is the SSA, the DOD, the DTPS, as well as the ECS-CSIRT and the 
Cybersecurity Hub. The DTPS is an actor acting on the South African national Cybersecurity Hub 
structure and the SSA is an actor acting on the ECS-CSIRT structure. There will be instances where 
the state and government actor’s responsibilities overlap across the offensive and defensive 
domains.  
 
An example of overlapping responsibilities is the South African DOD’s responsibility to defend 
South Africa’s cyber space in times of peace (defensive domain), but they also have to offer an 
offensive function during times of war (offensive domain). The selection of a domain for the NCMF 
to operate in is unique, and specific to the nation state’s geo-political posture during the application 
of the NCMF.  
 
The principle that we want to communicate though, is that it is necessary to select a domain to 
assist with the identification of cybersecurity structures. Section 3.8 introduces the cybersecurity 
mandates. Nation states using the NCMF need to select a mandate, or mandates for the NCMF. 
The cybersecurity mandates influence the identification and selection of national cybersecurity 
functions. 
 
3.8 Cybersecurity mandates 
 
Figure 18 serves to orient the Reader, and shows that this section will be used to discuss 
the NCMF Mandates. The five Mandates identified by NATO, and displayed in  
Figure 18 are: 
 
• Military cyber 
• Counter cybercrime  
• Intelligence and counter-intelligence 
• Critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) and national crisis management 
• Cyber diplomacy and internet governance 
 
A mandate is a formal order, or provides someone with the authority to do something, or to behave 
in a certain way [87]. In the context of the NCMF, the mandate gives the NCMF the authority to act 
in a specific way during the nation’s cybersecurity effort. It also influences the selection and 
prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions. NATO [1], identified five mandates and these are  
military cyber, counter cybercrime, intelligence and counter-intelligence, critical information 
infrastructure protection (CIIP), national crisis management and cyber diplomacy and internet 
governance.  
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Figure 18: Section 3.6 Orientation - Mandates 
 
The NCMF can operate in one, many, or all mandates, and each mandate is the responsibility of a 
Government department, or one Government department could be responsible for more than one 
mandate. One or more of the cybersecurity mandates need to be selected for the NCMF. The 
purpose of the national cybersecurity mandates is to: 
 
• Provide input into the selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity functions. As an example, if 
a nation  selects the military cyber mandate, then actors and functions supporting the mandate 
will receive priority for implementation. 
• Assist nation states to identify responsible actors. Different mandates require different actors. 
 
The five mandates, as taken from NATO [1], and adapted for the South African context, are 
introduced next. 
 
3.8.1 Mandate 1: Military cyber 
 
This mandate forms part of the offensive domain, and as discussed, our focus is on the defensive 
domain. The military cyber mandate is thus not discussed in detail. This military cyber mandate 
consists of five services and these are [1]: 
 
• Protection of South African defence networks. 
• Establishing a cyber warfare capability. 
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• Development of a network-centric warfare capability (sensor to shooter, or intelligent logistics). 
• Battlefield or tactical cyber warfare, and, 
• Strategic cyber-warfare. 
 
In-South Africa, the military cyber mandate is executed by cybersecurity functions and services 
offered from the DOD Cyber Command, as prescribed by the NCPF [6] and the Cybercrimes and 
Cybersecurity Bill [34].  
 
3.8.2 Mandate 2: Counter cybercrime  
 
Cybercrime happens when criminals exploit the anonymity and speed of the internet to commit 
crimes across borders. This mandate covers cyberterrorism, theft of identity, and theft of intellectual 
property. Cybercrime is one of the fastest growing areas of crime globally. The World Economic 
Forum (WEF) estimates the cost of cybercrime at $445 billion per annum [88]. Interpol distinguishes 
between two main categories of cybercrime [89].  
 
The first category is advanced cybercrime. This category describes sophisticated attacks against 
computer systems. The second category is cyber-enabled crime. This is where a traditional crime 
is enabled by cyber. Examples include crimes against children, terrorism, and financial crime. Since 
there are no jurisdictional restrictions or boundaries where it concerns cybercrime, collaboration 
and cooperation between nations is essential. From a South African perspective, this mandate is 
performed by national cybersecurity functions offered from the SAPS Cybercrime Centre, as 
mandated by the NCPF [6] and the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34]. The Counter 
Cybercrime mandate resides in the defensive domain. 
 
3.8.3 Mandate 3: Intelligence and counter-intelligence 
 
This mandate prescribes national cybersecurity functions to detect and combat cyber intrusions, 
and could rely on aspects outside of the cyber domain, such as human-intelligence and signal-
intelligence. Specific foreign policy response mechanisms need to be developed to govern 
intelligence and counter-intelligence in the cyber domain.  
 
This mandate may also include functions to spy on nations. From a South African perspective, this 
mandate is performed by national cybersecurity functions offered by the State Security Agency 
(SSA) using various cybersecurity structures, as well as the DOD Cyber Command as prescribed 
by the NCPF [6] and the Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill.  
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The Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence mandate resides in both the defensive and offensive 
domains in that this mandate may be helpful to predict cyber-attacks (see Section 3.6.2). It may 
also be used in an offensive manner during times of war, to actively spy on nation states. 
 
3.8.4 Mandate 4: Critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) and 
national crisis management 
 
Critical Information Infrastructure (CII) must be defined and identified and should form part of the 
national crisis management structure. Mechanisms must be put in place to facilitate the 
collaboration and dissemination of information between CII service providers South Africa 
addresses . CIIP in the NCPF [6], the South African Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34] and 
the Protection of Critical Infrastructure Bill [90].  
 
The National Crisis Management mandate-is satisfied through national cybersecurity functions 
offered from a national SOC or  CSIRT structure [1]. The critical information infrastructure protection 
(CIIP) and the national crisis management mandate resides in the defensive domain. 
 
3.8.5 Mandate 5: Cyber diplomacy and internet governance 
 
This mandate covers the promotion of norms and standards for cyber behaviour, as well as the 
process by which state and non-state actors manage the internet. Internet governance implies non-
government, self-regulation and is comprised of the public sector as well as government.  
 
Some examples of organisations are the Internet Architecture Board (IAB) [91] and the Internet 
Engineering Task Force (IETF) [92]. Their focus in terms of cybersecurity is a preventative one. 
The cyber diplomacy and internet governance mandate resides in the defensive domain.  
 
3.9 Contextualising the dimensions and mandates  
 
Nations applying our NCMF should contextualise the dimensions and mandates for their countries. 
This contextualisation helps with the identification of actors. The contextualisation also informs the 
selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions. We illustrate this approach by 
contextualising the dimensions and mandates for the South African environment. The three 
dimensions and five mandates contextualised for the South African environment are shown in 
Figure 19.  
 
Figure 19 was developed using input from NATO [1] and shows the five mandates and three 
dimensions with its actors specific to South Africa. One, many or all of these mandates can be  
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assigned to actors present in the government, national or international dimensions. The figure 
further shows that each mandate can be viewed from a different perspective such as a government, 
national or international perspectives. Figure 19 is populated with some of the actors we identified 
using the stakeholders and actor identification template presented in Section 3.5.3 in Table 8, as 
well as the function, structure and actor identification template for domains in Table 10. 
 
Figure 19 illustrates how responsibility may be assigned to actors for the different mandates. To 
illustrate the assigning of responsibilities to actors, the responsibility of government and its 
departments is to coordinate national crisis management efforts, whereas the national responsibility 
and focus would be to foster cooperation between, and within industries and their sector-CSIRTs. 
From a South African context, the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security Cluster (JCPS) [93] is 
responsible for most mandates. The JCPS consists of the Department of Defence and Military 
Veterans (DOD and DMV); South African Police Service (SAPS); Justice (DOJ) and Correctional 
Services; Home Affairs (DHA); State Security Agency (SSA) and Finance. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 19: Mandate actors mapped to dimensions in the South African 
context [1]  
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Figure 19 also illustrates that from a government perspective (Whole of Government) the South 
African Department of Defence (DOD) is responsible for the military cyber mandate, the South 
African Police Service is responsible for the counter cybercrime mandate, and the intelligence and 
counter intelligence mandate is the responsibility of the South African Secret Service (SSA).  
 
Figure 19 further shows that the critical infrastructure protection and national crisis management 
mandate is the responsibility of the Department of Public Enterprises, and the Department of 
Telecommunications and Postal Services (DTPS) - who are the state actors at government level. 
The national Cybersecurity Hub is a state actor at national level, while the sector-CSIRTs are 
national, non-state actors. FIRST is an international, organised non-state actor. 
 
The cyber diplomacy and internet governance mandate is the responsibility of the South African 
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the Department of International Relations and Cooperation 
(DIRCO). It is also shown in Figure 19 that government has a national coordinating function and 
that non-state actors cooperate at national level. Collaboration takes place at international level, 
but in essence, the cooperative and collaborative functions need to be managed and facilitated by 
government.  
 
The responsibilities for the different mandates are assigned in the South African National 
Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) [4] and the South African Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity 
Bill [33]. The state actors, non-state actors and non-state actors abroad may be identified by using 
the stakeholders and actor identification template introduced in Section 3.5.4, presented in         
Table 8. The perspective from where the mandates are viewed from, influences the cybersecurity 
functions required.  
 
The government, with a perspective on coordinating responsibility, might want to implement 
national cybersecurity crisis management centres to accomplish this (the National Cybersecurity 
Hub is an example), while at a national level, sector-CSIRTs could be established nationally across 
sectors and industry to foster cooperation. In terms of international collaboration, the National 
Cybersecurity Hub and sector-CSIRTs liaise with the Forum of Incident Response and Security 
Teams (FIRST).  
 
Nations applying the NCMF could select one, or more than one mandate. Each mandate requires 
a cybersecurity function, or functions. Considering the fiscal and skills constraints, as well as in 
keeping with the recommendation that developing countries should start small and follow a phased 
approach during the implementation of national cybersecurity functions, we recommended that 
developing countries only select one mandate at a time.  
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The Critical Infrastructure Protection and National Crisis Management mandate is selected as the 
mandate in context of which the illustrative application of the NCMF implementation part will be 
done in Part 2. 
 
3.10 Conclusion 
 
Section 3.10 concludes the development of level 1 of the NCMF. In this section, we will provide a 
summation of the work we have done in Chapter 3, and we then present level 1. The Chapter 
started with a motivation for the development of a NCMF in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, the concepts 
of national and international authoritative and normative sources were introduced. These 
authoritative sources are of paramount importance, as they will be consulted to identify prescripts 
for mandatory national cybersecurity functions. National and international normative sources may 
be used to identify non-mandatory functions. 
 
In sections 3.5 to 3.8, the dimensions, mandates and domains were introduced, and selected to 
illustrate the application of the NCMF. The NCMF dimensions, mandates and domains assist the 
user of the NCMF to identify non-mandatory national cybersecurity functions and actors. Section 
3.5 introduced the three dimensions of government, national and international. 
 
Each of these dimensions has actors associated with its and some of the actors in the three 
dimensions were identified in the context of South Africa. The identification of actors is important 
since responsibility for the application of the NCMF, as well as responsibility for the implementation 
of national cybersecurity functions will be assigned to them. To assist with the identification of 
actors, we proposed, and presented a stakeholders and actor identification template in              
Section 3.5.3 in Table 8. 
 
 Section 3.6 introduced the two domains. The two domains are the offensive domain, and the 
defensive domain. The defensive domain was selected as the domain of operation for the NCMF, 
and the selection was made based on our work experience in the defensive domain. The defensive 
domain’s four lifecycle phase was introduced. They are the protecting, detecting, responding and 
recovering phases. Different defensive domain lifecycle phases need different national 
cybersecurity functions, and national cybersecurity structures. An understanding of the defensive 
domain lifecycle phases can thus assist with dentifying national cybersecurity structures, the 
functions and services it offers, and its actors. 
 
The domain selected may also influence the selection of national cybersecurity functions for 
implementation. To assist with the identification of domain-specific structures and actors we have 
proposed and presented a function, structure and actor identification template for domains in              
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Table 10. This template may be populated with the actors identified with the stakeholders and actor 
identification template in Section 3.5.3 inTable 8. Section 3.8 introduced and discussed the five 
mandates. The five mandates are military cyber, counter cybercrime, intelligence and counter 
intelligence, critical information infrastructure protection and national crisis management, and cyber 
diplomacy and internet governance. 
 
The mandate selected to illustrate application of the NCMF implementation part, is the critical 
information infrastructure protection, and national crisis management mandates. Our motivation for 
selecting this mandate, is that we have experience working with these mandates at the national 
level. Level 1 is presented in Figure 20. 
 
Figure 20 shows that authoritative and normative prescripts and recommendations, dimensions, 
mandates and domains in which the NCMF operate need to be considered. It also shows that a 
nation’s government is responsible for level 1 of the NCMF.  Level 1 of the NCMF is foundational 
in nature, and if not applied correctly, the identification, selection and prioritisation of national 
cybersecurity functions might not be relevant to the nation-state applying the NCMF.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 20: NCMF Level 1 
 
Now that we have introduced and discussed level 1 of the NCMF, we will use level 1 in Chapter 4, 
to identify general cybersecurity functions. We will identify the prescripts in national and 
international authoritative sources, as well as the recommendations in national and international 
normative sources. This will result in a list of mandatory and non-mandatory cybersecurity functions. 
From this list, we will identify the most commonly occurring functions to get to a list of general 
cybersecurity functions.  
 
It is important to identify and introduce these functions, since some of them will serve as examples 
during our illustrative application of the rest of the NCMF levels. Chapter 4 is still part of level 1 and 
identifies and introduces the general cybersecurity functions. This is achieved by building on, and 
using the level 1 elements discussed in this Chapter. The sole purpose of Chapter 4 is thus to  
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identify and introduce the general cybersecurity functions. Chapter 4 must be read as being part of 
the level 1 discussion, and as flowing from Chapter 3.
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Chapter 4: General cybersecurity functions 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 4 builds on the introduction and discussion we had of level 1, in Chapter 3. The purpose for the 
development of our NCMF, is to provide a framework that can assist developed and developing countries with 
their national cybersecurity management tasks. These tasks were introduced in Section 2.1 as the 
identification, selection, prioritisation and implementation of national cybersecurity functions. National 
mandatory or non-mandatory cybersecurity functions are identified at level 1 of the NCMF, and selected and 
prioritised at level 2 of the NCMF.  
 
Level 1 is used to identify national and international authoritative sources, and from those sources, identify 
their mandatory cybersecurity function prescripts. Level 1 may also be used to identify non-mandatory 
cybersecurity functions using general recommendations in national and international normative sources. A 
nation-state may also select to identify and use existing authoritative sources from other countries, and use 
the other countries’ mandatory functional prescripts as its non-mandatory function recommendation. This 
means that the authoritative sources of a disparate country become a normative reference for the country 
using it. We will follow this approach, and use the NCMF’s level 1, to identify a list of the most general 
cybersecurity functions.  
 
In most instances, most developing nations have not yet developed national authoritative sources such as a 
NCS [94]. They also often lack the capability and capacity to identify national cybersecurity functions 
themselves. Our general cybersecurity functions will provide these developing countries with a list of 
predetermined, general cybersecurity functions, and they can select functions from this list for national 
implementation. The general cybersecurity functions are identified and discussed in more detail here. The two 
cybersecurity function types were briefly introduced as nation-state specific and mandatory national 
cybersecurity functions, and non-mandatory cybersecurity functions that are general in nature, and this 
Chapter builds on the introduction made in Section 3.3.   
 
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to identify and introduce, in more detail, general cybersecurity functions that 
appear most commonly across the sources we will consult. It is important to have a solid understanding of 
these functions, their service and complementary capabilities, and the structures from where they are offered.  
Our intention is to select two of these functions, and then merge their relevant services and capabilities 
(consisting of people, processes and technology as explained in Section 2.4). These merged services and 
capabilities will then be offered from a new national cybersecurity structure, called the E-CMIRC (See Part 2 
for a best practice guide on how to establish such a structure). This selection must happen in context of 
developing countries, keeping in mind their constraints and unique requirements. The rest of the Chapter is 
structured as follows: 
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Section 4.2 provides a motivation for the identification of the general cybersecurity functions. 
 
Section 4.3 presents the aims of the general cybersecurity functions, and illustrates how they can be selected 
and prioritised by nation states. 
 
Section 4.4 discusses developing countries, and their constraints in context of national cybersecurity matters. 
 
Section 4.5 introduces the approach that we have followed to identify a list of general cybersecurity functions. 
 
Section 4.6 introduces and discusses the general cybersecurity functions. We also select and motivate two of 
the general cybersecurity functions for use in the development of a new, national cybersecurity structure, the 
E-CMIRC.   
 
Section 4.7 concludes the Chapter. 
 
4.2 Motivation 
 
National cybersecurity functions can be general (non-mandatory) in nature, or nation-state specific, and 
mandatory. The NCMF can be used to identify both types. National and international authoritative sources 
identify the nation-state specific and mandatory, functions. Accordingly, these national and international 
authoritative sources, together with national and international normative sources may be used to identify        
non-mandatory functions. The dimensions, domains and mandates inform and influence the selection of 
cybersecurity functions for implementation. They further assist with the identification of national actors, 
structures and services.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 21: Mandatory cybersecurity function sources 
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The sources used for the identification of mandatory cybersecurity functions are shown in Figure 21 as being 
national and international authoritative sources, with guidance being provided by the dimensions, mandates 
and domains. Not implementing these mandatory cybersecurity functions may lead to sanctions. 
 
As with mandatory national cybersecurity functions, the dimensions, domains and mandates influence the 
selection of non-mandatory cybersecurity functions for implementation, and assist with the identification of 
actors, structures and functions. Figure 22 shows that the sources used to identify non-mandatory national 
cybersecurity functions are typically national and international normative sources.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 22: Non-mandatory cybersecurity function sources 
 
The cybersecurity functions mentioned in these sources are viewed as recommendations and are not 
mandatory. We use the term “typically” because nation states may also select to use authoritative sources 
from other countries to identify cybersecurity functions that they can use as non-mandatory functions for their 
own countries. We will follow this approach in Chapter 4 where we will use international normative sources as 
our primary source, but also use national and international authoritative sources to augment our list of 
functions. Not implementing these cybersecurity functions does not lead to sanctions.  
 
We will be using the NCMF in this chapter to identify the general functions that are most common across the 
sources we will consult. We have previously stated that the NCMF is developed in the context of developing 
countries. General cybersecurity functions may be identified by consulting national and international normative 
sources, and will then formulate  the cybersecurity functional recommendations based on them. In keeping 
with our intention to develop the NCMF in the context of developing countries, South African authoritative 
sources will also be consulted, and these sources’ cybersecurity function prescripts will be considered for 
inclusion in our list of general cybersecurity functions. Our approach with regard to identifying the general 
cybersecurity functions using both authoritative and normative sources is motivated as follows: 
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• The international normative sources will provide non-mandatory cybersecurity functions, and the South  
African authoritative sources will provide mandatory cybersecurity functions in the context of a developing  
country.  
• Consulting authoritative and normative sources allows us to illustrate the application of the NCMF to 
identify not only non-mandatory cybersecurity functions, but also mandatory cybersecurity functions. 
• Finding an overlap and appearance of functions across authoritative and normative sources allows some  
measure of certainty that our functions are general in nature, relevant and applicable to South Africa. 
• Similarities between our non-mandatory cybersecurity functions and functions from authoritative sources,  
gives us the certainty that our non-mandatory functions are aligned with international standards and 
approaches. 
 
We are following this approach so that we can identify, and then compile a list of general cybersecurity 
functions, that is not only applicable to developing countries, but is also relevant to developed countries. We 
will further test the relevancy and accuracy of our general cybersecurity functions by comparing, and identifying 
similarities between developed countries’ authoritative sources. Our focus will, however, be on the 
identification of the most commonly occurring functions, in other words, the general cybersecurity functions. 
 
Level 1 of the NCMF describes the identification of national authoritative and normative sources. We will thus 
identify South African national authoritative sources, and consult them to determine mandatory cybersecurity 
functions. These functions are specific to South Africa. International normative sources will then be identified 
and consulted to determine international non-mandatory cybersecurity functions. Lastly, international 
authoritative sources are identified, and our list of non-mandatory functions are then compared against these 
sources. The most commonly functions are then identified. 
 
Nation states may identify similar, or even totally different cybersecurity functions, and this outcome is 
determined by the relevant sources they use, as well as their dimensions, mandates and domains. They may 
even identify many more, or fewer non-mandatory cybersecurity functions than we do. Our list of general 
cybersecurity functions is thus a fluid list, and subject to change. Our approach further illustrates the 
effectiveness of the NCMF, as well as its flexibility, in demonstrating that it can be applied by both developed 
and developing countries. 
 
The identified South African authoritative sources provide input with respect to a developing country. General 
international normative sources, written by developed countries, will be used to provide input applicable to 
developed countries. For countries that do not have the capability or capacity to identify their own national 
cybersecurity functions, the identified non-mandatory cybersecurity functions could serve to provide a “basket,” 
or list of general cybersecurity functions from which they can choose one or two, for implementation.  
 
In Section 4.3, the aims of the general cybersecurity functions are introduced.  
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4.3 Aims of the general cybersecurity functions 
 
The identification of general cybersecurity functions, and the rationale for the presentation of these functions 
in this Chapter, is done with two aims in mind. These aims are: 
 
• Aim 1 is to provide a list of pre-determined, non-mandatory cybersecurity functions from which developed  
and developing countries may make a selection, for implementation. This means that countries that have 
not yet developed their own authoritative and normative sources, or experience skills and fiscal 
constraints, do not need to apply level 1 of the NCMF, but can select one or two of the predetermined, 
non-mandatory functions. Level 1 is applied, when following this approach, by a third party, to identify 
non-mandatory cybersecurity functions on behalf of the nation-state. Level 1 is thus still used, but applied 
by a third party, and not by the nation-state using the NCMF. 
 
• Aim 2:  is for nation states identifying their own national cybersecurity functions, to use this predetermined 
list of non-mandatory cybersecurity functions against which to measure the strategic relevance and 
completeness of their own identified national cybersecurity functions. The non-mandatory cybersecurity 
functions are all strategic in nature, (as opposed to tactical or operational), and, as such, provide a 
predetermined list of functions that are general in nature, against which to measure the strategic 
relevance and completeness of their mandatory national cybersecurity functions. The strategic nature of 
the NCMF will be introduced and described as part of the NCMF implementation strategy in Section I.1. 
 
These two aims are not meant to imply that levels 1 and 2 of the NCMF are of lesser importance, but having 
a list of non-mandatory cybersecurity functions is helpful in a scenario where there is a lack of authoritative 
and normative sources. Based on our experience, this is a scenario often found in developing countries. The 
United Nations (UN) reported in 2017 [95] that only about 38% of nation-states have a published NCSs (an 
authoritative source), and these are mostly published by developed countries.  
 
It is further advantageous to have the general cybersecurity functions to use as a baseline, or foundation, 
against which to measure the completeness and relevance of a nation’s identified national cybersecurity 
functions. Being able to measure the national cybersecurity functions against an existing baseline is useful in 
that it ensures alignment with the international community and its cybersecurity efforts. 
 
 In Section 4.4, we will introduce developing countries and their unique requirements briefly with regard to 
national cybersecurity. We also motivate our recommendation that developing countries should select one, or 
two cybersecurity functions at a time for implementation, and to follow a phased approach. 
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4.4 Developing countries and national cybersecurity 
 
Our experience has shown that developing countries would benefit the most from a list of predetermined, 
general and non-mandatory cybersecurity functions. Our experience has further shown, and it is our 
recommendation, that developing countries should start small, and follow a phased approach, and this means 
that they should select one, or at most two, of the functions for implementation at national level. This can result 
in an improvement in their national cybersecurity posture.  
 
In Section 1.1, the statement was made that developing countries have unique requirements concerning its 
ICT, as well as  the securing its ICT at national level. Some differences between developing and developed 
countries related to their national cybersecurity efforts, are the availability of skills [96] [97]. Developing 
countries typically have fewer people skilled in cybersecurity, as opposed to developed countries where the 
skills shortage is not as evident. 
 
Another difference is that developing countries often have less money to spend on national ICT infrastructure 
development. This impacts negatively on their research infrastructure and cyber-driven commercial activities. 
Developing countries are also typically burdened with intense foreign debt [98]. National cybersecurity often 
fails to receive the focus and resource allocation it should, due to the lack of funding for ICT and the skills 
shortage - both at industrial and national level.  
 
When considering developing countries' skills shortage and financial constraints where it concerns the 
implementation and securing of its national ICT infrastructure, one can conclude that it will not be feasible for 
them to implement all the general cybersecurity functions at once. It is our belief that developing countries 
should start small, and build on their initial successes when implementing national cybersecurity strategy and 
national cybersecurity functions. In other words, they should follow a structured and phased approach.  
 
Accordingly, developing countries should select and prioritise one or two of the identified general cybersecurity 
functions to implement strategically – a move which will save costs, and will allow for the identification and 
skilling of resources to plan, build, run and monitor the national cybersecurity function. The NCMF level 1 is 
applied in Section 4.6 to identify the most general, non-mandatory cybersecurity functions. 
 
4.5 Concepts identifying a list of general cybersecurity functions 
 
In this section, we will introduce the process that we followed during the identification of the general 
cybersecurity functions. In Section 3.3, where we discussed the NCMF level 1 elements, authoritative and 
normative sources were introduced. We used our experience with working in the South African (as a 
developing country) national cybersecurity environment to identify South African national authoritative sources.  
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In order to identify a list of the most commonly occurring mandatory and non-mandatory functions found in 
national and international authoritative and normative sources, we had to keep three concepts in mind. 
 
First concept: Experience showed that it would be helpful to consult international normative sources to 
discover non-mandatory cybersecurity functions. The international normative sources are mostly from 
developed countries where development has already been done in terms of frameworks, standards and best 
practices. There are also implementation references for the cybersecurity functions mentioned in these 
normative sources that are applied, and implemented successfully. One such example is the implementation 
of a national incident handling function using the Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST) 
services framework [99]. 
 
Second concept: We are developing our framework in the context of developing countries. We have thus 
decided to identify national cybersecurity functions from the authoritative sources of at least one developing 
country against which to compare the validity of the non-mandatory functions described in the international 
normative sources. We have selected South Africa as our reference country since we have experience working 
in South Africa, and also because it is one of the few developing countries that have developed authoritative 
sources describing national cybersecurity functions.  
 
Third concept: Once we have compiled a list of non-mandatory functions as described in international 
normative sources, as well as the authoritative sources derived from one developing country, we will validate 
them against international authoritative sources. These sources are selected randomly to avoid bias. This will 
then ensure that our list of general functions identified from international normative sources, as well as  the 
authoritative sources of one developing country, also appears in a random selection of other nations’ 
authoritative sources. This will substantiate the general nature of our list of cybersecurity functions. 
 
4.6 General cybersecurity functions 
 
The identification of general or non-mandatory cybersecurity functions in this chapter is important, since the 
services and technologies realising two of these functions will be identified, and combined to be offered from 
a new structure, called the E-CMIRC. In Section 3.3, we introduced and described the level 1 process to be 
followed during the identification of nation-state specific and mandatory national cybersecurity functions. The 
process entails first identifying  national and international authoritative sources, and then extracting  national 
cybersecurity function prescripts from those sources.  
 
The dimensions, domains and mandates within which the NCMF will operate, is considered next. To determine 
the non-mandatory cybersecurity functions, international normative sources and their recommendations have 
been consulted. We will now introduce the sources that we identified and selected for consultation. 
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Identified international normative sources: We have identified normative sources describing national 
cybersecurity functions for NATO members, America, and the United Kingdom (UK). From a developed country 
perspective, the following international normative sources were identified, and earmarked for consultation to 
identify non-mandatory cybersecurity functions. The normative sources from developed countries included in 
this study are: 
 
• The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) National Cyber Security Framework Manual (2011) [1]  
that can be found here: goo.gl/oVz7iF, 
• The United Kingdom’s Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for Nations (CMM) - Revised Edition  
(2016) [53] that can be found here: goo.gl/p7aMhe, 
• The ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (2011) [100] that can be found here: goo.gl/yF4XBQ, 
• Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) - Version 1.1 (2014) developed by the United States  
Department of Homeland Security [101] that can be found here: goo.gl/Gu8X7V. 
 
Identified South African authoritative sources: From a developing country perspective, South Africa is 
used as a reference country. Three authoritative South African were used to identify national cybersecurity 
functions for developing countries from.  
 
• The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) [6], National Gazette No. 39475,  04 December  
2015, Vol. 606 that can be found here: goo.gl/YcH6Qn 
• The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34], Government Gazette No. 40487 of 9 December 2016 that  
can be found here: goo.gl/HiAvSo and  
• The Protection of Critical Infrastructure Bill 2017 [90] that can be found here: goo.gl/167QB4. 
 
Identified international authoritative sources: The European Union Agency for Network and Information 
Security (ENISA) provides a list of European Nation States’ NCSs  [94]. From this list, a random and blind 
selection was made to do a comparative analysis against, and to correlate our identified non-mandatory 
security functions against, to ensure its relevance. The following developed countries’ and the National 
Cybersecurity Strategies were randomly selected: 
 
• UK's National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 (2016) [102]  that can be found here:  
https://goo.gl/CuhnGK, 
• Irish National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2017 (2015)  [103] that can be found here:  
https://goo.gl/DwA9wY, 
• Cyber Security Strategy for Germany (2011) [104] that can be found here: https://goo.gl/oWkvrB, 
• Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic (2015) [105] that can be found here:  
https://goo.gl/6bNDwq .   
• Finland's Cyber Security Strategy (2013) [106] that can be found here: https://goo.gl/RBYXdr  
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For the identification of the non-mandatory cybersecurity functions, level 1 of the NCMF level is followed as 
discussed above. This concept is displayed in Figure 23. Figure 23 shows level 1 of the NCMF, and it shows 
the national and international authoritative and normative sources we will use to identify the general 
cybersecurity functions. From these sources, we have identified thirteen general cybersecurity functions that 
are applicable to developed and developing countries. The thirteen non-mandatory cybersecurity functions are 
presented in Table 11, with a detailed description in the following sections.. The thirteen general cybersecurity 
functions were identified across all the sources consulted, and explicit as well as implicit references to 
cybersecurity functions were considered. Some of these cybersecurity functions only appear in one or two of 
the sources, and some appear across all the consulted sources. 
 
It is important to note that we have omitted the dimensions, mandates and domains as influencing elements. 
These elements are of relevance during the identification of nation-state specific cybersecurity functions. It has 
no influence where it concerns the identification of non-mandatory cybersecurity functions. It will only influence 
the selection and prioritisation of mandatory and non-mandatory cybersecurity functions. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23: NCMF Level 1 Non-mandatory cybersecurity functions identification 
 
Given that the some of the thirteen cybersecurity functions are found across the national and international 
authoritative and normative sources, for both developed and developing nations, a strong argument can be 
made that they are general in nature. Some nation states might however require national cybersecurity 
functions that are not mentioned in the consulted sources. This stems from the fact that the cybersecurity  
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functional requirements expressed in acts, national cybersecurity policies, and regulatory requirements differ 
between nations.  
 
Whether or not a nation-state is at war, influences the actors identified across the NCMF dimensions, and it 
also influences the mandates selected. This, in turn, influences the national cybersecurity functional 
requirements. Emerging technologies and the adoption thereof (such as the Internet of Things (IoT)) [107] is 
another factor that may influence a nation’s cybersecurity function requirements. For example, the adoption of 
IoT introduces new technologies, connectivity requirements, communication protocols, and new cyber risks. 
The adoption of IoT may influence national cybersecurity function requirements in terms of research and 
development for security controls for IoT, Critical infrastructure providers uses IoT to monitor and manage 
systems, and new functions may need to be developed to monitor and evaluate IoT.  
 
Considering all the possible elements that may influence the identification, selection and prioritisation of 
national cybersecurity functions, the necessity of our NCMF guiding nation-states in the identification of  
applicable national cybersecurity functions - keeping authoritative and normative prescripts, as well as the 
dimensions, mandates and domains it addresses, in consideration - is emphasised. Once the cybersecurity 
functions are identified, they also need to be implemented. The identification and consultation of all the 
elements that determine, inform, and influence national cybersecurity functions also underscore the need for 
a framework that nation-states can follow to guide them during the implementation of national cybersecurity 
functions. A best practice implementation guide for national cybersecurity structures can be found in Part 2.  
Table 11 presents our thirteen general cybersecurity functions that we have identified from the sources shown 
in Figure 23, with a more detailed discussion in the following sections. 
 
Table 11: Thirteen general cybersecurity functions 
sn General Cybersecurity Function Section 
1 Military cyber / Cyber warfare 4.6.1 
2 Cybercrime / Investigations / Digital forensics 4.6.2 
3 Research and development (R&D), education and awareness 4.6.3 
4 Critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) 4.6.4 
5 Cryptography 4.6.5 
6 E-Identity 4.6.6 
7 Incident handling 4.6.7 
8 Monitoring and evaluation 4.6.8 
9 Internal coordination 4.6.9 
10 External stakeholder engagement 4.6.10 
11 National policy and strategy development 4.6.11 
12 National regulations development 4.6.12 
13 National strategic risk and threat assessment 4.6.13 
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The thirteen identified general cybersecurity functions are now discussed in more detail in the text following, 
and they are presented in the context of South Africa. The non-mandatory functions identified from the 
international normative sources are introduced, together with their correlated international authoritative 
sources. The non-mandatory cybersecurity function types are displayed in tables, with the sources where they 
appear. 
 
4.6.1 Military cyber / cyber warfare 
 
Table 12 introduces the military cyber function. This cybersecurity function refers to the capability of South 
Africa to engage in cyber warfare, where cyber warfare is defined as the actions of a nation state to “penetrate 
another nations’ computers or networks for the purposes of causing damage or disruption”  [108]. This national 
cybersecurity function provides South Africa with a military cyber offensive and defensive function, to support 
operational tasks, assist in accomplishing strategic missions, and facilitating a network-centric warfare 
capability. In South Africa, this function is enabled or realised by services offered from the DOD Cyber 
Command structure.  
 
Table 12: Military cyber / cyber warfare 
Type General cybersecurity function source 
Source document 
location 
International 
normative 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) National Cyber 
Security Framework Manual (2011) [1]  
4.5.1 p121 
The United Kingdom’s Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for 
Nations (CMM) - Revised Edition (2016) [53] 
D.1.1 p23 
The ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (2011) [100] 7.2 p42 
National 
authoritative 
The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) [6], National 
Gazette No. 39475, 04 December 2015, Vol. 606 
16.5 p94 
The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34], Government Gazette 
No. 40487 of 9 December 2016 
Ch 6 Section 55 
International 
authoritative 
UK's National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 (2016) [102]  1.10; 6.3; 6.5.3 
Irish National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2017 (2015)  [103] 5.7 p14 
Finland's Cyber Security Strategy (2013) [106] (5) p8 
 
4.6.2 Cybercrimes / investigations / digital forensics 
 
Table 13 introduces the cybercrimes, cyber investigations and digital forensics function. This function refers 
to the capability to investigate and prosecute cybercrimes. Investigations will likely require the ability to perform  
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digital forensics to obtain evidence for prosecution. This function allows South Africa to develop strategies to 
govern the development of  cybercr ime legis lat ion  that should be g lobal ly appl icable and  
interoperable with the existing national and regional legislation. It further defines the cybersecurity services 
and capabilities supporting the cybercrime function, such as digital forensics and cybercrime. 
 
Table 13: Cybercrimes / investigations / digital forensics 
 
4.6.3 Research and development (R&D), education and awareness 
 
Table 14 introduces the research and development, education and awareness function. This function describes 
the South African capability to perform its own independent research and development (R&D) in the field of 
cybersecurity. The Council for Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) is currently involved in helping the 
DST define an R&D agenda [109]. It also refers to the capability of South Africa to produce individuals that are 
educated enough to enable and support all the national cyber defence functions that have been identified.  
 
It further refers to the capability to make organisations and individual citizens aware of cybersecurity related 
issues. This function ensures that all South African stakeholders and actors understand cyber risks, trends  
 
Type General Cybersecurity Function Source 
Source Document 
Location 
International 
normative 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) National Cyber 
Security Framework Manual (2011) [1]  
4.5.2 p122 
The United Kingdom’s Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for 
Nations (CMM) - Revised Edition (2016) [53] 
D.4.3 p47 
The ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (2011) [100] 1.4 (4); 11.5 p67 
National 
authoritative 
The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) [6], National 
Gazette No. 39475, 04 December 2015, Vol. 606 
7 (d) p6; 8 p7; 16.3 
p28 
The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34], Government Gazette 
No. 40487 of 9 December 2016 
Ch 6 Section 54 
International 
authoritative 
UK's National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 (2016) [102]   
3.2; 3.3; 3.6; 
Section 4 p28; 6.2 
p47 
Irish National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2017 (2015)  [103] 5.6 p14 
Cyber Security Strategy for Germany (2011) [104] (6) p6 
Finland's Cyber Security Strategy (2013) [106] (4) p8 
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and countermeasures. It also ensures that cyber education and training is available at national level, and 
institutions are in place to facilitate R&D of cybersecurity at national level. 
 
Table 14: Research and development (R&D), education and awareness 
 
4.6.4 Critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) 
 
Table 15 introduces the critical infrastructure protection function. This function describes the capability of the 
country to protect critical ICT or ICT-dependent national infrastructure from threats. Critical infrastructure can 
be considered any infrastructure that is essential for the functioning of society or the economy [34] [33] [90]. 
This provides South African critical infrastructure owners, providers and operators with the capability to defend 
their infrastructure and information against cyber-attacks. 
 
 
 
Type General cybersecurity function source 
Source 
Document 
Location 
International 
Normative 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) National Cyber 
Security Framework Manual (2011) [1]  
4.6.3 p133 
The United Kingdom’s cybersecurity capacity maturity model for 
nations (CMM) - Revised edition (2016) [53] 
D.3.2 p 35 
The ITU National cybersecurity strategy guide (2011) [100] 
5.3.8 p30; 18.3.1.1 
p90 
National 
Authoritative 
The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) [6], National 
Gazette No. 39475, 04 December 2015, Vol. 606 
1.6 p11; 2.8 p131.1 
p15; 5.3.6 (f) p16; 
12 p24 
The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34], Government Gazette 
No. 40487 of 9 December 2016 
51 (c)(6)(g)(vi) 
International 
Authoritative 
UK's National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 (2016) [102]   7.0.2 p55; 7.3 p59 
Irish National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2017 (2015)  [103] 5.12 p16 
Cyber security strategy for Germany (2011) [104] (8) p7 
Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic (2015) [105] 3.7 p18 
Finland's Cyber Security Strategy (2013) [106] (7) p5 
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Table 15: Critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) 
 
4.6.5 Cryptography 
 
Table 16 introduces the cryptography function. This function describes the capability of South Africa to  develop 
and deploy its own cryptographic technology independently. South Africa is provided with its own internal 
services and capabilities to develop secure cryptographic products and algorithms. The South African 
Communications Security Agency (SACSA), are incorporated into SSA, and  provides the cybersecurity 
services to realise the Cryptography cybersecurity function [110]. 
 
 
 
 
Type General Cybersecurity Function Source 
Source Document 
Location 
International 
Normative 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) National Cyber 
Security Framework Manual (2011) [1]  
1.5.2 p36 
The United Kingdom’s Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for 
Nations (CMM) - Revised Edition (2016) [53] 
D.1.3 p20 
The ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (2011) [100] 1.5.3 p7; 5.1 p25 
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) - Version 1.1 (2014) 
developed by the United States Department of Homeland Security 
[101] 
2.2 p3 
National 
Authoritative 
The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) [6], National 
Gazette No. 39475, 04 December 2015, Vol. 606 
16.2.1 (e) p27; 19.1 
(c) p30 
The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34], Government Gazette 
No. 40487 of 9 December 2016 
Section 8 Ch 7 
The Protection of Critical Infrastructure Bill 2017 [90] 
The whole Bill 
covers Critical 
Infrastructure 
International 
Authoritative 
UK's National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 (2016) [102]   5.4 p39 
Irish National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2017 (2015)  [103] 2.5 p6 
Cyber Security Strategy for Germany (2011) [104] (1) p3 
Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic (2015) [105] 2.2 p6 
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Table 16: Cryptography 
 
4.6.6 E-Identity 
 
Table 17 introduces the e-identity cybersecurity function. This cybersecurity function describes the capability 
to develop and deploy electronic means to identify and authenticate citizens [6]. This capability provides for 
the development of a national strategy for developing a generic and universal digital identity system for South 
African citizens. 
Table 17: E-Identity 
 
4.6.7 Incident handling 
 
Table 18 introduces the incident handling function. This function deals with the capability of South Africa to 
respond to cybersecurity-related incidents - such as attacks - in a coordinated and efficient manner. This 
capability provides incident handling support at a national level. This capability is typically facilitated by a 
national CSIRT structure. The incident handling cybersecurity function is the first national cybersecurity 
function selected to be offered from the E-CMIRC structure. The rationale for selecting this cybersecurity 
function is that this is a requirement expressed across all sources consulted as a national cybersecurity  
Type General Cybersecurity Function Source 
Source Document 
Location 
International 
Normative 
The United Kingdom’s Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for 
Nations (CMM) - Revised Edition (2016) [53] 
D.5.5 p56 
The ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (2011) [100] 5.3.1 p28 
National 
Authoritative 
The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) [6], National 
Gazette No. 39475, 04 December 2015, Vol. 606 
(9) p21 
International 
Authoritative 
UK's National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 (2016) [102]   6.6 p51 
Type General cybersecurity function source 
Source document 
location 
International 
normative 
The ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (2011) [100] 4.3.6 (5) 
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) - Version 1.1 (2014) 
developed by the United States Department of Homeland Security 
[101] 
5.3 p25 
National 
authoritative 
The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) [6], National 
Gazette No. 39475, 04 December 2015, Vol. 606 
 
10.3 p87 
International 
authoritative 
UK's National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 (2016) [102]   5.2.3 p36 
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function. A secondary motivation is that we have experience in planning, building, running and monitoring 
organisational and national CSIRTs. The CSIRT is the structure used to enable or realise the Incident Handling 
function through its cybersecurity services and capabilities.  
 
Table 18: Incident handling 
 
4.6.8 Monitoring and evaluation 
 
Table 19 introduces the monitoring and evaluation function. This cybersecurity function refers to the capability 
to continuously monitor and evaluate the state of ICT within South Africa in order to detect malicious activity 
or faults. This is closely related to incident management since many incidents will be detected through the 
ability to monitor and evaluate ICT.  
 
This capability allows for the monitoring, evaluation and improvement of national cybersecurity services and 
capabilities, and their effectiveness and performance. The Monitoring and Evaluation function is the second 
cybersecurity function selected to be offered from the E-CMIRC.  
Type General cybersecurity function source 
Source document 
location 
international 
normative 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) National Cyber 
Security Framework Manual (2011) [1]  
4.5.4 p124 
The United Kingdom’s Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for 
Nations (CMM) - Revised Edition (2016) [53] 
D.1.2 p17 
The ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (2011) [100] 11.3 p64 
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) - Version 1.1 
(2014) developed by the United States Department of Homeland 
Security [101] 
5.7 p35 
National 
authoritative 
The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) [6], 
National Gazette No. 39475, 04 December 2015, Vol. 606 
5.3.3 p81; 5.3.5 p81; 
5.4 p81 
The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34], Government 
Gazette No. 40487 of 9 December 2016 
Section 53 Ch 6 
International 
authoritative 
UK's National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 (2016) [102]   5.6 p44 
Irish National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2017 (2015)  [103] 2.6 p7 
Cyber Security Strategy for Germany (2011) [104] (4) p4 
Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic (2015) [105] 3.1 p11 - 14 
Finland's Cyber Security Strategy (2013) [106] (2) p7 
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Table 19: Monitoring and evaluation 
 
4.6.9 Internal coordination 
 
Table 20 introduces the internal coordination function. This cybersecurity function refers to the internal 
coordination between government actors responsible for the other cybersecurity functions and services in the 
framework. This coordination is required to ensure that all the cybersecurity functions and services are being 
governed, aligned with one another, and executed in accordance with government policy and legislation.  
 
This function allows for the coordination of cybersecurity activities at national level. It also coordinates the 
national cybersecurity risk assessment, and aligns with CIIP. It further assists with incident and crisis 
management, and international cybersecurity incidents that involves international stakeholders and actors. 
The NCMF prescribes the establishment of the overall controlling body in Chapter 3 that will perform this 
function. 
Type General Cybersecurity Function Source 
Source Document 
Location 
International 
normative 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) National Cyber 
Security Framework Manual (2011) [1]  
4.5.2 p122 
Compliance 
function p 177 
The United Kingdom’s Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for 
Nations (CMM) - Revised Edition (2016) [53] 
D.1.2 p19; D.5.4 
p55 
The ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (2011) [100] 2.4.1.1 p15 
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) - Version 1.1 (2014) 
developed by the United States Department of Homeland Security 
[101] 
5.1 p19; 5.4 p27 
National 
authoritative 
The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) [6], National 
Gazette No. 39475, 04 December 2015, Vol. 606 
7 (c) p71; 16.2.1 (e) 
The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34], Government Gazette 
No. 40487 of 9 December 2016 
60(3) p110 
International 
authoritative 
UK's National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 (2016) [102]   
5.0.2 p33; 6.4.4 
p50 
Irish National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2017 (2015)  [103] 5.2 p13 
Cyber Security Strategy for Germany (2011) [104] (4) p5 
Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic (2015) [105] 3.1 p12; 3.3 (2) p16 
Finland's Cyber Security Strategy (2013) [106] (3) p8 
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Table 20: Internal coordination 
 
4.6.10 External stakeholder engagement 
 
Table 21 introduces the external stakeholder engagement function. This function describes the capability to 
interact with external, non-government actors, such as local industry representatives, citizens, amongst 
others,as well as foreign organisations with similar responsibilities in their respective countries. This capability 
builds relations with foreign stakeholders and actors to facilitate cooperation where it concerns national 
cybersecurity functions. 
 
 
 
 
Type General Cybersecurity Function Source 
Source Document 
Location 
International 
normative 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) National Cyber 
Security Framework Manual (2011) [1]  
4.6.1 p130 
The United Kingdom’s Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for 
Nations (CMM) - Revised Edition (2016) [53] 
D.1.2 p14; D.1.5 
p15 
The ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (2011) [100] 4.3.5; 4.3.6 p21 
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) - Version 1.1 (2014) 
developed by the United States Department of Homeland Security 
[101] 
(3) p57 
National 
authoritative 
The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) [6], National 
Gazette No. 39475, 04 December 2015, Vol. 606 
16.5; 16.6 p94 
The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34], Government Gazette 
No. 40487 of 9 December 2016 
54 (4)(a) and (c) 
p90 
The Protection of Critical Infrastructure Bill 2017 [90] 
2 (j) p12; 9 (2)(b) 
p20 
International 
authoritative 
UK's National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 (2016) [102]   4.16 p28 
Cyber Security Strategy for Germany (2011) [104] p3; p5 
Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic (2015) [105] 2.2 p6; 3.2(1) p15 
Finland's Cyber Security Strategy (2013) [106] 
(1) p7 (3) p4; (10) 
p11 
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Table 21: External stakeholder engagement 
 
4.6.11 National policy and strategy development 
 
Table 22 introduces the national policy and strategy development function. This function refers to the capability 
to develop national policy and strategy around cybersecurity. This capability enables South Africa to develop 
its own cybersecurity strategy and policy based on, and aligned with international best practices. The National 
Policy and Strategy Development function could collaborate with the R&D, Education and Awareness function, 
but this does not necessarily mean that these two functions need to be selected together.   
 
We made the statement in section 2.6 that one of a nation’s most important authoritative sources, is its national 
cybersecurity strategy (NCS). This makes the national policy and strategy development function an important 
one, and should be considered for early implementation when selecting and prioritising national cybersecurity 
functions for implementation. 
 
 
 
 
 
Type General Cybersecurity Function Source 
Source Document 
Location 
International 
normative 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) National Cyber 
Security Framework Manual (2011) [1]  
5.4.2 p185 
The United Kingdom’s Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for 
Nations (CMM) - Revised Edition (2016) [53] 
(II)(b) p8; D.1.1 p17 
The ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (2011) [100] 11.3 p64 
National 
authoritative 
The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) [6], National 
Gazette No. 39475, 04 December 2015, Vol. 606 
11 p23; 4.1.3 p80 
The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34], Government Gazette 
No. 40487 of 9 December 2016 
26 p38; 44(2)(b) 
p61 
International 
authoritative 
UK's National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 (2016) [102]   5.0.1 p33; 8.2 p63 
Cyber Security Strategy for Germany (2011) [104] p2; p3 
Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic (2015) [105] 3.6 p18 
Finland's Cyber Security Strategy (2013) [106] 
(4) and (6) p5; (4) 
p8; (6) p9 
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Table 22: National policy and strategy development 
  
4.6.12 National regulations development 
 
Table 23 introduces the national regulations development function. This function describes the capability to 
create compulsory cybersecurity regulations – at national level – that organisations within the public sector 
have to adhere to. These regulations specify what individual organisations are required to do to ensure 
cybersecurity.  
 
Organisational ICT governance frameworks must be used to develop the regulations (such as COBIT and    
ISO/IEC 27001:2005). The SSA is primarily responsible for developing these regulations from a South African 
perspective. This cybersecurity function could use as input, and collaborate with the R&D, education and 
awareness capability, but it is not necessary for them to be selected together. 
 
Type General cybersecurity function source 
Source Document 
Location 
International 
normative 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) National Cyber 
Security Framework Manual (2011) [1]  
3.4.2 p91; 3.6 p103 
The United Kingdom’s Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for 
Nations (CMM) - Revised Edition (2016) [53] 
D.1.1 p16 
The ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (2011) [100] 4.3.6 (2) p21; 6 p35 
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) - Version 1.1 
(2014) developed by the United States Department of Homeland 
Security [101] 
3.1 p6 
National 
authoritative 
The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) [6], National 
Gazette No. 39475, 04 December 2015, Vol. 606 
5.4.6 p82; 7 (b) 
p71; 8.2 p85 
The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34], Government Gazette 
No. 40487 of 9 December 2016 
51(6)(h) p79; 
52(5)(f) p81 
The Protection of Critical Infrastructure Bill 2017 [90] 7(a)(v) p18 
International 
authoritative 
UK's National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 (2016) [102]   
7.4.1 p60; 7.4.2 
p60 
Irish National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2017 (2015)  [103] 2.6 p8 
Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic (2015) [105] 
3.1 p12; 3.3(2) p16; 
3.6 p18 
A National Cybersecurity Management Framework for Developing Countries 
 
109 
  
General Cybersecurity Functions 
 
Table 23: National regulations development 
 
4.6.13 National strategic risk and threat assessment 
 
Table 24 introduces the national strategic risk and threat assessment function. This function deals with the 
capability to identify risks and threats at a national, strategic level.  At a strategic level such risks are not 
technical cybersecurity risks, but may, for example, be related to geopolitical threats that increase the risk to 
South Africa’s cybersecurity. The rationale for including this function is based on the following two reasons:  
 
• Best practice for cybersecurity governance suggests a risk-based approach [48] [49]. 
• Risks change over time and, in order for South Africa to adapt as needed, there needs to be a formal, 
 periodic assessment of risks and threats. 
 
This function allows for the establishment, operation and maintenance of a cybersecurity risk management 
process at national level. This process would serve as input to, and guide the selection and prioritisation of  
Type General cybersecurity function source 
Source document 
location 
International 
normative 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) National Cyber 
Security Framework Manual (2011) [1]  
4.3 p115; 4.6.1 
p131 
The United Kingdom’s Cybersecurity Capacity Maturity Model for 
Nations (CMM) - Revised Edition (2016) [53] 
D.4.1 p39 
The ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (2011) [100] 
9.1.3 p50; 11.4.1 
p66 
National 
authoritative 
The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) [6], National 
Gazette No. 39475, 04 December 2015, Vol. 606 
7.1 (c) p84; 8.2 (a) 
p85; 16.4 (a) 93 
The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34], Government Gazette 
No. 40487 of 9 December 2016 
52 (6) p82; All 
sections talk about 
regulations 
The Protection of Critical Infrastructure Bill 2017 [90] Ch 6 p46 
International 
authoritative 
UK's National Cyber Security Strategy 2016-2021 (2016) [102]   4.16 p27; 5.4.8 p41 
Irish National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2017 (2015)  [103] (3) p 10; (4) p11 
Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic (2015) [105] (1) p5; (3) p10 
Finland's Cyber Security Strategy (2013) [106] (2) p7 
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national cybersecurity functions identified in level 1. We have placed this function at level 2 of the NCMF. The 
rationael for placing this function at level 2 is because the function will be established by the overall controlling 
body, and will primarily assist with the prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions for implementation that 
happens at level 3. It will also inform the selection of national cybersecurity functions for implementation. 
 
Table 24: National strategic risk and threat assessment 
 
4.7 Conclusion 
 
Chapter 4 started with a discussion on the aims we wanted to achieve with the identification of the general 
cybersecurity functions. Two aims were listed in Section 4.3. The first aim is to provide a pre-defined list of 
general and non-mandatory cybersecurity functions that countries can choose from for implementation. The 
second aim is for the predefined list of general cybersecurity functions to be used as a baseline against which 
the strategic applicability of the nation state’s national cybersecurity functions may be measured against. 
Developing countries with their unique requirements and constraints, in the context of national cybersecurity 
were discussed in Section 4.4.  
 
 
Type General cybersecurity function source 
Source Document 
Location 
International 
normative 
The North Atlantic Treaty Organisation’s (NATO) National Cyber 
Security Framework Manual (2011) [1]  
4.2.2 p113 
The ITU National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide (2011) [100] 16.1.2.1.2 p76 
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) - Version 1.1 (2014) 
developed by the United States Department of Homeland Security 
[101] 
5.1 p19 
National 
authoritative 
The National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) [6], National 
Gazette No. 39475, 04 December 2015, Vol. 606 
5.4.5 p82; 5.4.6 p82 
The Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34], Government Gazette 
No. 40487 of 9 December 2016 
52(5)(e) p81; 
52(5)(f) p81 
The Protection of Critical Infrastructure Bill 2017 [90] 
7(a)(iii) p17; 
9(2)(a)(ii) p20 
International 
authoritative 
Irish National Cyber Security Strategy 2015-2017 (2015)  [103] 3.3 p10 
Cyber Security Concept of the Slovak Republic (2015) [105] Measure 5 p30 
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The thirteen general cybersecurity functions were introduced and discussed in detail. The selection of the 
monitoring and evaluation, and incident handling functions was motivated for use in the development of the   
E-CMIRC structure. The E-CMIRC structure is developed to illustrate the implementation part of the NCMF, 
and to provide a best practice guide for the development of national cybersecurity structures Part 2. The             
E-CMIRC structure will be developed by combining the services and technologies enabling these two selected 
functions. Following from here, Chapter 5 introduces and discusses level 2 to level 6 of the NCMF, ending with 
a presentation of the complete NCMF.
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Chapter 5: The National Cybersecurity Management Framework Level 2 to Level 6 
 
5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 3 introduced and presented level 1 of the NCMF. Level 1 lays the NCMF’s foundation, and is used to 
discover a nation-state’s national and international authoritative sources, and their cybersecurity functional 
prescripts. Chapter 5 serves to motivate and introduce level 2 to level 6 of the NCMF. We conclude this chapter 
with a consolidated view of the NCMF. The rest of the Chapter is structured as follows: 
 
Section 5.1 provides a motivation for the development of level 2 to level 5 of the NCMF.  
 
Section 5.2 introduces level 2. Level 2 motivates, and describes that a national risk-based approach should 
be followed to inform the selection, and drive the prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions for 
implementation. Level 2 also proposes the establishment of an overall controlling body.  
 
Section 5.3 introduces level 3. Level 3 serves as a placeholder to consolidate the selected and prioritised 
cybersecurity functions. This grouping allows for the identification of cybersecurity structures from where the 
functions will be offered from. 
 
Section 5.4 to Section 5.9 introduces levels 4 to 6. These levels provide an implementation framework for the 
selected and prioritised national cybersecurity functions. The three options available to nation states during 
the application of level 3 of the NCMF (introduced in Section 5.5) are also discussed in more detail. 
 
Section 5.10 introduces the complete NCMF. 
 
Section 5.11 concludes this Chapter. 
 
5.2 Motivation for NCMF Levels 2 to 6 
 
We have described the desired characteristics of a National Cybersecurity Management Framework in    
Section 1.3 as being: 
 
• Scalable,  
• Flexible, and 
• Agile.  
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Keeping the desired characteristics in mind, the decision was made in Section 2.9 to limit the NCMF to a 
maximum of six levels, without impacting on the efficiency and effectiveness of the framework. We impose this 
limitation to keep the framework simple, scalable, flexible and agile. 
 
In Chapter 4, we have used level 1 of the NCMF to identify general cybersecurity functions, and actors. This 
activity resulted in a list of cybersecurity functions. Once the cybersecurity functions and actors are identified, 
the following management tasks remain: 
 
• Selection of functions for implementation. 
• Prioritisation of functions for implementation. 
• Implementation of the selected and prioritised functions. 
 
Responsibility for these tasks may be assigned to some of the actors that we have identified by using our 
stakeholder and actor identification template introduced in Section 3.5. We will now develop levels 2 to 6 of 
the NCMF to guide us with regard to these remaining tasks, and provide a high-level overview of levels 2 to 6 
of the NCMF. 
 
5.3 High-level overview of levels 2 to 6 
 
It is our experience that the national cybersecurity management tasks of selecting, prioritising and 
implementing functions, will not happen unless explicit responsibility is assigned to national actors. This 
observation of ours is supported in the ITU’s National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide [52].  We will now provide 
a high-level overview of the remaining NCMF levels, followed by a detailed description of each in the sections 
following.   
 
5.3.1 Level 2 high-level introduction 
 
The management tasks of selecting and prioritising the identified cybersecurity functions for implementation, 
lead to the requirement for a second level for the NCMF.  It is our experience that these tasks will not happen 
unless explicit responsibility is assigned to national actors. This observation is supported in the ITU’s National 
Cybersecurity Strategy Guide [52]. Level 2 prescribes the establishment of an overall controlling body. The 
overall controlling body is needed to initiate, drive and manage these tasks. Level 2 also prescribes the 
establishment of a national strategic risk and threat assessment process.  
 
This process will inform and guide the selection, and prioritisation of functions for implementation. The 
motivation for placing an overall controlling body at level 2, is because this body must ensure that the NCMF 
is implemented from the top down as intended, and to drive the selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity  
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functions by means of the national strategic risk and threat assessment process. Responsibility for these tasks 
is explicit, and has to be assigned to actors by the overall controlling body. 
 
5.3.2 Level 3 high-level introduction 
 
After the application of level 2, we have a list of selected and prioritised national cybersecurity functions for 
implementation. We now need to identify the cybersecurity structures from where these functions will be 
offered. This allows us to identify the cybersecurity function’s structure-specific functions, services and 
technologies. From these functions, we can then identify overlapping and similar functions services and 
technologies. In level 3, we consolidate the selected and prioritised national cybersecurity functions. This 
consolidation provides us with a logical grouping of cybersecurity functions, and we can use this to identify 
their structures and services.  
 
5.3.3 Level 4 high-level introduction 
 
The levels following level 2 of the NCMF (levels 3 to 6) are cybersecurity function, and structure specific. This 
means that the focus from level 2 onwards shifts from the identification of the mandatory or non-mandatory 
cybersecurity functions (level 1), and the selection and prioritisation of the functions (level 2), to the 
consolidation of functions (level 3), and implementation of the functions and their structures. Level 3 thus 
serves as the demarcation point where the implementation part of the NCMF starts. Level 3 provided us with 
a consolidated list of cybersecurity functions. In level 4, the structures supporting these functions are identified 
and consolidated.  
 
These structures have their own functions and services. We will be using level 4 to determine the structure 
functions and services, and identify overlaps and similarities. For developing countries, these overlapping and 
similar functions and services may be combined, and offered from a new structure. Combining the functions 
and services of multiple structures, and offering them from a single structure, realise a cost and skills saving.  
 
5.3.4 Level 5 high-level introduction 
 
Since our framework is aimed at improving the national cybersecurity posture of nations, but with a focus on 
developing countries, the level 4 structures will be national structures, and will be subject to national acts and 
regulations. Level 5 is used to determine authoritative sources and their prescriptions applicable to the 
structures. These could be prescripts found in acts and regulations such as national health and safety, or 
physical security regulations if the structure is considered a national key point. 
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5.3.5 Level 6 high-level introduction 
 
Level 6 addresses the operational elements of the national structure. These elements are all internal and 
examples are the structures policy, processes and procedures. Level 6 also addresses the technology needed 
to make the structure operational. The NCMF six levels, and the transition in focus from identification, selection 
and prioritisation to implementation is shown in Figure 24.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 24: Shift in Focus of NCMF Levels 
 
Figure 24 shows that the identification of cybersecurity functions happens at level 1 of the NCMF, and that the 
selection and prioritisation of those functions for implementation happens at level 2. The selected and 
prioritised functions are then consolidated, and their corresponding structures, with their services and 
capabilities are identified in level 3. The framework is structure specific from level 4 onwards. Level 4 to level 
6 of the NCMF is used to determine structure specific elements needed (structure types, structure functions, 
services and technologies) to offer the national cybersecurity function. 
 
Levels 2 to 6 is introduced and discussed in more detail in the following sections. We start our discussion 
with level 2, where the national, overall controlling body, as well as the strategic risk and threat assessment  
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function is described. During our discussion, we will use generic examples to illustrate the application of the 
NCMF levels, but we will also personalise the level discussions with our structures and templates, as well as 
South African actors, based on our experience. 
 
5.4 NCMF Level 2 – National cybersecurity controlling body and strategic risk and 
threat assessment process 
 
Level 2 describes the need for a national cybersecurity overall controlling body, and a National strategic risk 
and threat assessment function. In Chapter 4 we have identified the National Strategic Risk and Threat 
Assessment function as one of the thirteen general functions. This function was introduced in Table 11  in 
Chapter 4. A conscious decision was made to place the national strategic risk and threat assessment function 
at level 2 of the NCMF to support nation states during the selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity functions 
for implementation at national level.  
 
The selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions happen at level 2 of the NCMF, and through 
the application of the national strategic risk and threat assessment function. The use of the national strategic 
risk and threat assessment function, or a mechanism that will achieve the same outcome, is thus mandatory 
for nation states wishing to select and prioritise their mandatory, or non-mandatory cybersecurity functions for 
implementation. The outcome of the risk management process described in the national risk management 
guide, will, together with the dimensions, domains and mandates, largely dictate the selection and prioritisation 
of cybersecurity functions for implementation. 
 
Although the national strategic risk and threat assessment function, or similar mechanism, is mandatory for 
nation-states wishing to select and prioritise their national cybersecurity functions, it is however not prescriptive 
in terms of standards, frameworks and approaches to be used. What matters though, is that this function is 
implemented to inform the selection and prioritisation tasks. Nation-states could make use of our national 
strategic risk and threat assessment guide (introduced in Appendix H with our recommended standards), or 
they can make use of their own frameworks and standards to guide them.  
 
Our National Strategic Risk and Threat Assessment Guide (Appendix H) make a valuable contribution in that 
it provides a mechanism – with proven international standards – to conduct a national cybersecurity risk 
assessment. The outcome of such a risk assessment not only helps with the selection and prioritisation of 
cybersecurity functions, but it also helps nations understand the types of cyber risks they face and to develop 
strategies to mitigate those risks. The establishment and implementation of the national strategic risk and 
threat assessment function is the responsibility of the overall controlling body, and they must select the most 
suitable standard, framework or approach for their state, to execute cybersecurity risk management at national 
level. In developing countries, these overall controlling bodies still need to be established. The ITU in their  
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Global Cybersecurity Index (2017) [111], shows that out of forty-four African countries measured, only nine 
countries have an overall controlling body responsible for national cybersecurity.  
 
This overall controlling body will have as its responsibility the implementation of the NCMF itself, as well as 
the implementation of the cybersecurity functions. Some of the activities that this national controlling body will 
execute, based on our experience, and supported by the ITU in their  National Cybersecurity Strategy Guide 
[100] are to: 
 
• Identify NCMF actors and stakeholders, and assigning responsibilities to them. 
• Drive, steer and guide the implementation of the NCMF.  
• Drive, steer and guide the selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions for 
implementation. To assist with this task, the national strategic risk and threat assessment function is 
included in level 2 (refer to section 4.6.13). 
• Drive, steer and guide the implementation of selected and prioritised national cybersecurity functions.  
• Identify existing national cybersecurity structures from where the cybersecurity services enabling the 
selected national cybersecurity functions are offered..  
• In the absence of existing structures, their responsibility would be to envision and establish new national 
 cybersecurity structures. 
 
In summary, the purpose of level 2 of the NCMF is to: 
 
• Establish a national cybersecurity controlling body with the purpose of overseeing and controlling the 
application of the NCMF. It further oversees, steers and guide the identification, selection, prioritisation 
and implementation of cybersecurity functions through the implementation of the NCMF and its national  
strategic risk and threat assessment function. 
• Establish a risk-based approach to do the prioritisation, and inform the selection of the cybersecurity  
functions for implementation through a national cybersecurity risk and threat assessment process, 
 
Figure 25 presents the NCMF’s second level, and illustrates that the overall controlling body, resides here. In 
South Africa, the SSA will typically be assigned the responsibility for the establishment of the overall controlling 
body, who, in turn, establishes the National Strategic Risk and Threat Assessment function. The national 
strategic risk and threat assessment function, also residing at level 2, is used to guide the cybersecurity 
function selection and prioritisation tasks.  
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Figure 25: NCMF Level 2 
 
Now that we have selected and prioritised cybersecurity functions for implementation at level 2, we will move 
to level 3 of the NCMF. Level 3 is used to consolidate the selected and prioritised national cybersecurity 
functions. This consolidation has as purpose the identification of their complementary structures, its associated 
functions, and technologies. 
 
5.5 NCMF Level 3 – Consolidation 
 
The identification of mandatory or non-mandatory national cybersecurity functions happens at level 1. The 
selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions happen at level 2. The national cybersecurity 
functions that are selected and prioritised in level 2, are consolidated at level 3 of the NCMF. These functions 
give effect to national laws and treaty obligations, as well as national policies and strategies.   
 
Once we have presented level 3, we will also introduce three scenarios describing how level 3 of the NCMF 
may be implemented. The three implementation scenarios are introduced in Section 5.6. The purpose of       
level 3 is: 
 
• To provide a logical, structured placeholder to consolidate the selected and prioritised national 
 cybersecurity functions. Consolidating the selected and prioritised cybersecurity functions is beneficial in  
 that it drives the identification and the selection of existing structures, or the envisioning and development  
 of new national cybersecurity structures that complement the selected and prioritised cybersecurity  
 functions. 
• Together with the defensive domain lifecycle phases introduced in Section 3.6.1, the cybersecurity 
functions selected and prioritised in level 2, could be prescriptive in the selection of national cybersecurity  
structures that are needed to offer them from.  
 
Figure 26 shows the NCMF’s third level. For the sake of completeness, and to illustrate the complete 
application of the NCMF in the context of identifying non-mandatory cybersecurity functions, we include the 
general functions that we have identified in Chapter 4.  
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It needs to be understood clearly that nation-states may identify many more or less mandatory or non-
mandatory cybersecurity functions than the thirteen we have. Each nation’s authoritative sources are unique. 
Nations may also select to use international normative sources different to the ones we have uses, and this 
will also influence the type and number of cybersecurity functions identified. 
 
Twelve of the general cybersecurity functions are displayed in Figure 26. The thirteenth cybersecurity function, 
the national strategic risk and threat assessment function was displayed in Figure 25 as part of the NCMF level 
2. The reason for this is,  as  we stated in Chapter 4, the national strategic risk and threat assessment function 
is one of the thirteen general cybersecurity functions that we identified in Chapter 4, and this function is placed 
at level 2 of the NCMF to support the selection and prioritisation of the cybersecurity functions for 
implementation.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 26: NCMF level 3 
 
In terms of personalising the NCMF we have highlighted, in black, the two general cybersecurity functions that 
we have prioritised and selected for the development of our E-CMIRC in Part 2. These two general functions 
are the incident handling, and monitoring and evaluation of ICT functions. Each of the thirteen general 
cybersecurity functions must be handled as distinct areas of responsibility, and should be assigned to an 
appropriate government department for implementation.  
 
One department may be assigned more than one function as its area of responsibility, such as the South 
African DOD being responsible for the military cyber function and the cryptography function. In most instances 
though, different government departments will be responsible for different structures, such as where the 
cybersecurity services are realising the incident response and monitoring and evaluation of ict function are 
offered from two different structures, and could fall under the auspices of two different government 
departments.  
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In Section 5.6, we will introduce three application scenarios for levels 1 to 3 of the NCMF. Our motivation for 
introducing and discussing the three implementation scenarios here, is that we had to introduce levels 1 to 3 
first to allow the reader to get a solid understanding of the first three levels. This understanding is necessary 
since the implementation scenarios describe the three different ways in which nations can implement levels 1 
to 3. 
 
5.6 Implementation scenarios for NCMF levels 1 to 3 
 
Now that we have discussed level 1 to level 3 of the NCMF, we would like to introduce and discuss our three 
application scenarios for the first three levels. We have stated in Section 5.2 that level 3 serves as the 
demarcation point where the implementation of cybersecurity functions start (implementation starts at level 4 
and ends at level 6).  
 
We have also introduced in Section 5.2 that level 1 identifies, level 2 selects and prioritises, and level 3 
consolidates the selected and prioritised functions. We have identified three implementation scenarios for 
levels 1 to 3, and we will now introduce them.  
 
We are introducing the three scenarios here, and before we start with our discussion on the levels following 
level 3. Levels 4, 5 and 6 focus on the implementation of the cybersecurity functions, and we will, thus, 
introduce our implementation scenarios before we start with the NCMF implementation levels. Our three 
implementation scenarios are: 
 
• Scenario 1: Nation-states use our predetermined list of thirteen general cybersecurity functions but use  
their own mechanisms and criteria to select and prioritise them for implementation. 
• Scenario 2: Nation-states use our predetermined list of thirteen general cybersecurity functions and use  
the NCMF National Strategic Risk and Threat Assessment function to assist with the selection and 
prioritisation of their national cybersecurity functions. 
• Scenario 3: Nation-states use the NCMF to identify their own mandatory, and specific national 
 cybersecurity functions. They then use the national strategic risk and threat assessment function to 
 assist with the selection and prioritisation of their national cybersecurity functions. 
 
We will now provide a more detailed discussion of the three scenarios. 
 
• Scenario 1: In the first scenario, developed and developing countries select functions from our                 
 pre-determined list of thirteen general cybersecurity functions for implementation. The compilation of such  
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a list of general cybersecurity functions was described as one of our aims in Section 4.3. The 
implementation of one, or many of our thirteen general functions will have a positive impact on a country’s 
national cybersecurity posture.  
 
Levels 1 and 2 of the NCMF are thus not used at all, and nation-states start using the NCMF from levels 
3 to 6. Nation states then use their own selection and prioritisation mechanisms, and criteria, to select 
one, or many of the general functions for implementation. Scenario 1 is depicted in Figure 27. It is shown 
in Figure 27 that nation-states only make use of the consolidated general cybersecurity functions, and 
use their own selection and prioritisation criteria and mechanisms. 
 
 
 
Figure 27: NCMF application scenario 1 
 
Following scenario 1 does not make level 1 of the NCMF to a lesser importance. Level 1 of the NCMF is 
still applied to identify the cybersecurity functions, just not by the nation-state using the NCMF, but by us, 
as a third party. In   scenario 1, the nation-state uses their own mechanisms and criteria to select and 
prioritise the general cybersecurity functions for implementation, 
 
• Scenario 2: In the second scenario, nation-states use our pre-determined list of thirteen general 
cybersecurity functions, but use the NCMF national strategic risk and threat assessment function to 
assist with the selection and prioritisation of functions for implementation. This scenario is depicted in 
Figure 28.  In scenario 2, only the list of consolidated, general cybersecurity functions, and the national 
strategic risk and threat assessment function from level 2 are used. 
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Figure 28: NCMF application scenario 2 
 
• Scenario 3: In the third scenario, nation states use the NCMF to identify their own mandatory, and specific  
national cybersecurity functions. In this scenario, the NCMF is prescriptive in terms of the approach to be 
followed during the identification, selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions.  
 
 
 
Figure 29: NCMF application scenario 3 
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This scenario is the only one where the use of our national strategic risk and threat assessment function is 
mandatory. The NCMF is applied in its entirety to assist nation-states with national cybersecurity functions 
management tasks. The discussion in Chapter 2 was done against the context of applying the NCMF in 
scenario 3.  
 
In summation, developing countries could use any one of the three NCMF implementation scenarios. In the 
first scenario, the thirteen general cybersecurity functions could be used as a pre-determined list of functions 
from which they select one or many functions from for implementation. They use their own selection and 
prioritisation mechanism and criteria (they would thus follow their own approach to do the selection and 
prioritisation of cybersecurity functions for implementation).  
 
They could also decide to use the second scenario where the pre-determined general cybersecurity functions 
are used, but the NCMF national strategic risk and threat assessment function is used to assist with the 
selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity functions. Using the third scenario, they would use the whole of the 
NCMF as described in Chapters 2 and 3. 
 
In developing the E-CMIRC structure to illustrate the implementation part of the NCMF, we will follow the first 
scenario. This means that only the pre-determined list of thirteen general cybersecurity functions are 
considered. We have used, as a selection mechanism and criteria, our experience with the cybersecurity 
functions at national level, and based on this, selected two them, the incident handling function, and the 
monitoring and evaluation function to develop the E-CMIRC. It is thus not necessary for us to follow the risk-
based approach prescribed by the NCMF, since we have already done our selection and prioritisation based 
on our experience with the two selected functions at national level. We will now in Section 5.7 continue or 
discussion of the NCMF level 4. 
 
5.7 NCMF Level 4 – National structures 
 
In Section 2.4, the terms “cybersecurity function,” “cybersecurity service” and “cybersecurity capabilities,” were 
introduced and defined. We explained that functions consist of services that are offered from national 
structures. We also described that cybersecurity services consist of capabilities that are made up of people, 
processes and technology.  
 
The relationship between national cybersecurity functions, cybersecurity services, cybersecurity capabilities 
and structures were displayed in Figure 9. At level 4 of the NCMF, the national cybersecurity structures needed 
to deliver the cybersecurity functions that were consolidated at level 3, are defined. The purpose of level 4 of 
the NCMF is to: 
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• Identify existing national cybersecurity structures from where the national cybersecurity functions’ are 
offered from. Where no national cybersecurity structures exist, new national cybersecurity structures need 
to be envisioned and established. 
• To identify the actors responsible for the implementation of the national cybersecurity structure. These 
actors could be organs of state. 
 
These national cybersecurity structures could be logical or physical in nature. An example of a logical national 
cybersecurity structure could be the E-Identity cybersecurity function introduced in Table 17. The E-Identity 
cybersecurity function consists of cybersecurity services and capabilities (people processes, and technology 
as defined in Section 4.6.6) and could be offered from a web portal.  
 
The cybersecurity services realising the Incident Handling cybersecurity function (introduced in Table 18) are 
offered from structures such as CSIRTs [63]. The CSIRT national cybersecurity structures are typically 
physical, “brick and mortar” structures. These structures offer a facility from where the cybersecurity services 
realising the national cybersecurity functions are offered from. It offers a space to house people, and where 
incident handling related processes can be followed, tasks executed, or initiated, and where supportive 
cybersecurity technologies are deployed, housed and supported.  
 
The E-CMIRC structure proposed in Part 2 to illustrate the application part of the NCMF, is a national 
cybersecurity structure that is housed in a centralised, physical facility. The E-CMIRC and all other national 
cybersecurity structures resides at Level 4 of the NCMF. A best practice guide to the establishment of national 
structures, such as our E-CMIRC structure, will be described in detail in Part 2. Figure 30 presents the NCMF’s 
fourth level. Figure 30 shows that national cybersecurity structures could be structures such as CSIRTs and 
SOCs, and that our E-CMIRC is also a structure that resides here. We are including common structures, and 
personalise the level with our structure, the E-CMIRC, as explained in Section 5.2.  
 
 
 
Figure 30: NCMF Level 4 
 
5.8 NCMF Level 5 – Regulations for National Cybersecurity Structures 
 
Level 5 specifies authoritative and normative sources needed in support of the structures with their associated 
services that they offer to facilitate cybersecurity functions. The purpose of level 5 of the NCMF is to identify  
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and, or, develop authoritative and normative documents applicable to the level 4 cybersecurity structures. The 
authoritative and normative documents are developed by the responsible actors that are identified during the 
application of level 1 of the NCMF. As mentioned in Section 3.9, and from a South African context, some of 
the organs of state actors could be SITA, DTPS, the DOD, and the SSA. 
 
The level 5 authoritative and normative sources are specific to the structure, and could include physical 
security, or health and safety prescripts expressed in legislation or regulations. An example of regulatory 
bodies in a South African context is the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) [112] 
[113], and the National Energy Regulator of South Africa (NERSA) [114]. These regulatory bodies would 
exercise autonomous authority over, and regulate the activities of telecommunication providers (ICASA) and 
nuclear providers in South Africa (NERSA). 
 
 From a South African national incident response function perspective, the DTPS is responsible for developing 
regulatory requirements. The regulatory body is typically independent from the government [115]. Regulatory 
examples may include the security rating of the facility, its occupational health and safety requirements [116], 
and its physical security prescripts. The national cybersecurity structure’s authoritative and normative 
prescripts and requirements are determined at level 4 of the NCMF. Figure 31 presents the NCMF’s fifth level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 31: NCMF Level 5 
 
5.9 NCMF Level 6 – Cybersecurity structure governance 
 
From an operational governance perspective, the national cybersecurity structures need their own internal 
policies, processes and procedures. Level 6 describes the operational elements of the level 4 structures. These 
operational policies, processes and procedures are determined and developed in level 6 of the NCMF.  
 
Examples of these elements could be the internal policies, processes, procedures and configuration standards 
describing and governing incident response for national incident response teams (CSIRT structure). Using the 
South African Cybersecurity Hub [82] as a case study, some examples of the operational documents are an 
incident handling policy, an incident management processes, back-up procedures, and password policies. In  
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the context of a SOC structure, an example of a policy could be the incident handling policy, and a process 
could be the monitoring process, or a shift handover process. These policies, processes procedures and 
standards enforce, and give effect to the regulations and normative documents as described in level 4.  
 
Figure 32 presents the NCMF’s sixth level. Figure 32 shows that structures such as the South African 
Cybersecurity Hub, and the newly envisioned E-CMIRC structure needs its own internal policies, processes 
and procedures. The purpose of level 6 of the NCMF is to develop and implement structure specific, internal, 
operational policies, processes and procedures. These policies, processes and procedures assists with the 
national structure’s operational and governance requirements.  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 32: Illustrative implementation of NCMF Level 6 
 
Now that we have concluded our discussion of the NCMF’s level 1 in Chapter 3, and applied level 1 to identify 
thirteen of the most general cybersecurity functions in Chapter 4, and introduced and discussed levels 2 to 6 
in this chapter, we will now, section 5.10 present the complete NCMF. 
 
5.10 NCMF complete framework 
 
Figure 33 presents the complete NCMF. It displays the overall structure of the NCMF with all the levels 
populated. Level 1 is used to identify national and international authoritative sources to determine nation state 
specific and mandatory cybersecurity functions. Level 1 can also be used to identify national and international 
normative sources to determine general cybersecurity functions.  
 
We have used level 1 in Chapter 4 to identify national authoritative sources applicable to a developing country 
(South Africa), as well as international normative sources with its recommendations in terms of cybersecurity 
functions. Level 1 also identified the  influencing elements. These are the cybersecurity dimensions, mandates 
and domains. Level 1 answers why cybersecurity functions are needed, and serve to assist in the identification 
and prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions. Level 2 concerns itself with the selection and prioritisation 
of national cybersecurity functions for implementation. Level 2 prescribes the need for a national overall 
controlling body, and also prescribes a risk-based approach. This risk-based approach is achieved by one of 
the thirteen cybersecurity functions, the national strategic risk and threat assessment function. We have  
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proposed a national cybersecurity risk management guide in Appendix H that nation states may use for their 
national risk management strategy. This risk-based approach further assists with the selection and 
prioritisation of cybersecurity functions for implementation. The overall national cybersecurity controlling body 
in level 2 should follow the PBRM organisational approach as a logical reference to ensure that all 
organisational aspects of the cybersecurity functions and its services are considered. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 33: The NCMF complete framework 
 
The national strategic risk and threat assessment function assists with the selection and prioritisation of 
cybersecurity functions. The selected and prioritised cybersecurity functions will be unique to each country. 
This is because their risks and threats in the cyberspace differ from each other. The cybersecurity functions of 
nation states will also differ since their authoritative and normative source prescripts and recommendations 
may differ. 
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Level 3 is used to consolidate the thirteen general cybersecurity functions. The general cybersecurity functions 
that we identified, were compared against international authoritative sources for completeness and relevancy. 
The two general functions (incident handling and monitoring and evaluation of ICT) that we have selected and 
motivated to illustrate the application of the NCMF’s implementation part is shown in black. Level 3 serves as 
the demarcation point in the framework where the focus shifts from identification, selection and prioritisation, 
to the implementation of national cybersecurity functions.  
 
Level 4 identifies national cybersecurity structures, as well as responsible organs of the state. These are 
actors, responsible for the implementation of the optimal national cybersecurity structures. The responsible 
actors will be selected from the list compiled from level 1 of the NCMF by using the stakeholder and actor 
identification template proposed in Table 8. These cybersecurity structures will house the people and 
technology that will enable the cybersecurity functions. The proposed E-CMIRC is a level 4 structure. 
 
Level 5 describes the national cybersecurity structure’s regulatory environment, and its authoritative and 
normative source prescripts are developed here. Level 6 describes the national cybersecurity structure’s 
internal policies, processes and procedures. These internal policies, processes and procedures are 
operational in nature, and give effect to the national cybersecurity structure’s authoritative and normative 
source prescripts that are developed in Level 5.  
 
The NCMF is flexible in that it could be adapted for use in any of the dimensions, mandates and domains. 
Changes to authoritative and normative prescripts, as well as changes to the dimensions, mandate and 
domains of the NCMF will influence the identification, selection and prioritisation of the cybersecurity functions. 
The NCMF can also be applied to industry to improve the security posture of business entities [117].  
 
5.11 Conclusion 
 
Now that we have introduced the NCMF, and its six sequential levels, we will apply the NCMF in Chapter 6  in 
the context of a developing country, using South Africa as a reference country. The levels are populated using 
South African authoritative and normative sources, overall controlling bodies, national cybersecurity functions 
and structures. 
 
In this Chapter, the NCMF level 2 to level 6 was introduced. The NCMF consists of six levels, starting with 
level 1 and ending with level 6. The purpose of NCMF level 1 to level 2 is to guide, steer and inform the 
national cybersecurity management tasks of identification, selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity 
functions. The purpose of the NCMF Level 3 to Level 6 is to guide, steer and inform the implementation of  
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national cybersecurity functions. The NCMF follows a top-down hierarchical approach, and it is flexible enough 
for use by nation states, and at organisational level. 
 
Section 5.2 provided a motivation for NCMF level 2 to level 6. It confirmed the desired characteristics of a 
NCMF as being scalability, flexibility, and agility. These characteristics place a limit on the number of framework 
levels. The identification of actors and their responsibilities were discussed. Some of their responsibilities are 
to implement the NCMF, and to implement the national cybersecurity functions. 
 
Section 5.3 provided a high-level overview of levels 2 to 6.  
  
Section 5.4 introduced level 2 of the NCMF. Level 2 prescribes the establishment of an overall national 
controlling body and a risk-based approach to do the selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity 
functions for implementation. It was illustrated how the list of cybersecurity functions is determined from 
national and international authoritative and normative sources, and that these sources could prescribe, or 
recommend nation state specific and mandatory, or general cybersecurity functions. The outcome is that       
level 3 is populated with the selected and prioritised cybersecurity functions. 
 
Section 5.6 introduced level 3 of the NCMF. Level 3 serves as a placeholder to consolidate the selected and 
prioritised cybersecurity functions. The selected and prioritised cybersecurity functions are used to identify 
national cybersecurity structures, and their services. The three scenarios that nation-states may consider when 
using level 1 to level 3 of the NCMF were also described. 
 
Section 5.7 introduced level 4 of the NCMF. This level identifies and houses the national cybersecurity 
structures needed to offer the selected and prioritised cybersecurity functions from, as well as its actors.  
 
Section 5.8 introduced level 5 which considers regulations, authoritative and normative prescripts applicable 
to the national cybersecurity structures. 
 
Section 5.9 introduced level 6. Level 6 considers operational elements of the national cybersecurity structure, 
such as structure specific policies, processes and procedures. 
 
Section 5.10 introduced the complete NCMF with its six levels. 
 
In Chapter 6 we will use apply the NCMF in the context of South Africa. We do this to illustrate the application 
of the NCMF at a national level, for a developing country. The application of the NCMF and the population of 
the framework is done based on our work experience, executing cybersecurity projects at national level in 
South Africa. 
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Chapter 6: Sample Application of NCMF in South Africa 
 
6.1 Introduction 
 
The NCMF was introduced in Section 2.9, and level 1 was discussed in detail in Chapter 3, while level 2 to 
level 6 were discussed in detail in Chapter 5. The NCMF consists of six hierarchical levels starting at level 1. 
The sample application of the NCMF is done in the South African context, and uses the incident handling and 
monitoring and evaluation general cybersecurity functions that we identified in Chapter 4, and consolidated in 
level 3. The services from these two functions are combined, and offered from a new level 4 national structure. 
The envisioned application of each level is presented in the text below. 
 
Section 6.2 to Section 6.7 illustrate the application of the NCMF levels in context of South Africa as a 
reference developing country. 
 
Section 6.8 concludes this chapter. 
 
6.2 NCMF Level 1 – Identify South African authoritative and normative sources 
 
The NCMF level 1 was introduced in Chapter 3. As stated in Section 3.3, the purpose of level 1 of the NCMF 
is to identify national and international authoritative and normative sources, and to identify mandatory national 
cybersecurity functions, or non-mandatory cybersecurity functions from those sources. Level 1 is further used 
to identify actors by considering the NCMF dimensions.  
 
Some of the South African authoritative and normative sources found during our research, are the NCPF [6], 
South African Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34], Protection of Critical Infrastructure Bill [90], The 
Protection of Personal Information Act 4 of 2013 [39], Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 
2002 [118], and government requirements expressed in the Department of Public Service and Administration 
(DPSA) Public Service Corporate Governance of Information and Communication Technology Policy 
framework which requires that COBIT 5 be adopted by public sector organisations [119]. 
 
Following the identification of these national and international authoritative and normative sources, the 
mandatory cybersecurity function prescripts expressed in them are identified. As an example, and from a South 
African national policy perspective, the NCPF [6] prescribes that cybersecurity in South Africa be improved. 
[34]. The NCPF then further prescribes the establishment of a national Incident Handling function [6] as one 
means of achieving this. The establishment of a national incident handling function is also prescribed by the 
South African Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34]. 
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The South African Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34] however goes into more detail, in that it prescribes 
the establishment of additional structures that need to be established to offer functions such as the                 
ECS-CSIRT (the incident handling function for government), the Cybersecurity Hub (the critical information 
infrastructure protection (CIIP) function), the cyber command (the military cyber function) and the Cyber Crimes 
Center (the cybercrimes / investigations / digital forensics function). The South African Cybercrimes and 
Cybersecurity Bill also assigns responsibilities to government departments and organs of state for the 
establishment of these national cybersecurity structures. The functions, their structures and responsible 
organs of state is displayed in Table 25. 
 
Table 25: South African cybersecurity functions, structures and responsibilities 
National Cybersecurity Function Structure Responsibility 
Incident handling ECS-CSIRT SSA 
Critical information infrastructure protection Cybersecurity Hub DTPS 
Military cyber /cyber warfare Cyber Command DOD 
Cybercrimes / investigations / digital forensics Cyber Crimes Centre SAPS 
 
The cybersecurity dimensions, mandates and domains in which the NCMF operate, inform and augment the 
identification, selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity functions. The NCMF government, national and 
international dimensions assist with the identification of actors. Responsibility for the implementation of the 
NCMF, as well as the implementation of cybersecurity functions, could be assigned to the actors identified. 
The dimensions were introduced and discussed in Section 3.5. 
 
The NCMF can further operate in either the offensive, or defensive domain. The defensive domain lifecycle 
phases can assist with the selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity functions, in that different cybersecurity 
functions and structures are needed during each of the lifecycle phases of the defensive domain. The domains 
were introduced and discussed in Section 3.6. 
 
The NCMF mandate also informs the selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity functions. As an example, 
the mandate of the NCMF during time of war will be to identify and implement cybersecurity functions in support 
of military cyber, or cyber intelligence and counter-intelligence. Rising national cybercrime levels could shift 
the mandate of the NCMF to the identification and implementation of national cybersecurity functions in support 
of counter cybercrime efforts. These are all possible mandates for the NCMF, and will influence the selection 
and prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions. The mandates were introduced and discussed in       
section 3.8. 
 
To illustrate the application of the NCMF, in the context of South Africa as a developing country, the defensive 
domain is selected as the domain of operation, with the critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) and 
national crisis management as its mandates. The selection of the defensive domain and critical information  
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infrastructure protection (CIIP) and national crisis management mandate were motivated in sections 3.7 and 
3.9.  
 
The cybersecurity incident handling and monitoring and evaluation of ICT national cybersecurity functions 
reside in the defensive domain, and deliver on the critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) and the 
national crisis management mandate. Their complementary cybersecurity structures are CSIRTs and SOCs 
as introduced in Appendix A. 
 
6.3 NCMF Level 2 – Establish a South African national cybersecurity controlling 
body 
 
This level describes an overall controlling body that is responsible for implementing the NCMF, and also the 
national cybersecurity functions as expressed by the NCPF [6] and the South African Cybercrimes and 
Cybersecurity Bill [34]. Examples of such controlling bodies in the South African context, are the Cyber 
Response Committee (CRC) [120] and the National Cybersecurity Advisory Council (NCAC) [121], as 
mandated by the NCPF [6]. The role of these controlling bodies is to oversee, steer and guide the planning, 
as well as the building, running and monitoring of the national cybersecurity structures from where the national 
cybersecurity functions are offered.. 
 
 In South Africa, the SSA leads this multi-departmental approach. The function of the overall national 
cybersecurity controlling body is to ensure that the national cybersecurity structures needed for the national 
functions, are planned, built, ran and monitored. The appointed CRC, chaired by the SSA, will oversee and 
steer the implementation of national cybersecurity functions in South Africa. As an advisory body, the National 
Cybersecurity Advisory Council (NCAC) [122] may also influence the national cybersecurity agenda. 
 
The national strategic risk and threat assessment function resides at level 2, and promotes the selection and 
prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions through a risk-based approach. For example, the national 
strategic risk and threat assessment function’s processes identify the lack of national incident response and 
co-ordination at national level as a high risk, and flags the incident handling function for selection as a national 
cybersecurity function, and prioritises the establishment of a national incident handling function.  
 
The national strategic risk and threat assessment function could be based on international standards such as 
ISO/IEC 27005:2011 – information security risk management [123], or any nation state-specific risk and threat 
assessment methodology. To provide nation states with a starting point, we have proposed a National 
Cybersecurity Risk and Threat Management Guide in Appendix H. 
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Now that a national cybersecurity controlling body has been established, as well as a mechanism for steering 
the selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions for implementation, the NCMF’s level 3 
captures and consolidates the identified, selected and prioritised national cybersecurity functions. 
 
6.4 NCMF Level 3 – Consolidate national cybersecurity functions 
 
The output from level 1 and level 2 – the selected and prioritised national cybersecurity functions, are 
consolidated at level 3. As stated in section 5.5, the cybersecurity functions can be nation-state specific and 
mandatory, or general. Level 3 is flexible and will change as and when a nation state’s cybersecurity posture 
changes. Structures at level 4 are selected based on the national cybersecurity functions consolidated in      
level 3.  
 
The levels following level 3 of the NCMF (levels 4 to 6), are cybersecurity structure specific, as described in 
section 5.2 and displayed in Figure 24. To illustrate the sample application of the NCMF in a South African 
context, the incident handling, and monitoring and evaluation of ICT general cybersecurity functions are 
selected. These two national functions’ structures, their functions, complementary services and technologies 
are identified in Appendices B and C. Now that the cybersecurity functions have been identified, selected and 
prioritised, and consolidated in level 3, the optimal cybersecurity structure need to be identified, from where 
the national cybersecurity function, and its cybersecurity services will be offered from. Level 4 of the NCMF 
identifies the optimal national cybersecurity structures. 
 
6.5 NCMF Level 4 – Structures realising the cybersecurity functions 
 
The national cybersecurity structures could be centralised, or decentralised. National-CSIRTs can be 
considered as an example of a decentralised structure. These structures typically consist of a top-level 
structure, the national-CSIRT, with distributed sector-CSIRTs. In South Africa, the Cybersecurity Hub serves 
as the national-CSIRT, with the South African Banking Risk Information Centre serving as a banking          
sector-CSIRT [124].  
 
This type of structure is typically decentralised, with sector-CSIRTs feeding, and reporting into, the national-
CSIRT [125], [126]. The national cybersecurity structures may also be a structure that is  physical, or logical 
in nature, or a combination of the two. An example of a national cybersecurity function offered from both a 
physical and a logical structure, is the South African national cryptography cybersecurity function, which is 
offered by the South African Communications Security Agency (SACSA) [110]. The responsibility of SACSA 
is to consider and develop national cryptography policies, and public key infrastructures (PKI) [127]. It is our 
experience that this function is offered from a single, centralised physical structure (building) housed in South  
Africa, using a logical structure (technology framework and processes) to develop national policies and 
solutions. 
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From a South African context, the National Cybersecurity Policy Framework (NCPF) [6] and the Cybercrimes 
and Cybersecurity Bill [34] prescribe the establishment of four national cybersecurity structures. In South 
Africa, the national CSIRT or Cybersecurity Hub [82], as mandated by the NCPF [6], falls under the auspices 
of the Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services (DTPS), and it realises the national incident 
handling cybersecurity function. None of the South African authoritative sources, however, prescribe a 
monitoring and evaluation function.  
 
Most international normative sources, however, have strong references to such a function such as ISO/IEC 
27001:2013 [128], COBIT 5 [129] and NIST SP 800-39 [9] to name a few. The services and technologies that 
enable and realise the monitoring and evaluation function, is offered from structures such as SOCs [19]. In 
South Africa, the responsibility for the establishment of these structures may fall under the auspices of the 
State Information Technology Agency (SITA) [3].  
 
Some additional national cybersecurity structures prescribed by the NCPF are the Cyber Command which is 
a Department of Defence (DOD) responsibility [34], the Cybercrimes Centre –  a South African Police Service 
(SAPS) responsibility [34] and the government-CSIRT known as the Electronic Communications Security 
CSIRT (ECS-CSIRT) which is a State Security Agency (SSA) responsibility [34]. 
 
Where it concerns Incident Handling at national level in South Africa, the DTPS is responsible to build a 
structure called the Cybersecurity Hub that serves as the South African national CSIRT. One of the mandates 
of the Cybersecurity Hub is to promote the building of additional structures called Sector-CSIRTs [34]. The 
Cybersecurity Hub is the South African national cybersecurity structure that offers the services that enables 
and realises the national Incident Handling function.  
 
Once the actors responsible for the implementation of a national cybersecurity function, as well as its optimal 
structure are identified, regulations and prescripts related to the national cybersecurity function and its structure 
need to be determined, and developed if needed. These regulations and prescripts, expressed in authoritative 
and normative sources, influences the operations and services that are offered from the national structure, as 
well as its governance. 
 
6.6 NCMF Level 5 – Regulations for national cybersecurity structures 
 
From a South African perspective, and using the incident handling cybersecurity function as an example, it is 
prescribed by the NCPF that the DTPS must be held responsible for the national incident handling function, 
with the national Cybersecurity Hub identified as the optimal national cybersecurity structure [33]. The DTPS 
is responsible for developing authoritative and normative sources applicable to the South African incident 
handling function at national level. These sources may contain regulatory requirements and standards. 
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6.7 NCMF Level 6 – Cybersecurity structure governance 
 
Level 6 of the NCMF describes the national cybersecurity structure’s governance requirements. From a South 
African perspective, these would be the Cybersecurity Hub internal policies, processes, procedures and 
standards applicable to the structure itself, and the daily operations of the Cybersecurity Hub.  
 
6.8 NCMF consolidated application 
 
The application of the NCMF in the  context of South Africa as a developing country is shown in Table 26.  
      
Table 26: NCMF Applied to South Africa 
NCMF Level  South Africa  
National cybersecurity identification function 
NCMF Level 1 
(L1) 
Domain: Defensive domain. 
Mandate: Critical information infrastructure protection (CIIP) and National crisis 
management. 
Dimension: Government (SSA, DOD, DTPS, SITA) National (SABRIC) international 
(FIRST). 
National authoritative sources: NCPF, South African Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity 
Bill, Protection of Critical Infrastructure Bill, The Protection of Personal Information Act 4 
of 2013, Electronic Communications and Transactions Act of 2002. 
National normative: COBIT 5. 
Mandatory national cybersecurity functions: Incident handling and monitoring and 
evaluation of national ICT as prescribed by NCPF and applicable to the selected domain 
and mandates.  
National cybersecurity selection and prioritisation function 
NCMF level 2 
(L2) 
Overall controlling body: National Cybersecurity Advisory Council. 
National strategic risk and threat assessment process: Using ISO/IEC 27005:2011. 
National cybersecurity function implementation 
NCMF level 3 
(L3) 
After application of the national strategic risk and threat assessment process, a selection 
and prioritisation of the identified national cybersecurity functions takes place. In our 
example, the national incident handling and monitoring and evaluation of national ICT 
functions are selected and prioritised for implementation. 
NCMF level 4 
(L4) 
Structures identified from where the selected and prioritised national cybersecurity 
functions are offered from as determined by considering the Defensive Domains lifecycle 
phases. The structures at national level is a CSIRT, and at organisational level, a SOC. 
For illustration, a CSIRT is selected. 
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NCMF level 5 
(L5) 
SAPS Act 68 of  1995 [130] provides prescripts in terms of physical security, and the 
Occupational Health and Safety Act (No. 85 of 1993 ) [43] provides prescripts in terms of 
occupational health and safety. 
NCMF level 6 
(L6) 
Policy: National incident management policy, acceptable use policy, mail policy, for 
example. 
Process: Incident management process, escalation process, back-up process 
Procedure: Symantec netbackup procedure. 
 
Table 26. Shows the dimensions, mandates and domains we have selected to illustrate the application of the 
NCMF, and it also shows the South African national authoritative, as well as national normative sources. We 
further show that we have selected the incident handling and monitoring and evaluation of cybersecurity 
functions. We also show that the overall controlling body and the national strategic risk and threat assessment 
process resides at level 2. We contextualised the overall controlling body for South Africa.  
 
Levels 3 to 6 describe the implementation of national cybersecurity functions and their structures. Level 3 is 
used to consolidate the selected and prioritised functions and level 4 identifies the cybersecurity function’s 
complementary structures. Levels 5 and 6 are structure-specific, and identifies authoritative and normative 
prescripts related to the structure, as well as operational and governance requirements for the structure. 
 
Now that the NCMF is presented, and its application illustrated in the context of South Africa as a reference 
developing country, a mechanism is proposed for its implementation by nation states. Appendix I proposes 
that the implementation of the NCMF be made a government responsibility. The responsibility for the 
implementation of the NCMF may be delegated to the national overall controlling body.  
 
The NCMF should operate at the strategic level of government operations. It is important to have an 
implementation plan for the NCMF since, without such a plan, the NCMF will remain a framework on paper 
only. Following an implementation best practice will assist with defining an implementation strategy, align 
actors and stakeholders, and assist with assigning responsibilities in terms of implementing the NCMF. In 
Appendix I we provide an NCMF best practice implementation guide. 
 
6.9 Conclusion 
 
In this chapter, we have illustrated the working of the NCMF by applying it to South Africa as a reference 
developing country. Section 6.2 to Section 6.6 covered the six levels of the NCMF, and we presented a sample 
application of the NCMF’s six levels in  the  context of South Africa as a developing country. 
 
Chapter 6 concludes our discussion of the NCMF. We have introduced the NCMF and illustrated its application 
in context of South Africa as a developing country as listed below: 
 
A National Cybersecurity Management Framework for Developing Countries 
 
139 
  
Sample Application of NCMF in South Africa 
 
• In Chapter 3 we developed level 1 of the NCMF. 
• We then used the NCMF level 1 in Chapter 4 to identify thirteen of the most general cybersecurity functions. 
• Chapter 5 was used to develop levels 2 to 6 of the NCMF. 
• In Chapter 6 we presented a sample application of the NCMF in the context of South Africa as a developing 
country. 
 
The reader should now have a good understanding of our intended application and usage of the NCMF. The 
key aspects of the NCMF we would like to highlight are: 
 
• The NCMF consists of 6 levels. 
• Levels 1 and 2 of the NCMF identify, select and prioritise national cybersecurity functions through the 
identification of national and international authoritative and normative sources. It also considers input from 
influencing elements such as dimensions, domains and mandates. The identified, selected and prioritised 
cybersecurity functions are consolidated in level 3.  
• Levels 4 to 6 of The NCMF describe how to implement national cybersecurity functions. 
• Cybersecurity functions consist of services that are made up of capabilities. Services and capabilities are 
made up of people, processes and technologies, and are offered from national cybersecurity structures. 
• Nation states using the NCMF should follow a phased approach, and only implement one or two functions 
at the most, at a time. 
• The general cybersecurity functions we have identified may be analysed and compared with the functions 
and services offered by existing national and commercial cybersecurity structures to identify overlapping 
or similar services, technologies and skills needed to enable them.  
• Nation states may realise costs and skills saving by combining and then offering the services and 
technologies from two or more functions from a single structure. 
 
Chapter 6 concludes Part 1. In Part 1, we developed the NCMF. We have also identified thirteen general 
cybersecurity functions and explained in Chapter 1 that national cybersecurity functions are offered from 
national cybersecurity structures. In Part 2, we propose a best practice guide that nation-states can use when 
building, running and monitoring national cybersecurity functions. Part 2 is meant to illustrate  
the application of the NCMF which we developed in Part 1. It is not necessary for the reader to read Part 2 in 
as much detail as Part 1, since Part 2 is seen as an operational guide, and it is a secondary deliverable. 
 
6.10 Summative model for part 2 
 
We have stated in Section 1.1 that we have selected and motivated for the use of the PBRM organisational 
approach for the development of our NCMF. The NCMF assisted us to identify general cybersecurity functions, 
and satisfied the plan function of the PBRM organisational approach. Throughout this thesis we have made 
mention of functions, services and capabilities. We have also discussed structures. Each of the cybersecurity  
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functions have services and capabilities associated with them, and these serve to enable them. These national 
cybersecurity functions are then offered from cybersecurity structures. 
 
Where the NCMF addresses the plan function of the PBRM organisational model, our E-CMIRC’s descriptive 
models will address the build, run and monitor functions of the PBRM organisational approach. To assist us in 
envisioning a new structure, we will first look at existing structures from where the incident handling, and 
monitoring and evaluation functions may be offered from. We have identified two existing structures – SOCs 
and CSIRTs that offer the incident handling, and monitoring and evaluation functions respectively. 
 
Part 2, provides an example of how a structure such as the E-CMIRC may be developed. We are developing 
the E-CMIRC structure to illustrate the application of the NCMF. We have selected and motivated for the use 
of the monitoring and evaluation, and the incident handling cybersecurity functions to illustrate the 
implementation part of our NCMF. Using these two cybersecurity functions as a reference, we will identify their 
complementary cybersecurity structures. The monitoring and evaluation function’s complementary structure is 
the SOC, and the incident handling’s complementary structure is the CSIRT. 
 
The SOC and the CSIRT have their own functions and services. It needs to be mentioned here again that a 
function consists of a service, and that a service is made up of a capability that, in turn, are made up of people, 
processes and technologies. In Part 2 in Appendices B and C, we will identify the SOC and CSIRT functions 
and services. Our primary intention is to identify the SOC and CSIRT functions with overlapping services and 
capabilities. 
 
Our E-CMIRC structure will offer a combination of the SOC and CSIRT functions and services. By combining 
the functions and services with its supporting technologies, developing countries can realise a cost benefit. 
This may be achieved by offering them from a single structure, using a common technology and processes. It 
further results in skills saving, in that a lesser number of technologies need to be supported, managed and 
maintained.  
 
Appendix A introduces the SOC, and CSIRT structures where the monitor and evaluation function, and the 
incident handling function is offered from. SOCs are sometimes referred to as cyber intelligence centres (CIC) 
[131]. The discussion of these two structures will be general in nature, and an initial understanding of these 
two structures and their service delivery models will assist the reader in understanding the detailed discussion 
of their functions and services following in Appendices B and C. Part 2 is structured as follows: 
 
• Appendix A, is used to introduce SOCs and CSIRTs, and provide a high-level overview of each structure’s 
functions. 
• Appendix B is used to identify SOC services. 
• Appendix C is used to identify CSIRT services. 
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• Appendix D is used to identify SOC and CSIRT common services, and make a selection from the common 
services for our E-CMIRC. 
• Appendix E is dedicated to the development of the E-CMIRC CDM. 
• Appendix F is used to develop the E-CMIRC OM. The capability development model and the operations 
model are then introduced as a single integrated model. 
• Appendix G is used to develop the ECMIRC CMM.  
• Appendix H provides a National Risk Management Guide. This intention is for nations applying  the NCMF 
to use this guide at level 2 of the NCMF to help with the section and prioritisation process. 
• Appendix I offers a NCMF implementation guide. 
 
It needs to be noted again that the primary deliverable of this thesis is the NCMF, and this was done in Part 1 
while the E-CMIRC descriptive models in Part 2 is a secondary deliverable. The reader may choose not to 
read Part 2 with as much attention as Part 1, or even choose not reading it altogether.  
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 Chapter 7: Closure 
 
7.1 Introduction 
 
This study was used to develop an NCMF. The NCMF is a framework that can be used at national level to 
guide nations during the identification, selection, prioritisation and implementation of national cybersecurity 
functions. The NCMF is aimed at developing nations, and with the combination of national cybersecurity 
functions, processes and technologies, developing states may achieve a cost saving. The NCMF is flexible 
and scalable enough to be used by both developed and developing nations during their national cybersecurity 
management journey.  The rest of this chapter is structured as follows: 
 
Section 7.2 discusses the research study. 
 
Section 7.4 provides in tabled format, our problem statement, objectives and deliverables, with an indication 
on whether we have achieved each of them. 
 
Section 7.5 discusses future research. 
Section 7.6 summarises the study. 
 
7.2 Discussion of the research study  
 
We established that there is a need for a National Cybersecurity Management Framework, as research did not 
turn up any publicly available frameworks. This led to the development of the National Cybersecurity 
Management Framework – the NCMF. The intention was to develop the NCMF with a top-down hierarchical 
approach. The NCMF consists of six levels – starting with level 1 and ending with level 6.  
 
The identification task of the NCMF starts at level 1 and, the selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity 
functions for implementation is done at level 2. The implementation part of the framework starts at level 3 and 
ends at level 6. The NCMF satisfies the “plan” part of the PBRM organisational approach. The NCMF level 1 
is foundational in nature, and was developed in Chapter 3. Level 1 describes the identification task.  
 
The application of level 1 was illustrated in Chapter 4, where we used it to identify thirteen general cybersecurity 
functions. The NCMF levels 2 to 6 were developed in Chapter 5. A sample application of the NCMF in the 
context of South Africa, as a developing country, was provided in Chapter 6.  
 
The management of national cybersecurity consists of four tasks. These tasks are the identification, selection, 
prioritisation and implementation of national cybersecurity functions. To assist with these cybersecurity  
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management tasks, we have developed a framework, called the National Cybersecurity Management 
Framework – the NCMF. 
 
The NCMF has six levels that must be executed sequentially, starting at level 1. Levels 1 to 2 of the NCMF 
does the identification, selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity functions for implementation at national 
level.  Level 1 has a primary element as well as secondary, influencing elements. The level 1 primary element 
is: 
 
• National and international authoritative and normative sources. These sources prescribe mandatory  
national cybersecurity functions, or make cybersecurity function recommendations.  
 
The secondary elements influencing and informing the selection and prioritisation of national cybersecurity 
functions are: 
 
• Dimensions. Dimensions are used to identify actors. 
• Domains. Two possible domains, the offensive and defensive domains. 
• Mandates. Five different mandates. These are the military cyber, counter cybercrime, intelligence and  
counter-intelligence, critical information infrastructure protection (ciip) and national crisis management, 
and cyber diplomacy and internet governance. 
 
Actors involved in national cybersecurity functions are also identified at level 1. To support the identification of 
actors. We have developed the following templates: 
 
Level 1 templates 
 
• Stakeholder and actor identification template. 
• Function, structure and actor identification template for domains. 
 
The prioritisation of national cybersecurity functions for implementation happens at level 2. This is achieved 
by following a national risk management process. For nations that do not have their own national risk 
management strategy and process, we propose a National Cybersecurity Risk Management Guide in    
Appendix H. 
 
Level 1 of the NCMF was used to identify thirteen general national cybersecurity functions. Levels 3 to 6 of the 
NCMF describe the implementation of national cybersecurity functions. The selected and prioritised 
cybersecurity functions are offered from national cybersecurity structures. To illustrate the application part of 
the NCMF, we propose a best practice guide in Part 2  for the implementation of a new national cybersecurity 
structure called the Early Cybersecurity Monitoring and Incident Response Centre (E-CMIRC). 
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This E-CMIRC structure offers a combination of SOC and CSIRT services to realise a cost benefit. Our 
intention is for the E-CMIRC to illustrate the implementation part of the NCMF, and also serve as a best practice 
guide during the development of national cybersecurity structures. The E-CMIRC structure is developed in 
Part 2, and described with three models in Appendices E to G. These models are: 
 
• E-CMIRC Capability Development Model (E-CMIRC CDM) in Appendix E. 
• E-CMIRC Operations Model (E-CMIRC OM) in Appendix F. 
• E-CMIRC Capability Maturity Model (E-CMIRC CMM) Appendix G. 
 
We have selected the PBRM organisational approach as a high-level framework to guide the development of 
the NCMF. The National Cybersecurity Management Framework satisfies the “plan” part of the PBRM 
organisational approach, while the E-CMIRC, satisfying the build, run and monitor part of the PBRM 
organisational approach. In Section 7.3, we will show how we managed to approach the problem statement, 
objectives and deliverables, and whether we were successful in addressing them. 
 
7.3 Problem statement, objective and deliverable mapping   
 
We will use tables to map our problem statement, objectives and deliverables against chapters, and indicate 
whether we have achieved each of them. We will now in Table 27 show how we solved our problem statement, 
achieved our objectives and delivered on our deliverables. 
 
Table 27: Problem statement addressed 
Problem Statement 
A framework, dedicated to developing countries, to assist them with the national cybersecurity management 
tasks of the: 
 
• Identification, 
• Selection,  
• Prioritisation and 
• Implementation of national cybersecurity functions could not be identified from the existing literature.  
 
A developing country specific, initial or start-up national cybersecurity structure - with descriptive models, 
from where national cybersecurity functions can be offered, could not be identified from the existing 
literature. It is important to follow a reference framework or model during the execution of national 
cybersecurity management tasks. Not following a framework or model may lead to disjointed efforts, 
misalignment between organs of state and state departments, make budgeting difficult, and lead to 
inconsistent, and non-repeatable results. This ultimately leads to wasted expenditure, and a poor national 
cybersecurity effort. 
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Section Artefact Location Achieved 
Section 1.4 (p29) The national cybersecurity management 
framework (NCMF) 
Chapter 2 to Chapter 6 
 
Section 1.4 (p29) E-CMIRC Appendix E to Appendix G 
 
Description 
The NCMF as a framework was developed to assist both developing and developed nations during the 
management of national cybersecurity functions. The NCMF provides a mechanism to identify, select, 
prioritise and implement national cybersecurity functions. 
 
The E-CMIRC was developed as an initial or start-up national cybersecurity structure. The implementation 
thereof is described in our best practice guide for the implementation of national cybersecurity structures. 
 
Table 28 shows that we have achieved our primary objective in Part 1 – Chapters 2 to 6. We have done so 
through the development of the NCMF. We further show that we have achieved our secondary objective 
through the development of a best practice guide for the implementation of national cybersecurity structures. 
We have envisioned a new, initial national cybersecurity structure called the E-CMIRC, and our best practice 
guide describes the implementation of the E-CMIRC. 
 
Table 28: Objective addressed 
Objective 
Primary objective: 
To develop a scalable and flexible framework (the NCMF) that can be used by developed and developing 
countries to 
• Identify. 
• Select. 
• Prioritise. 
• Implement national cybersecurity functions. 
Secondary objective: 
To develop a comprehensive best practice guide that may be used during the implementation of national 
cybersecurity structures. We will develop three models as part of this best practice guide to describe the 
implementation of national cybersecurity structures. 
Section Artefact Location Achieved 
Section 1.5 (p30) Part 1: The National Cybersecurity 
Management Framework (NCMF) 
Chapter 2 to Chapter 6 
 
Section 1.5 (p30) Part 2: Best practice guide for the 
implementation of national cybersecurity 
structures 
Appendix A to Appendix G 
 
Description 
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Primary objective - Part 1: We have met the primary objective by the development of the NCMF. The 
NCMF is a flexible and scalable framework that can assist nation-states, as well as organisations to identify, 
select, prioritise and implement national cybersecurity functions. 
 
Secondary objective - Part 2: The E-CMIRC was developed as an initial or start-up national cybersecurity 
structure. The implementation thereof is described in our best practice guide for the implementation of 
national cybersecurity structures. 
 
In Table 29, we show that we have achieved our two deliverables. The first deliverable is the NCMF framework 
in Part 1. Our second deliverable in Part 2 is the best practice guide for the implementation of national 
cybersecurity structures. The implementation of our best practice guide is illustrated through the development 
of 3 models that describe a newly envisioned national structure called the E-CMIRC. 
 
Table 29: Deliverables addressed 
Deliverables 
Primary deliverable 
The primary deliverable is a national cybersecurity management framework, the National Cybersecurity 
Management Framework (NCMF).  
 
Secondary deliverable: 
The secondary deliverable is a comprehensive best practice guide that describes the implementation 
of national cybersecurity structures. We will describe the implementation of a new structure called the 
Early Cybersecurity Monitoring and Incident Response Centre (E-CMIRC). It is described using three 
reference models. 
Section Artefact Location Achieved 
Section 1.5 (p30) Part 1: The National Cybersecurity 
Management Framework (NCMF) 
Chapters 2 to 6 
 
Section 1.5 (p30) Part 2: Best Practice Guide for the 
Implementation of National Cybersecurity 
Structures 
Appendix A to Appendix G 
 
Description 
Primary deliverable – The NCMF in Part 1: We have met the primary objective by the development of the 
NCMF. The NCMF is a flexible and scalable framework that can assist nation-states, as well as 
organisations to identify, select, prioritise and implement national cybersecurity functions. 
 
Secondary deliverable – The best practice guide in Part 2: The best practice guide describes the 
implementation of a national cybersecurity structure called the E-CMIRC. The focus of this structure is on 
cost saving, and is aimed at developing countries. The structure is described using three models. 
 
Table 30 provides a detailed breakdown of the objective and aims of each Chapter and Appendices. 
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Table 30: Aims and objectives mapping to parts and chapters 
Chapter Objective  Aim Deliverable 
Chapter 1 Introduce the study, the problem statement 
and the deliverables. 
Introduces the study. Problem statement 
Deliverables 
Part 1 
Chapter 2 Motivation for an NCMF. 
• Define functions, services, capabilities 
and structures. 
• Introduce authoritative and normative 
sources 
• Introduce elements influencing the 
NCMF 
• NCMF high-level overview. 
Motivate the development of an 
NCMF. 
• Establish a common 
understanding of terms and 
definitions. 
• Introduce the NCMF. 
NCMF influencing elements 
 
Chapter 3 Development of NCMF level 1. Ensure all elements influencing the 
identification of national 
cybersecurity functions are 
considered. 
NCMF level 1 
 
Chapter 4 Identify the most general national 
cybersecurity functions. 
Illustrate the application of NCMF 
level 1 to identify national 
cybersecurity functions. 
Thirteen general cybersecurity 
functions 
 
Chapter 5 Development of NCMF level 2 to level 6. Complete and present the NCMF 
framework. 
NCMF level 2 to level 6 
Chapter 6 Illustrate the application of the NCMF in the 
context of a developing country. 
Illustrate to the reader how to apply 
the NCMF in its entirety in the 
context of a developing country. 
Complete NCMF  
Chapter 7 Conclude this study Justify and close the study. Conclusion 
Part 2 
Appendix A Provide a high-level introduction to SOCs 
and CSIRTs. 
SOCs and CSIRTs were identified 
as structures whose functions and 
services can be merged to realise a 
cost saving. The aim is to orient the 
reader in terms of the Chapters 
following. 
SOC and CSIRT introduction 
Appendix B Determine SOC functions. Determination of SOC functions. 
The function complementary 
services will be determined from 
these functions.  
A list of SOC functions. 
Appendix C Determine CSIRT functions. Determination of CSIRT functions. 
The function complementary 
services will be determined from 
these functions. 
A list of CSIRT functions. 
Appendix D Determine E-CMIRC functions and services. The E-CMIRC functions and 
services are introduced, The            
E-CMIRC functions and services is 
a combination of SOC and CSIRT 
functions and services. 
E-CMIRC functions and 
services. 
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Chapter Objective  Aim Deliverable 
Appendix E Development of the E-CMIRC Capability 
Development Model (E-CMIRC CDM). 
Identification of existing capability 
development models, and selection 
of a model for the E-CMIRC. 
E-CMIRC CDM 
Appendix F Development of the E-CMIRC Operations 
Model (E-CMIRC OM). 
Identification of existing operational 
models, and selection of a model 
for the E-CMIRC. 
Presentation of the integrated         
E-CMIRC CDM and E-CMIRC OM. 
E-CMIRC OM and integrated 
E-CMIRC CDM and OM model. 
Appendix G Development of the E-CMIRC Capability 
Maturity Model (E-CMIRC CMM). 
Identification of existing capability 
maturity models, and selection of a 
model for the E-CMIRC CMM. 
Presentation of the E-CMIRC 
CMM. 
E-CMIRC CMM. 
Appendix H Development of the national cybersecurity 
risk management approach 
Identifies existing risk management 
standards and frameworks 
National cybersecurity risk 
management approach  
Appendix I NCMF implementation plan Implementation plan and critical 
success factors for the 
implementation of national 
frameworks. 
NCMF implementation plan 
 
 
7.4 Future research 
 
In future, the E-CMIRC capabilities’ measures of effectiveness and measures of performance can be 
determined. This can augment the E-CMIRC CMM, and allow for the proper benchmarking of cybersecurity 
services and capabilities at the national level. The NCMF and E-CMIRC could be introduced to developing 
countries for implementation. This will improve the national cybersecurity posture. Continuous improvement of 
the NCMF and E-CMIRC will take place, and our framework and models will be benchmarked against existing 
frameworks, standards and best practices to ensure its currency and usability. It is further important to develop 
a methodology to evaluate our framework, and future research will focus on developing such an evaluation 
methodology. 
 
7.5 Summary 
 
This study produced a framework to assist nation-states with the identification, selection, prioritisation and 
implementation of national cybersecurity functions. This framework is called the NCMF, and the application of 
the NCMF is illustrated with the development of a new national cybersecurity structure – the E-CMIRC.  
 
The E-CMIRC is developed in Part 2 to illustrate the implementation part of the NCMF. The development of 
the E-CMIRC is done keeping in mind the fiscal and skills constraints of developing countries. The E-CMIRC  
is described using three models – conforming to the PBRM organisational approach. As deliverables, this 
study produced the following: 
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• The NCMF which is a framework to guide, steer and inform the identification and implementation of 
national cybersecurity functions. The framework follows a top-down hierarchical approach, and consists 
 
of six levels. 
• The E-CMIRC structure offering combined cybersecurity services from two national cybersecurity  
functions – the monitor and evaluate cybersecurity function, and the incident handling cybersecurity 
function. The E-CMIRC is described using three different, models. 
 
o The E-CMIRC Capability Development Model (E-CMIRC CDM). 
o The E-CMIRC Operations Model (E-CMIRC OM). 
o The E-CMIRC Capability Maturity Model (E-CMIRC CMM). 
 
Using the NCMF to identify national cybersecurity functions will improve the national cybersecurity posture of 
the nation applying the framework. We have also provided a list of the thirteen most general national 
cybersecurity functions that nation-states may consider for implementation. Having a secure and dependable 
ICT infrastructure will foster trust and may facilitate economic activity. 
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Appendix A:  Introducing SOCs and CSIRTs 
  
A1  Introduction  
 
In the preceding chapters, we concluded the development and illustrative application of the NCMF in context 
of South Africa as a developing country. We will now use Appendix A to provide a high-level, general 
introduction to SOCs and CSIRTs. These are the two structures from where the monitoring and evaluation, 
and incident handling functions are offered. A high-level overview of SOCs will be provided in Section A3, and 
an overview of CSIRTs will be provided in Section A4. This will provide the reader with a basic understanding 
of these structures, and this understanding will help with the orientation and interpretation of the discussion of 
their functions in the chapters following. 
 
As stated in Chapter 2, cybersecurity functions and its services are offered from different structures. It is 
important for us to identify the structures from where the monitoring and evaluation function, and incident 
handling functions are offered from, as this allows us to identify its services. Before we start with a discussion 
on the structures, we will reinforce our motivation for the selection of the monitoring and evaluation function, 
and the incident handling functions in Chapter 4. These two functions’ corresponding structures are SOCs and 
CSIRTs. Appendix A is structured as follows: 
 
Section A2 motivates our selection of the monitoring and evaluation, and incident handling function. It is 
necessary to strengthen the  understanding of our selection since their complementary structures will be used 
to identify services and technologies for the E-CMIRC. 
 
Section A3 introduces the SOC structure at a high level. 
 
Section A4 introduces the CSIRT structure at a high level. 
 
Section A5 concludes Appendix A, and provides two ways of viewing the Monitor and Evaluate and Incident 
Handling function. 
 
A2  Motivation for functions selected for E-CMIRC structure 
 
In Chapter 4, South African authoritative sources were identified to assist with the identification of its national 
cybersecurity functions. International normative sources were also identified, and analysed, to  
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identify thirteen of the most general functions. The general cybersecurity functions we have identified using 
South African authoritative, and international normative sources, were then correlated to, and verified and 
validated against a random, and blind selection of international authoritative sources. 
 
The dimensions, mandates and domains the NCMF operate in, were introduced in Chapter 3. The dimensions, 
mandates and domains introduced in Section 3.5 to Section 3.8, together with the National Strategic Risk and 
Threat Assessment Guide introduced in Appendix H, assist with the selection and prioritisation of one, or many 
of the cybersecurity functions for implementation at national level. 
 
There is an overlap in some of the services and technologies of some of the national cybersecurity functions, 
such as the services and technologies of the monitoring and evaluation, and the incident handling functions. 
This overlap in services and technologies means that developing countries can realise a cost saving by 
identifying these overlapping services and technologies, and offering them from a single, national structure.  
 
In this regard, it can be noted thatthe monitoring and evaluation, and the incident handling functions have a 
common service, the incident management service. This common service could use the same technology and 
processes. Using the same technology and processes has the advantage in that money is spent on only one 
technology, and only one set of skills is needed to support this technology. 
 
The two cybersecurity functions’ overlapping services and technologies will be identified and offered from a 
newly envisioned cybersecurity structure. Our new structure is called the E-CMIRC. The development of the 
E-CMIRC models will allow us to illustrate the application of the NCMF implementation part (levels 4 to 6).  
 
Our selection was made based on our experience in planning, building, running and monitoring these two 
cybersecurity functions and its structures, both at national and organisational level, as well as the fact that their 
needed skillsets, services and technologies overlap. Another reason for selecting these two functions with their 
complementary structures for the development of the E-CMIRC, is that there are a large number of reference 
implementation architectures for both. Most developed nations have a national CSIRT structure offering the 
services to realise the incident handling function, and there exists abundant reference material in terms of its 
services. The same holds true for the monitoring and evaluation function whose services are offered from a 
SOC structure. There is ample reference material on how to plan, build, run and monitor CSIRTs and SOCs. 
We will now provide a high-level introduction to the SOC structure. 
 
A3  Introduction to the SOC structure 
 
As part of a defence in depth strategy [71] [132], organisations and nations deploy technical controls to mitigate 
risks associated with the cyber environment. Some examples of these technical controls are network-based  
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controls to protect the network itself (such as firewalls, intrusion protection systems and network access 
control), network-based controls to protect information (data loss prevention), or host-based controls (anti-
malware, file integrity monitoring). These controls need to be monitored to ensure that they work as intended, 
and to detect attacks against the organization. To achieve this objective, and depending on the monitoring and 
log collection deployment model, the logs of the technical controls are collected, correlated, and in some 
instances aggregated, and then forwarded to a SOC. From the events in the logs, detected anomalies and 
attacks results in incidents, and these incidents need to be handled, either by the SOC itself, or by a CSIRT.  
 
There is currently an increase in the establishment of SOCs and CSIRTs due to the drive by governments and 
industry to address the ever increasing cyber threat [133]. Other driving factors are the requirements expressed 
in authoritative sources (NCSs, acts and regulations) as discussed in Chapter 3, and requirements, expressed 
by various normative sources, such as standards and best practices. Some of the normative sources 
expressing monitoring requirements are: 
 
• COBIT 4.1 - DS5.5 Security testing, surveillance and monitoring [134]. 
• IITIL v3 - SO 5.13 Information security management and service operation [135]. 
• ISO/IEC 27002:2005 - 10.10.2 Monitoring system use, 10.10.3 Protection of log information, 10.10.4 
 Administrator and operator logs, 15.3.1 Information systems audit controls [135]. 
• SANS critical controls - critical control 14: maintenance, monitoring, and analysis of security audit logs 
 [51]. 
• NIST SP 800-53 - AC-17 (1), AC-19, AU-2 (4), AU-3 (1,2), AU-4, AU-5, AU-6 (a, 1, 5), AU-8, AU-9 (1, 2), 
 AU-12 (2), SI-4 (8) [136]. 
 
In addition to the normative and authoritative requirements for ICT monitoring, there are also tangible business 
benefits to be gained, which further drives the need for monitoring. Key to this, is that monitoring fulfils a portion 
of the risk management strategy for services and infrastructure, and it precipitates in the following benefits that 
are equally applicable to nation states [137]. In addition to there being a lower interruption of critical services, 
critical infrastructure and business processes, monitoring. 
 
• Lower interruption to critical services, critical infrastructure and business processes. 
• Transforms a business or nation from a reactionary posture to a prepared posture. 
• Controls and prevents threats. 
• Releases critical IT and network resources. 
• Preserves accountability and corporate governance. 
• Provides and maintains privacy for the public, employees, partners and customers. 
• Produces a situational awareness. 
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Taking into consideration the definitions and description of SOCs, we can conclude that SOCs thus serve as 
a central repository for logs that are scanned to detect anomalies, and to identify possible attacks against an 
organisation or nation. Typical functions offered by SOCs are monitoring, incident management and the 
mitigation and containment of threats detected against assets. To this effect, a well-functioning SOC can 
mitigate some of the cyber risks to which  nations or organisations are exposed. SOC functions are discussed 
in more detail in Appendix B. 
 
There is currently no publicly available standard for building SOCs [138], but there are numerous frameworks 
and best practices that could be applied to SOCs in terms of operational management. Some examples are 
ITIL [139] for operations management, and ISO/IEC 27001:2013 [48] for cybersecurity management. From the 
SOC definitions, we have seen that one of the key services of a SOC, is incident management. In keeping with  
our intention of identifying functions with overlapping services and technologies, we will now introduce the 
CSIRT structure, whose primary function is one of incident management. 
 
A4:  Introduction to the CSIRT Structure 
 
The abbreviation, CSIRT stands for a computer security incident response team. The abbreviation is mostly 
used in Europe for the protected Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT), or Computer Emergency 
Response Team Coordination Centre (CERT-CC) name. The names “CERT” and “CERT/CC” are registered 
and owned by the Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at the Carnegie Mellon University (CMU). The CMU 
CERT was the first CSIRT [140]; [141].  
 
The CERT/CC forms a sub-component of the larger CERT division. CERT is a name, and not an acronym 
[141]. Many CSIRTs have been allowed by CMU to use the name CERT or CERT/CC in their names, but these 
are independent of the university. Many of these CSIRTs are however members of the Forum of Incident 
Response and Security Teams (FIRST) community, of which the CERT/CC was a founding member. For the 
purpose of developing the E-CMIRC model, and for reference to an incident resolution capability, we will use 
the acronym CSIRT.  
 
It is further our experience that most often, a structure’s function may be derived from its definition and 
description. We will now introduce some of the CSIRT definitions from literature sources. The OAS [126] 
defines a national CSIRT as an entity that serves a defined community, and coordinates incidents at a national 
level. It further serves as a contact point for national and international incidents. 
 
The European Agency for Network and Information Security (ENISA) defines a CSIRT as “a team of IT security 
experts whose main business is to respond to computer security incidents. It provides the necessary services  
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to handle them and support their constituents to recover from breaches” [140], while Ruefle [142], defines a 
CSIRT as: 
 
“…a concrete organizational entity (that is, one or more staff) that is assigned the responsibility for 
coordinating and supporting the response to a computer security event or incident. CSIRTs can be created 
for nation states or economies, governments, commercial organizations, educational institutions, and 
even non-profit entities. The goal of a CSIRT is to minimize and control the damage resulting from 
incidents, provide effective guidance for response and recovery activities, and work to prevent future 
incidents from happening.” 
 
The Software Engineering Institute (SEI) [81] at the Carnegie Mellon University defines a CSIRT as: 
 
“…a service organisation that is responsible for receiving, reviewing, and responding to computer security 
incident reports and activity. Their services are usually performed for a defined constituency that could be 
a parent entity such as a corporate, governmental, or educational organization; a region or country; a 
research network; or a paid client.” 
 
 Taking into consideration the formal definition of CSIRTs, it can be concluded that the main function of a 
CSIRT is to perform incident handling.  
 
The Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT) [143] states that the function or roles of CSIRTs are to 
receive, review and respond to cybersecurity incident reports and activity. CSIRTs are service oriented 
organisations [141]. Incident Handling services are reactive in nature. The purpose of a CSIRT is “to “minimize 
the impact of an incident to a company, and allow it to get back to work as quickly as possible” [144], or “to 
serve as a focal point in the prevention, receiving and responding to computer security incidents” [126] [145].  
 
CSIRTs are made up of teams responding to cybersecurity incidents. The terms CSIRT is used as a generic 
description of an incident response team [146], while CERT is a trademarked name which is controlled by 
CERT/CC [147] as explained in Appendix A.  In the development of the E-CMIRC model, we will be using the 
term “CSIRT.” There are different CSIRT structures, types and service delivery models, and all of them are 
discussed to determine the model best suited for the E-CMIRC. Our intention with this Appendix is further to 
identify CSIRT functions. The most relevant and applicable functions and service delivery models from the 
SOC and CSIRT structures will then be identified, and motivated, and combined in Appendix D to compile a 
list of functions for the E-CMIRC. 
 
ENISA defines a CSIRT as “a team of IT security experts whose main business is to respond to computer 
security incidents. It provides the necessary services to handle them and support their constituents to recover 
from breaches” [148]. National CSIRTs should build relations with national and international structures and 
stakeholders to foster collaboration and cooperation across borders.  
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These functions and roles are confirmed by Morgus; Skierka; Hohmann and Mauer [149]. Morgus et al 
describes a national CSIRT as an entity acting as the primary national interface between domestic incident 
responders (in a South African context, these would be sector-CSIRTs), as well as other national CSIRTs  
globally. A national CSIRT, subject to the country's political and legal setting, could also be used to provide 
additional functions, such as forensic and awareness functions.  
 
The Software Engineering Institute (SEI) at the Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) defines a national CSIRT 
as a structure that coordinates incident management at national level, and promotes the comprehension of 
cybersecurity related matters for the national community [150]. This includes awareness programmes. A 
national CSIRT should further be able to provide technical competence in the resolution of national 
cybersecurity incidents, and to disseminate this information to its constituents.  
 
ENISA defines a government CSIRT as “… governmental CSIRTs are typically used to protect the cyberspace 
of governmental institutions including critical infrastructure as well as to ensure cyber-crisis management.” 
[151], while Ruefle [152] defines a government CSIRT as “…may be involved in security awareness training 
and general incident handling activities but never perform any forensics activities.” Just as the SOC as an 
entity has its own SOC specific functions (Section A3), so does a CSIRT. The CSIRT, as a structure, offers 
the CSIRT structure functions to realise the incident handling function.  
 
Driving factors for the establishment of CSIRTs are the requirements expressed in authoritative sources 
(NCSs, acts and regulations) as discussed in Chapter 3) Incident handling is also expressed as a requirement 
by various normative sources such as: 
 
• COBIT 4.1 - DS5.6 Security incident definition, DS8.3 Incident escalation, DS8.4 Incident closure [134]. 
• ITIL v3 - SD 4.5.6.2 Management of security breaches and incidents, SO 4.1 Event management, ST, SO 
 4.2 Incident management [135]. 
• ISO/IEC 27002:2005 - 13.0. Information security incident management; 13.2. Management of information 
 security incidents and improvements; 13.2.2. Learning from information security incidents [135]. 
• SANS Critical Controls - CSC 19: Incident response and management [51]. 
• NIST SP 800-53 - IR 1-7 Incident response [136]. 
 
During our introduction and description of functions, services, capabilities and structures in Chapter 2 we 
explained that functions consists of services, and services consists of capabilities which are made up of people, 
processes and technologies. One of the services that makes up the Incident Handling function, is the incident 
management service. Therefore, while the main function of a SOC is to provide the monitoring and evaluation 
function, one of its services is an incident management service. The CSIRTs main function is the Incident 
Handling function, which also consists of an incident management service. 
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One way of looking at the two selected functions – the monitor and evaluate function, and the incident handling 
function, is that the events, threat intelligence and other security related information collected by SOCs (SOC  
services), could serve as input to the CSIRT. From this point of view, the monitor and evaluate function serve 
to enhance the CSIRT incident handling function. Augmenting the CSIRT services with SOC services allows 
CSIRTs to provide early warning, and remediation information to its constituents. In this instance, the incident 
handling function is seen as the primary function and is supported by SOC’s monitor and evaluate function. 
 
Another way of looking at the incident handling function in context of SOCs and CSIRTs, is that a CSIRT’s 
incident handling function could be viewed as a highly specialised, highly mature, sub-function of the SOC’s 
inherent incident handling function. For example, Standard Bank, a commercial bank in South Africa [153] has 
a highly effective SOC, and only in the event of cybersecurity events being detected, and classified as 
incidents, do they invoke a virtual-CSIRT to handle the incidents – such as when the theft of R300 million in 
2016 occurred in a scam originating from Japan [154]. In this instance, the monitor and evaluate function is 
seen as the primary function and is supported by the incident handling function.  
 
A5  Conclusion 
 
SOCs primarily provide a monitoring and evaluation function with secondary incident management services to 
organisations or government departments, while CSIRTs primarily offer an incident handling function that 
consists of incident management services, at organisational and national level. The fact that both SOCs and 
CSIRTs inherently deliver an incident management service necessitates the need to further explore the two 
structure’s similarities and differences in terms of services and technologies.  
 
This will allow us to identify services and technologies different, but also similar to both structures. We will be 
doing this since our intention is to realise cost and skills saving by combining and offering their overlapping 
services and technologies in terms of the E-CMIRC structure. 
 
Based on our experience working on cybersecurity projects at national level, combined with our experience in 
enterprise architecture, tangible benefits are gained by combining the services and technologies of two or 
more cybersecurity functions. Some of the key benefits gained by combining the services and technologies of 
two or more functions are: 
 
• Cost saving may be achieved through the combination and alignment of the service's processes.For 
 example, the incident management processes for SOCs and CSIRTs may be combined into one incident 
 management process addressing the similarly named incident management service. This single incident  
management process also has to integrate and align with the state’s escalation process and media 
 handling process. Generally speaking, aligning processes across different government departments may  
A National Cybersecurity Management Framework for Developing Countries 
 
180 
  
Appendix A: Introducing SOCs and CSIRTs 
 
 
realise a cost benefit. It may also lead to process automation leading to the correct and timeous execution 
 of processes, and in some cases, negates the need for human intervention. 
• Offering two or more national cybersecurity functions from a single structure offers a savings in terms of 
 shared infrastructure, such as facilities, connectivity, equipment and other resources. 
• Using one technology system to realise more than one cybersecurity service, also leads to a cost 
 reduction and  saving. For example, both SOCs and CSIRTs offer the incident management service.  
The  technology used by SOCs is a SIEM, and this is unique to a SOC. Most modern SIEMs also provide 
 incident management software and integration as part of the SIEM capability suite. This SIEM technology  
may be used to realise the incident management services of both SOCs and SIEMs, eliminating the need 
for separate technologies, while providing additional services such as log collection, aggregation and 
correlation. 
• Fewer technological systems reduces the need for multiple technology experts and skills. This has a cost 
benefit in that fewer human resources are needed to support the technologies. It also allows the people 
component to focus on process management and service tasks. 
 
Now that we have done a high-level introduction of SOCs and CSIRTs, the SOC functions and service delivery 
models are introduced and discussed in Appendix B and the CSIRT functions and service delivery models are 
introduced in Appendix C. Our motivation for the discussion on the service delivery models is that different 
service delivery models need different functions and services.  
 
We will then be identifying SOC and CSIRT overlapping services and technologies in Appendix D. Identifying 
SOC and CSIRT overlapping services and technologies are crucial since we will be combining them and offer 
them from our E-CMIRC. The E-CMIRC is a national structure that will offer overlapping SOC and CSIRT 
services, while consolidating the technology and processes needed to enable those services, at the same time 
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Appendix B:  SOCs 
 
B1  Introduction 
 
We introduced SOCs in Appendix A. This was an extremely high-level introduction, and we touched on some 
of its functions. In this appendix, we will provide a more detailed discussion on the SOC structure, and we will 
use this appendix further to identify the SOC functions, as well as its service delivery models. Some of the key 
components of an IT service delivery model are the governance of E-CMIRC services, organisation of                 
E-CMIRC services, E-CMIRC operational processes, and performance management [155].  
 
We explained in Chapter 4 and Appendix A that a cost and skills saving may be realised if the technologies 
and processes of two, or more cybersecurity functions are combined and offered from a single structure. This 
alignment of technology and processes, makes it necessary for us to identify different service delivery models. 
Different service delivery models offer different services, using different technologies and processes. 
 
IT Services may be offered "as a service," or by “augmenting staff” [156]. Various permutations of these two 
models exist. Service delivery realises benefits, and deliver on functions. There are publicly available service 
delivery frameworks that may be used as a reference. An example of a service delivery framework, is ITIL's IT 
Service Management (ITSM) [157]. Selecting the right service delivery model for the E-CMIRC realises the 
following benefits [155]: 
 
• It aligns services and technology. 
• It allows for business processes to be aligned 
• Cost efficiency is realised. 
• Agile response to change in the business environment. 
 
We have illustrated that we can use the general cybersecurity functions, as well as the domain lifecycle phases 
to identify cybersecurity structures, and we identified SOCs in Section 4.6.8 as the structures providing the 
monitoring and evaluate function, and CSIRTs in Section 4.6.7 as the structure providing the incident handling 
function. We will in this appendix introduce SOC structures, its service delivery models and functions. From 
these functions, we will  make a selection for our E-CMIRC. 
 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows: 
 
Section B2 introduces the SOC structures and service delivery models. SOCs may be structured to offer 
internally focussed services to a single entity or organisation, or externally to multiple entities or organisations. 
 
Section B3 identifies the SOC primary functions to be used during the development of the E-CMIRC. 
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Section B4 identifies and motivates the most suitable SOC service delivery model for use by the E-CMIRC. 
 
B2  SOC structures and service delivery models 
 
Our intention is to use this appendix to identify SOC functions, as well as the SOC service delivery models, 
and select functions and a service delivery model for the E-CMIRC. It should be understood the SOC and 
CSIRT functions are different to the national cybersecurity functions or general cybersecurity functions. The 
SOC and CSIRT functions are structure specific, in other words, specific to the SOC and CSIRT structures, 
and consist of their function’s specific services. Structural cybersecurity functions should not be confused with 
national cybersecurity functions. The two types of security functions we are discussing in this thesis are: 
 
• The general cybersecurity functions that we identified in Chapter 4. 
• The cybersecurity structure’s specific functions. These we will identify in Appendices B and C respectively. 
 
Our approach to identifying the two different functions and services is shown in Figure 34. 
 
 
 
Figure 34: E-CMIRC Development Approach 
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Figure 34 shows that NCMF levels 1 to 2 were used to identify thirteen general and non-mandatory 
cybersecurity functions. This was done in Chapter 4. We then selected and motivated two functions in      
Chapter 4, for the development of the E-CMIRC structure. The two selected functions are the monitoring and 
evaluate function, and the incident handling function.  
 
To prepare for the implementation of these functions using the E-CMIRC structure, we will introduce and 
discuss the monitoring and evaluation function’s structure, the SOC, in Appendix B and the incident handling 
function’s structure, the CSIRT, in Appendix C. These two structures’ functions are determined, overlaps 
identified, and we will then correlate the overlapping functions to identify E-CMIRC functions.  
 
The SOC and CSIRT structure’s services with similar processes and technologies are identified, and combined 
in Appendix D (as indicated by the two arrows), and these services are then offered by the E-CMIRC. The 
NCMF level 3 to level 6 is then applied to implement the E-CMIRC. The NCMF satisfies the plan function, 
while the E-CMIRC descriptive models satisfies the build, run and monitor functions of the PBMR 
organisational framework.  
 
We need to identify the structure’s functions first before we can discover its services. This flows from our 
discussion on functions, services, capabilities and structures in Chapter 2 where we have explained that 
functions are made up of services. With the identification, selection and prioritisation tasks now concluded, we 
will start with our preparation for the implementation part of the monitoring and evaluation, and incident 
handling, functions. We will do this by analysing SOC and CSIRT structures, and identify its overlapping 
functions, services and technologies in Appendix B and Appendix C, and propose services for the E-CMIRC 
in Appendix D. 
 
The Monitor and Evaluate function is offered from a SOC [158] [159] [160]. A SOC is an organised structure 
consisting of highly skilled people. The mission of a SOC is to monitor and advance the organisational or 
national cybersecurity posture. 
 
SOCs use SIEM tools to prevent, detect, analyse and respond to cybersecurity incidents [161]. SIEM 
technology components typically consists of a log manager, correlation engine, automated workflow, incident 
management and reporting engine to name a few [162] [163]. SOCs are extremely expensive to build and run, 
and as such, some service providers offer SOCs as a service. These are typically referred to as managed 
security service providers (MSSPs) [164] [165]. MSSPs is an example of an external SOC structure residing 
outside organisational boundaries.  
 
It is our experience that SOC services are used mostly by organisations or single government departments, 
and government structures. While it is not common to find SOC structures at national level, there are a few 
examples of SOCs being utilised at national level. Such an example is the Korean Internet and  
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Security Agency (KISA) in South Korea [166]. SOC structures can be localised, or geographically dispersed 
[167]. 
 
From a South African perspective, the intention of the State Information Technology Agency (SITA) 2012 was 
to build a SOC to monitor their government clients [168]. In some instances, the departments of defence of 
some nations build SOCs in order to provide a network-centric warfare capability, as well as a defensive and 
offensive capability, but these structures most often only have military applications. Some nations with military 
SOCs are Australia, China, India, Myanmar, North and South Korea, and the United States of America [169]. 
The South African Department of Defence is also mandated by the NCPF to build a cyber command which 
would provide these capabilities [33]. Our experience has shown that SOCs can be structured as follows: 
 
• External SOC or MSSPs. The SOC services are offered to, and shared across different customers.  
MSSPs  are external to organisations. This may be a commercial entity, or the service may be shared 
across government departments, such as the SSA ‘s monitoring of some South African government 
departments 
• Internal SOC. This is the organisational, government, or national SOC structure. The SOC services are 
 offered and consumed internally by the organisation, government or nation. 
 
Cybersecurity services offered by SOC structures are thus delivered using two distinct service delivery models. 
The first model is where SOC services are delivered as an outsourced, external service, using MSSPs [170]. 
MSSPs serve a variety of clients from different industries, or government departments [171]. MSSP’s typically 
offer SIEM as a Service (SaaS), and depending on the SIEM technology deploys either on-site remote log 
collectors, or use direct log transfer to the MSSP SIEM. 
 
The second model is where the services are delivered internally from organisational, or in-house SOCs. These 
SOCs can procure and deploy SIEMs on-site, or their delivery model could be SaaS. Internal or organisational 
SOCs focus their efforts on the organisation to whom they provide cybersecurity services and capabilities to. 
[172] [173]. The two service delivery models are described in Table 31. 
 
Table 31: SOC Cybersecurity Service and Capability Delivery Models 
SOC Structure Description 
MSSPs (External) This structure provides SOC services and capabilities as–a-service to organisations 
[164]. This model serves different customers form different industries, and even 
different countries. SIEM is deployed local or SaaS. 
SOCs (Internal) This structure serves a single (internal) customer. The structure could be centralised, 
or in the case of global organisations, distributed. SIEM is deployed local or SaaS. 
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SOCs can be situated locally, or be geographically dispersed (global SOCs) [174]. SOCs typically work in 
isolation, and it is our experience that it is uncommon for information sharing to happen between SOCs and 
MSSPs. This is mostly due to confidentiality clauses signed with customers. This contrasts with CSIRTs where 
the purpose is one of openness, and to share and disseminate information through established trust 
relationships and channels.  
 
B3  SOC Functions 
 
It must be understood that there is a difference between the national cybersecurity functions that we identified 
in Chapter 4, and the SOC and CSIRT structure functions. The former is applicable at national level, while the 
latter is structure specific, and can be viewed as sub-functions to the national cybersecurity functions. The 
national monitoring and evaluation function may be enabled by functions and services offered from a national 
SOC-like structure. The SOC specific functions and services must be identified so that we can do a comparison 
against the CSIRT function and services.  
 
There are similarities, but also fundamental differences between the functions and services offered from SOCs 
and CSIRTs. The differences are mainly in the form of the processes and technologies needed for their 
respective services, as well as the services themselves. These differences need to be understood, as it will 
serve as guidance to make a selection of the cybersecurity services and technologies for the E-CMIRC. 
 
ISACA stated that SOCs could offer all cybersecurity functions across the protect detect, respond, and recover 
incident handling model, and across the people, process and technology or tools framework [175]. Some of 
the cybersecurity functions offered by SOCs are to defend an organisation’s critical assets, assist with 
compliance requirements and respond to cybersecurity threats in a timely fashion [176].  
 
These functions are enabled through services such as the monitoring of critical assets with a SIEM technology. 
Monitoring of critical assets is also a requirement as expressed by various international authoritative and 
normative documents – such as acts, standards and regulations. The requirement for the monitoring of critical 
assets are expressed in various authoritative and normative sources. Some examples of these authoritative 
and normative sources requirements may be found in: 
 
• COBIT 4.1 - DS5.5 Security testing, surveillance and monitoring [134]. 
• IITIL v3 - SO 5.13 Information security management and service operation [135]. 
• ISO/IEC 27002:2005 - 10.10.2 Monitoring system use, 10.10.3 Protection of log information, 10.10.4 
 Administrator and operator logs, 15.3.1 Information systems audit controls [135]. 
• SANS Critical controls - Critical control 14: Maintenance, monitoring, and analysis of security audit logs 
 [51]. 
• NIST SP 800-53 - AC-17 (1), AC-19, AU-2 (4), AU-3 (1,2), AU-4, AU-5, AU-6 (a, 1, 5), AU-8, AU-9 (1, 2), 
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 AU-12 (2), SI-4 (8) [136]. 
• Payment card industry- Data security standard (PCI-DSS) [177],  
• ISO/IEC 27001:2005 [178],  
• South African ECT Act [118],  
• Sarbanes Oxley (SoX) [179] and others  [180].  
 
Kelley and Moritz [181] list the ability to monitor and respond to threats as the primary functions of SOCs. 
These functions are supported as primary functions in literature by Milne [182] Dempsey; Johnson; Scholl and 
Stine [183] and Rothke [170]. Paganini [161] describes a SOC as a structure that “continuously monitor and 
improve an organization’s security posture while preventing, detecting, analysing, and responding to cyber 
security incidents with the aid of both technology and well-defined processes and procedures.” 
 
During the European Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) Information Security Workshop in 2013, it was 
concluded that a SOC’s responsibility spans the daily operations of security events [184], while Zimmerman 
[185] defines a SOC as “a team primarily composed of security analysts organized to detect, analyse, respond 
to, report on, and prevent cybersecurity incidents.” Kelley et al. [186] explains that one of its functions is to 
“…monitor(s) and manage(s) all aspects of enterprise security in real-time from a single, centralized location.” 
 
Zimmerman [185] defines a SOC as “a team primarily composed of security analysts organized to detect, 
analyse, respond to, report on, and prevent cybersecurity incidents.” while Kelley and Moritz [181] describe 
the purpose of a SOC as being that of an entity that: 
 
“monitors and manages all aspects of enterprise security in     real-time from a single, centralized location. 
It discovers and prioritizes events, determines risk level and which assets are affected, and recommends 
and can execute the appropriate remediation solution. It delivers detailed reports at the local and network 
levels, meeting both real-time management and audit requirements.” 
 
McAfee describes an SOC as an entity that is [187] 
 
“:…responsible for monitoring, detecting, and isolating incidents and the management of the 
organization’s security products, network devices, end-user devices, and systems. This function is 
performed seven days a week, 24 hours per day. The SOC is the primary location of the staff and the 
systems dedicated for this function.” 
 
 In turn, Anderson describes a SOC as something dedicated to investigate, detect and respond to log events. 
These events could be triggered by security related correlating logic, using people, processes and technology 
[188]. 
 
As secondary functions, SOCs should provide information on latest threats and vulnerabilities as well as 
information on security countermeasures [181] [183]. SOCs should further be able to provide reporting and 
visualisation, strategic advice and guidance and vulnerability management as functions, [19]. Most  
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organisational cybersecurity operations could be offered from mature SOCs, including security device 
management.  
 
The SOC functions, as taken from  Zimmerman [185] and IBM [189] are shown in Table 32. We have used our 
experience in the planning, building and running of SOCs to map the similar functions as expressed by 
Zimmerman and IBM, both of which are authoritative sources in their field [190]. Our experience further 
supports the list of primary functions as presented by Zimmerman [185] and IBM [189]. 
 
Table 32: SOC Functions 
Zimmerman IBM 
Real-time monitoring. Security and threat monitoring. 
 Personnel recruitment, retainment and 
management. 
Sensor tuning and management and SOC 
infrastructure operations and maintenance (O&M), 
SOC tool engineering and deployment. 
Process development and optimisation 
Cyber intelligence collection and analysts. Emerging threat strategy (threat intelligence). 
Triage or incident analysis, coordination and response. Security incident management. 
 
We will be using the mapped functions from these two authoritative sources as the SOC primary functions for 
consideration during the development of the E-CMIRC. This list must not be seen as a complete list of SOC 
functions. Jacobs (2015) [138] has identified a comprehensive list of SOC functions, but we keep our selection 
of primary functions minimal on purpose as our intention is only to illustrate the application of levels 3 to 6 of 
the NCMF to develop the E-CMIRC.  
 
SOCs also offer secondary functions such as security awareness training, and business impact assessments 
[138]. Taking the fact into consideration that the functions are selected to illustrate the development of the E-
CMIRC, the secondary functions will be ignored. We have used our experience to aggregate the function 
descriptions from Zimmerman and IBM. The SOC primary functions are displayed in Table 33: 
 
Table 33: SOC Primary Functions 
SOC primary functions Aggregated From Table 32 
Monitoring and evaluation. Aggregated from security and threat monitoring and real-time monitoring. 
Security operations. Aggregated from process development and optimisation, and sensor tuning 
and  management, SOC infrastructure operations and maintenance (O&M), 
SOC tool engineering and deployment. 
Threat and vulnerability 
management. 
Aggregated from security and threat monitoring, emerging threat strategy 
(threat intelligence) and cyber intelligence collection and analysts. 
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Incident handling. Aggregated from security incident management, and triage or incident 
analysis,  coordination and response. 
 
The SOC monitoring and evaluation service satisfies the similarly named general national monitoring and 
evaluate function, while the SOC’s incident handling service corresponds to the primary function of a CSIRT 
(incident handling) as introduced in Section 4.6.7. It also satisfies the general national incident handling 
function. These functions are offered by both internal and organisational SOCs, and MSSPs. It is our 
experience that SOCs are internally focussed in terms of the incident handling service, in that it only considers 
organisational or government department specific incidents. This leads to our discussion on SOC service 
delivery models. 
  
B4  SOC Delivery model selected for E-CMIRC  
 
As stated in Chapter 2, service delivery realises benefits, and deliver on functions, and one of the benefits of 
selecting the correct service delivery model is that it aligns technology and processes.Taking into consideration 
that the E-CMIRC will be a combination of SOC and CSIRT services and technologies, and that it is meant for 
implementation at national level in developing countries, the MSSP model is selected as the most appropriate 
cybersecurity service delivery model for the E-CMIRC.  
 
Our motivation for selecting the MSSP service delivery model is that its processes and technologies caters for 
disparate organisations and their requirements – this model is flexible enough to operate at national level, and 
to cater for different, geographically dispersed state departments nationally, all of which could potentially use 
different technologies and diverse processes. The selection of the MSSP model is further motivated by the 
fact that it caters for different clients across different sectors and industries. This imposes a technical 
requirement on the SOC primary technology, the SIEM, in that it needs to cater for multi-tenancy, and be able 
to segregate sensitive information from different clients or constituents. The MSSP service delivery model 
demands logical segregation of events and information, ensuring that events or information from different 
clients (or state departments) is never contaminated with one another. 
 
The E-CMIRC, serving at national level, and catering for different departments and constituents, will make use 
of this cybersecurity service delivery model to ensure that as many as possible national state departments and 
constituents are covered, taking into consideration requirements such as multi-tenancy and segregation. This 
is impossible to achieve with an organisational specific, internal SOC catering for, and focussing on only one 
client. 
 
B5  Conclusion 
 
Appendix B considered the monitoring and evaluation function’s structure, the SOC. SOC high-level functions 
were introduced and its primary functions are: 
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• Monitoring and evaluation. 
• Security operations. 
• Threat and vulnerability management. 
• Incident management. 
 
Available SOC service delivery models were introduced. The two models are internal or organisational SOCs, 
and MSSPs. The MSSP model was selected and motivated as appropriate for the E-CMIRC. In Appendix C, 
the incident handling function’s structure, the CSIRT, is introduced.
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Appendix C:  CSIRTs 
 
C1  Introduction 
 
In Appendix B, we introduced the monitoring and evaluation function’s structure, the SOC. In addition, the SOC 
primary functions and service delivery models were introduced. The SOC service delivery model most suited 
to the   E-CMIRC was then identified and motivated as the MSSP model. Appendix C introduces the incident 
handling function’s structure, the CSIRT. The purpose of this chapter is to identify the CSIRT functions, its 
service delivery models as well as its authority levels. The authority levels describe the type of powers a CSIRT 
can exert over its stakeholders, and authority levels will be applied to, and described in terms of the E-CMIRC. 
In this appendix, We will select and motivate a CSIRT structure, type and service delivery model that can be 
used for the E-CMIRC. 
 
The incident handling function and its structure, the CSIRT, is discussed in more detail than the monitor and 
evaluate function’s structure, the SOC. Our motivation for spending more time on the CSIRT structure is as 
follows: 
 
• There are more reference implementations and literature available for CSIRTs at national level. This is 
important, and we will use this knowledge since the E-CMIRC is envisioned as a national structure. 
• Our research showed that it is not common for SOCs to be deployed at national level. CSIRTs are more  
often deployed at national level, and we will make use of their national deployment models to apply to our 
E-CMIRC. 
• The CSIRT national and government implementation structures and types will be used as a foundation 
during the development of the E-CMIRC structure 
• The focus of national and government CSIRTs are on improving the national security posture, while the 
focus of SOCs is more commonly on improving organisational security posture. 
 
The rest of the chapter is broken up as follows: 
 
Section C2 introduces the CSIRT structure and functions. The CSIRT structure and type influences the 
functions offered by the CSIRT.  
 
Section C3 introduces and motivates the CSIRT delivery model, and a selection is made for the E-CMIRC. 
This further influences the selection of functions and services for the E-CMIRC. 
 
Section C4 introduces and he CSIRT types, and a selection is made for the E-CMIRC. The CSIRT types 
further influences the selection of functions and services for the E-CMIRC. 
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Section C5 selects and motivates the CSIRT Service Delivery Model Selected for our E-CMIRC 
 
Section C6 introduces the authority levels that can be exerted by CSIRTs, and these will be made applicable 
to the E-CMIRC. This determines the level of authority the E-CMIRC will be able to exert over its constituents. 
 
Section C7 introduces the E-CMIRC functions. 
 
Section C8 concludes this chapter. 
  
C2  Introducing CSIRT Structures and Functions 
 
The CSIRT structure and type influences its functions, which, in turn influences its services. The service 
delivery model of the CSIRT further determines its place within an organisation or nation state, and could also 
influence its placement in terms of the geographical or physical location. CSIRTs functions are typically offered 
from a single local structure, or a distributed structure across an organisation or nation [145]. It is our 
experience that the CSIRT structure’s location (local, distributed, national, and organisational) influences the 
type of services it offers.  
 
For example, it is our experience that the services offered by a national, distributed CSIRT structure with a 
presence in rural areas, will offer different services to those than its parent CSIRT in a town or city. In rural 
areas, aspects like access to technology, and access to the internet could be a challenge, thus, a rural CSIRT 
structure would potentially only offer services and capabilities such as awareness campaigns, as opposed to 
multiple services offered by its parent CSIRT. 
 
Another example is that a CSIRT located within an urban area, with access to skilled resources and 
communication channels, will offer its services differently to a CSIRT in a rural area with little or no access to 
skilled resources. A CSIRT with skilled resources may also offer services that may not even be considered by 
a lesser skilled CSIRT. The structure and type eventually influence the selection of services to be offered from 
a CSIRT, and this is important for us as the identification of a CSIRT structure and type will assist us with the 
identification of services for our E-CMIRC. 
 
ENISA typifies CSIRT structures by the services they provide [191], or by the sectors they serve [192].  We 
will use the CSIRT type and sector to guide us during the identification of CSIRT structures. CSIRTs’ services 
may be offered from national or organisational structures. ENISA mentions four different ways a CSIRT may 
be structured [193]. These are all organisational models, and do not reflect a national capability. The four 
different ways of structuring a CSIRT according to ENISA are [193]: 
 
• The CSIRT structure as an independent organisation with its own staff. 
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• The CSIRT structure as part of an existing organisation. 
• Campus, or distributed model. 
• Voluntary model where people or groups with a shared interest get together and provide advice and  
support to each other. 
 
The common aspect here is that all these structures offer the incident handling function. The General 
Secretariat of the Organisation of American States (OAS) [126] recommends that CSIRTs be structured or 
classified according to the sector, or community in which they are active [126]. Some examples are academic 
CSIRTs, commercial CSIRTs, critical infrastructure CSIRTs, government CSIRTs, national CSIRTs and 
military CSIRTs to name a few. These structures are also supported by Killcrece; Kossakowski; Ruefle and 
Zajicek [145]. The Software Engineering Institute at the Carnegie Mellon University has categorised CSIRTs 
into six different structures These are [194]: 
 
• Internal CSIRTs. 
• National CSIRTs. 
• Coordination centres. 
• Analysis centres. 
• Vendor teams. 
• Incident response providers. 
 
Skierka; Morgus; Hohmann and Maurer (2015) [195] developed a CSIRT classification typology focusing on 
the community and organisational model of the CSIRT. This was done as part of a joint project between New 
America and the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi). ENISA developed two typologies - and their focus is on 
the environment in which the CSIRT operate. The differences and similarities are shown in Table 34 as taken 
verbatim from [195] in order not to change the intent and meaning. 
 
Table 34: CSIRT Classification Typologies [140] 
GPPI / New America 
(2015) 
ENISA (2013) ENISA (2006) 
Regional Not applicable Not Applicable 
National National/governmental  
National  
De facto national  
National CSIRT  
Sectoral Research and  education  
Financial sector  
Energy sector  
Industrial sector  
CIP/CIIP sector-CSIRT  
Governmental sector-CSIRT  
Military sector-CSIRT  
Organisational Governmental  Academic sector-CSIRT  
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Governmental/military  
Non-commercial organisation  
Commercial organisation  
Internal CSIRT  
SME CSIRT  
Vendor ICT vendor customer base  
Service provider/ISP customer base  
Vendor CSIRT  
 
Commercial Not applicable Commercial CSIRT  
 
Since the intention is for the E-CMIRC to offer the monitoring and evaluate and incident handling functions at 
national level, we will exclude organisational and campus CSIRTs, and only consider the national and 
government CSIRTs. We have further stated that our intention is for the E-CMIRC to serve as a national 
structure, improving the national cybersecurity posture. This means that the E-CMIRC will provide a national 
incident handling function to the nation, inclusive of government. We have also determined that most 
authoritative literature8 makes reference to government and national CSIRTs, and this means that we will have 
enough reference implementations and sources to consult. We thus select the national CSIRT and the 
government CSIRT as reference structures for the E-CMIRC.  
 
National CSIRT performs incident handling and coordination at national level. It is the top-level structure, and 
all other sector-CSIRTs report to the national CSIRT. The government CSIRT serves the government and its 
organs. There exists a reciprocal relationship between the national and government CSIRTs in that they 
collaborate and share information. We will now introduce the CSIRT structures as defined by the OAS. 
 
National CSIRT: In addition to serving a defined community, a country’s National CSIRT usually takes on 
the role of national coordinator for incident response, and is the contact point for national and international 
incidents. The role and target community of a national CSIRT varies depending on its roles and the existence 
of other response centers. For example, if there is no CSIRT designated for critical infrastructure, the national 
CSIRT could assume responsibilities normally assigned to a critical infrastructure response team. It can be 
considered as a “last resort CSIRT,” or one which takes charge of incident response matters that are not under 
the purview of another body. It is very common for various CSIRTs to be part of the community the National 
CSIRT serves. 
Government CSIRT: Government CSIRTs serve state institutions in order to ensure that government IT 
infrastructure and the services it facilitates to citizens have an adequate level of security. Government CSIRTs 
adapt their structures to the Government. They can meet local, regional or sector-specific government 
communities. Government CSIRTs can operate independently or interact to combine strategies and efforts 
and share resources and knowledge. Within a country, for example, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry 
of Tourism might operate independent CSIRTs, but collaborate and share information regularly. 
 
                                                     
8 In this context, the authoritative literature refers to peer reviewed literature, or publications by people or entities that are seen as 
authoritative and experts in their field. It should not be confused with authoritative sources. 
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C3  CSIRT types 
 
Now that we have introduced the CSIRT structures, we also need to introduce the CSIRT types. The CSIRT 
types are different from the CSIRT structures in that the types define the characteristics of the CSIRT, while 
the structure describes how the CSIRT is organised. Both the CSIRT types and structures influences the 
CSIRT services. The OAS defines four different CSIRT types. The types are:  
 
• Localised security team. 
• Distributed incident response teams. 
• Coordinating team. 
• Centralised incident response team. 
 
West-Brown, Stikvoort; Kossakowski; Killcrece; Ruefle and Zajicek [191] identify three different types of 
CSIRTs, which can be structured according to any of the models described by ENISA [193]. The types of 
CSIRTs described by Stikvoort et al [191] are: 
 
• International coordination centre. 
• Corporation. 
• Technical. 
 
In keeping with the intention of the E-CMIRC to provide services at a national level, the centralszed incident 
response team type is selected as most appropriate for the intended use of the E-CMIRC, based on its 
characteristics. The  centralised incident response team is a single team responsible for the management and 
response of security incidents across a number of locations that belong to one larger organisation. This model 
would be appropriate, for example, in an enterprise. In these structures, there is a defined response team and 
dedicated staff trained in managing information security and responding to security incidents. 
 
The centralised incident response team type is scalable, and its characteristic is to provide a geographically 
dispersed incident handling function.  Considering the South African context, and as stipulated in the NCPF 
[33] and Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill [34], the Cybersecurity Hub serves as the national CSIRT, and 
the SSA’s ECS-CSIRT serves as the government CSIRT [83]. Section C5 explores the high-level functions of 
national and government CSIRTs. 
 
C4  CSIRT functions 
 
A national CSIRT could serve as a government CSIRT [195]. This means that an overlap may be found 
between the services offered by national and government CSIRTs. Nation states however often detach 
government CSIRTs and national CSIRTs. This also the case in South Africa where the national CSIRT  
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(Cybersecurity Hub) is not under the  explicit control of the government, and its function is largely coordinating 
and advisory [33].  
 
It is our experience that the government CSIRT (ECS-CSIRT) has control to some degree over the networks 
and its connections within its constituency. The use of a government CSIRT often matures into a tactical cyber 
crisis management service [1]. In terms of the South African context, the Cybersecurity Hub was established 
by the DTPS. The functions of the Cybersecurity Hub according to the NCPF are listed verbatim, as taken    
from [33]: 
 
• Coordinate general cybersecurity activities. 
• Disseminate relevant information to other sector-CSIRTs, vendors, and technology experts on 
 cybersecurity developments. 
• Provide best practice guidance on ICT security for  the government, business and civil society. 
• Initiate cybersecurity awareness campaigns. 
• Promote compliance with standards, procedures and policy. 
• Encourage and facilitate the development of appropriate additional sector-CSIRTs. 
 
The establishment of sector-CSIRTs is also a key function of the Cybersecurity Hub. Another function of the 
Cybersecurity Hub is to serve as a coordinating centre between national structures, sector-CSIRTs, and the 
public. At the time of writing, South Africa had only one established sector-CSIRT for the banking sector.  
 
This banking sector-CSIRT was established, and operated by the South African Banking Risk Centre 
(SABRIC), that currently has 19 member-banks. SABRIC is a non-profit organisation and their aim is to assist 
banking and cash- intransit companies in the fight against organised bank related crimes, and this includes 
organised crime in the cyber domain [196].  
 
This model of operation is displayed in Figure 35, showing that there is a reciprocal information sharing 
relationship between the Cybersecurity Hub, the ECS-CSIRT, Cyber Command and Cybercrime Centre. It 
further shows that organisational CSIRs report to sector-CSIRTS, that, in turn report to the Cybersecurity Hub. 
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Figure 35: Relationship between the Cybersecurity Hub, national structures and 
sector CSIRTs 
 
CSIRT functions as expressed by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) in request for comment (RFC) 
2350 [197] and the SANS Institute [198] are listed verbatim in Table 35. The IETF and SANS functions were 
selected as they are representative of all the CSIRT functions as mentioned in their definitions in the preceding 
literature. Some of these functions are also described as functions for the Cybersecurity Hub. We have 
grouped the CSIRT functions based on their relevance to each other, and based on our experience. This is 
done to determine the CSIRT functions, as well as illustrate differences and similarities between the IETF and 
SANS description of CSIRT functions. 
 
Table 35: CSIRT Functions 
IETF [197] SANS [198] 
Remediate security activity in their constituency Real-time incident response activities and non-real-
time incident response activities 
Manages the entire incident life-cycle 
Play a coordination role to resolve incidents 
Provide incident handling capabilities within an 
organisation 
Analysis of incidents and vulnerabilities Analysis of incidents and vulnerabilities 
The CSIRT will otherwise share information freely 
when this will assist others in resolving or preventing 
security incidents 
For any CSIRT to be effective, it needs information 
and strong, positive communications with its 
constituency 
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A national CSIRT’s main role is to coordinate interaction between government and actors, and to promote 
incident handling effectiveness. This is achieved through coordinating incident handling efforts, and by 
promoting collaboration between government and actors. The national CSIRT structure further provides 
services such as the analysis of incidents and vulnerabilities, and disseminates and share information. It also 
develops best practices and supports government in the development of national best practices. 
 
We can thus conclude that the primary functions of a national CSIRT are to offer an incident handling function 
(national or organisational) by means of promoting and enabling cooperation and coordination between 
stakeholders, provide guidance in terms of cybersecurity issues and influence national policy, as well as the 
dissemination and sharing of cybersecurity information at national level. It may also assist in establishing 
awareness programmes at national level. The primary CSIRT functions aggregated from the IETF and SANS 
are thus: 
 
Table 36: CSIRT primary functions 
CSIRT Primary Functions Aggregated from Table 35 
Incident handling function. 
 
• Remediate security activity in their constituency 
• Real-time incident response activities and non-real-time incident 
response activities 
• Manages the entire incident life-cycle 
• Play a coordination role to resolve incidents 
• Provide incident handling capabilities within an organisation 
Analysis of incidents and 
vulnerabilities function 
 
• Analysis of incidents and vulnerabilities 
Disseminate and share 
information function 
 
• The CSIRT will otherwise share information freely when this will assist 
others in resolving or preventing security incidents 
• For any CSIRT to be effective, it needs information and strong, positive 
communications with its constituency 
 
C5  CSIRT service delivery model selected for E-CMIRC  
 
As stated in Appendix A, the incident handling function may be seen as a highly specialised, highly mature, 
sub-function of the SOC’s (which offers the monitoring and evaluation function), or the monitoring and 
evaluation function may be viewed to serves as input, and feeding into the incident handling function. We have 
made a conscious decision to view the monitoring and evaluation function as the primary function of our E-
CMIRC since our intention is to protect a nation’s cyberspace through monitoring for cyber-attacks and threats, 
by first detecting them (events), and then responding once the events are classified as incidents.  
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The monitoring and evaluation function will thus be used to detect attacks and threats, and the incident 
handling function will be used to respond to incidents resulting from those attacks and threats. The monitoring 
and evaluation function happens first (detection), and its results are then passed to the incident handling 
function for response and resolution. Taking the above statement in consideration, the incident handling 
function will serve as a highly specialised, highly mature, sub-function of the monitoring and evaluation 
function, to be offered from the E-CMIRC. 
 
In Appendix B and Appendix C stated that the SOC and CSIRT service delivery models will have an influence 
on the services they offer, and, ultimately, the technologies and processes needed to support those services. 
The CSIRT service delivery model that we have identified as most suitable and complementary for the E-
CMIRC, is that of a National and Government CSIRT [194], with the centralised incident response team as 
type, and incident handling, analysis of incidents and vulnerabilities and disseminate and share information 
functions  [126]. This is shown in Table 37: 
 
Table 37: CSIRT structure, type and function for E-CMIRC 
CSIRT Service Delivery Model National and government 
CSIRT Type Centralised incident response team 
 
CSIRT Function 
Incident handling 
Analysis of incidents and vulnerabilities function 
Disseminate and share information function 
 
We have motivated the selection of the national and government CSIRT structures and centralised incident 
response team type as relevant for the E-CMIRC, keeping in consideration that we are developing it to provide 
a national cybersecurity function, and also because there is a wealth of reference implementations available. 
The reference implementations have been proven as successful in improving the cybersecurity posture of 
nation states [2] [199] [200].  
 
Section C6 presents the CSIRT authority levels. The CSIRT authority levels describe the possible powers the 
CSIRT may exert over its constituents, and this authority is an important consideration for the E-CMIRC, and 
assists with clarifying its authority level at national level. 
 
C6  CSIRT authority levels 
 
The CSIRT authority level describes the type of powers a CSIRT can exert over its constituents. This also 
determines the CSIRT’s obligations in terms of the incident handling function [126]. These authority levels are 
important, since they will serve as guidance when nations need to determine the level of authority the E-CMIRC 
can exert over its constituents. The levels of authority, which can be exerted by CSIRTs, with our 
recommendations, are, as taken from [126]: 
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• Full authority – The CSIRT has authority to execute all steps and actions during the resolution of an  
incident. Actors and constituents are required to implement the measures as stipulated by the CSIRT. 
The CSIRT further has full control over any internal cybersecurity related incidents. We recommend that 
the E-CMIRC exert full authority where it concerns cybersecurity incidents at international and national 
level.  
 
• Shared authority – decisions regarding incidents are made jointly between the CSIRT and its affected  
actors and constituents. The CSIRT supports actors and constituents with equipment and expertise. It is 
recommended that the E-CMIRC exert shared authority where it concerns commercial actors and 
constituents, such as the banking and financial sector. 
 
The E-CMIRC will provide expertise and advice where it concerns cybersecurity related incidents. The    
E-CMIRC also offers shared authority where it concerns other government entities. From a South African 
context, this means members of the Justice, Crime Prevention and Security (JCPS) cluster, such as the 
Department of Defence (DOD) and Department of Justice (DOJ). 
 
• Null authority – the CSIRT has no jurisdiction over decisions where it concerns incidents. Advice, 
 guidance and expertise are provided, but those affected take the decisions. We recommend that the         
 E-CMIRC exert no authority where it concerns the resolution of public cybersecurity related incidents. 
 Public cybersecurity related actors and constituents, such as managed security service providers, 
 (MSSPs), and vendors such as Microsoft and other cybersecurity service providers, could potentially 
 resolve incidents. Depending on the maturity level of the E-CMIRC (the E-CMIRC capability maturity 
 model is developed in Appendix G), the E-CMIRC can do a satisfaction  survey, and, also perform quality 
 checks. 
 
• Indirect authority – The CSIRT has no authority over actors and constituents, but can influence them 
 through regulatory bodies with which the CSIRT has an established trust relationship. We 
 recommended that the E-CMIRC exert indirect authority over sectors and industries through 
 regulatory bodies where it concerns the establishment of sector-CSIRTs. At this level, incidents are 
 viewed as operational issues that must be resolved internally, but the E-CMIRC may influence behaviour 
 through regulatory bodies.  
 
The E-CMIRC has no authority where it concerns the handling and resolution of public incidents. The            
E-CMIRC thus primarily serve as a government CSIRT, offering some of the services and functionality of 
a national CSIRT, but to the exclusion of the resolution of publicly reported incidents. From a South African 
context, a good example is using the Independent Communications Authority of South Africa (ICASA) to 
drive the establishment of a telecommunications sector-CSIRT. 
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The chosen levels of authority and their applicability to the E-CMIRC is shown in Figure 36. Figure 36 shows 
that the full authority for the E-CMIRC means that it would be responsible for all national (inclusive of 
government) and international incidents across the incident management lifecycle. The E-CMIRC shares 
authority where it concerns incidents at the JCPS cluster, constituents and sector-CSIRTs. The E-CMIRC has 
indirect authority where it concerns incidents at government and sector-CSIRT level. 
 
Figure 36 shows that the full authority for the E-CMIRC means that it would be responsible for all national 
(inclusive of government) and international incidents across the incident management lifecycle. The  E-CMIRC 
shares authority where it concerns incidents at the JCPS cluster, constituents and sector-CSIRTs. The               
E-CMIRC has indirect authority where it concerns incidents at government and sector-CSIRT level. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 36: E-CMIRC levels of authority 
 
We will now consider the SOC and CSIRT functions, and identify overlaps and similarities between them. Our 
motivation for doing so is that it will allow us to determine if there are overlaps in services, and their processes 
and technologies. Our intention is then to combine these services and technologies, and offer them from the 
E-CMIRC to realise a cost and skills saving. 
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C7  E-CMIRC functions 
 
We identified thirteen of the most general cybersecurity functions in Chapter 4, and selected the monitoring 
and evaluation and incident handling functions, to illustrate the implementation part of the NCMF by developing 
our E-CMIRC. The selection of the monitoring and evaluation and incident handling functions allowed us to 
identify its structures, the SOC that is used for the monitoring and evaluation function, and the CSIRT that is 
used for the incident handling function. These two structures have their own functions, and we identified those 
in Appendix B and Appendix C. We again stress the fact that there are two types of functions to consider – the 
national cybersecurity functions and then the structure specific functions. We now need to aggregate, and 
select the cybersecurity functions for our E-CMIRC from the SOC and CSIRT functions. Our journey up to the 
identification of SOC and CSIRT functions is shown in Figure 37. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 37: SOC, CSIRT and E-CMIRC function selection 
 
Figure 37 shows that we have introduced and identified the authoritative and normative sources, as well as 
elements influencing the identification, selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity functions. This was done in 
Chapter 3. Authoritative and normative sources were identified, and the government, national and international 
Dimensions were used to identify actors. 
A National Cybersecurity Management Framework for Developing Countries 
 
204 
  
Appendix C: CSIRTs 
 
We have selected and motivated for the defensive domain, the critical information infrastructure protection 
(CIIP), and the national crisis management mandate to be used for our E-CMIRC. All these elements helped 
us to identify SOC s and CSIRTs as the structures offering these functions. The overlapping and similar SOC 
and CSIRT functions will then be identified and offered from the E-CMIRC. 
 
We also identified the SOC primary functions in Appendix B. To recapitulate, the identified SOC primary 
functions, as supported by Kelley et al (2006) [181]; Milne (2005) [182]; Dempsey et al (2011) [183]; Rothke 
(2009) [170]. Paganini (2016) [161]; Zimmermann (2014) [185] and IBM (2016) [189] are: 
 
• Monitoring and evaluation. 
• Security operations. 
• Threat and vulnerability management. 
• Incident handling. 
 
The CSIRT cybersecurity primary functions were identified in Appendix C. The CSIRT cybersecurity primary 
functions as expressed by the SEI at CMU [150]; ENISA [148]; Morgus et al. (2015) [149]; ENISA [193]; 
Brownlee [197]; SANS) Institute [198]; and IETF in RFC 2350 [197] is:  
 
• Incident handling. 
• Analysis of incidents and vulnerabilities function. 
• Disseminate and share information function. 
 
The SOC and CSIRT functions are shown in Table 38. We have done a mapping of the SOC and CSIRT 
functions based on our experience.  
 
Table 38: E-CMIRC functions 
SOC Functions CSIRT Functions 
Monitoring and evaluation function  
Security operations function  
Threat and vulnerability management function Analysis of incidents and vulnerabilities function 
Disseminate and share information function 
Incident handling function Incident handling function 
 
This functional overlap is shown in Table 38. It illustrates that there is an overlap between SOC and CSIRT 
primary functions. The unique function are the SOCs monitoring and evaluation function, and security 
operations function. There exists an overlap between the rest of the SOC and CSIRT functions. The primary 
difference in the delivery of functions, and their services when comparing the  SOC MSSP service delivery 
model,  
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with the CSIRT national and government service delivery model, is that the SOC functions’ services are 
internally focussed whereas the CSIRT functions’ services are externally focused. For example, a SOC will 
provide its services to one customer at a time, with no information and organisational specific threat intelligence 
sharing between customers. A CSIRT, on the other hand, will foster information sharing between constituents 
and industries. Internationally recognised standards and frameworks such as ITIL, COBIT and                    
ISO/IEC 27001:2013 [135] also support the overlaps and similarities between these functions. We will use a 
combination of SOC and CSIRT functions to be offered from the E-CMIRC. The functions we have selected 
for the E-CMIRC are: 
 
• Monitoring and evaluation function 
• Security operations function. 
• Threat and vulnerability management function. 
• Incident handling function. 
 
Our motivation for selecting these functions is that they deliver on the two selected general cybersecurity 
functions of monitoring  and evaluation, and incident handling. In Appendix D, we will identify the services.of 
the SOC and CSIRT functions.  These  services are then analysed, and similar, or overlapping services are 
mapped back to the E-CMIRC functions. We have now selected and motivated the E-CMIRC cybersecurity 
functions, and can now progress to the identification of its services in Appendix D.  
 
C8  Conclusion 
 
The CSIRT structures were described in this appendix in which we introduced two CSIRT structures as 
described in various literature sources as national, and government CSIRTs. The national and government 
CSIRT structures were then selected and motivated as most relevant for our E-CMIRC taking in consideration 
its intended application. The intention is for the E-CMIRC to primarily serve as a government type CSIRT, but 
with some of the functionalities and services of a national CSIRT, and a SOC. 
 
We also introduced the CSIRT types, and selected the centralised incident response team type’s 
characteristics as most relevant for our E-CMIRC. The CSIRT types were discussed in Section C4. We then 
considered some of the definitions for national and government CSIRTs, and found confirmation in 
authoritative literature sources that the incident handling function is one of the primary functions of a CSIRT. 
We then presented the service delivery model selected for the E-CMIRC in Table 37. The different CSIRT 
authority levels were introduced, and recommendations made for the E-CMIRC in Section C7. We have 
correlated SOC and CSIRT functions for the E-CMIRC in Section C8, and presented and motivated functions 
for the E-CMIRC.  
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Our rationale for identifying the CSIRT service delivery model, structure and types is that they offer different 
functions. We have selected a CSIRT service delivery model, structure and type for the E-CMIRC, and from 
there identified its relevant functions. In turn, the identification of the functions allows us to identify the services 
of the functions. In Appendix D, we will identify the SOC and CSIRT services, and map them back to the 
selected E-CMIRC functions. From there, we will identify similar services, and services sharing the same 
processes and technologies.
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Appendix D:  E-CMIRC cybersecurity services 
 
D1  Introduction 
 
Appendix D is dedicated to the identification of SOC and CSIRT services to deliver its functions. Accoirdingly, 
we will consult the available literature sources to identify the SOC and CSIRT services. Once we have identified 
the SOC and CSIRT services, we will map the services back to the E-CMIRC functions identified in                
Appendix C. We stated in Appendix C that the SOC and CSIRT service delivery model type and functions all 
have an effect on the services. The service delivery model, type and functions we have selected for the               
E-CMIRC is shown in Table 39. 
 
Table 39: SOC and CSIRT Service Delivery Models, Types and E-CMIRC functions 
 SOC CSIRT 
Service Delivery Model MSSP National and government 
Type Multi-tenancy Centralised incident response team 
E-CMIRC Functions Monitoring and evaluation function 
Security operations function. 
Threat and vulnerability management function. 
Incident handling function. 
 
The process we will follow to identify the SOC and CSIRT services is as follows: 
 
• Identify SOC services in the authoritative literature. 
• Identify CSIRT services in the authoritative literature. 
• Map the SOC and CSIRT services to the E-CMIRC functions identified in Section D4. 
• Identify common and unique SOC and CSIRT services. 
 
The identified services will then be mapped to the E-CMIRC functions we identified in Appendix C We are 
doing this to ensure that our E-CMIRC functions map to services from existing and proven structures. This will 
provide us with a list of services that are needed to realise the E-CMIRC functions. The services are then 
compared, and common or similar services will be identified to be offered from the E-CMIRC. Our approach is 
displayed in Figure 38. 
 
Figure 38 includes Figure 37 at the top, and it shows the process we have followed to identify the SOC, CSIRT 
and E-CMIRC functions. We have identified the SOC and CSIRT functions, and from these, selected and 
motivated functions for the E-CMIRC. These functions are realised by services, and we will identify SOC and  
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CSIRT services, and map those back to the E-CMIRC functions (which is a selection from SOC and CSIRT 
functions). 
 
 
 
 
Figure 38: SOC, CSIRT and E-CMIRC Service Selection 
 
We will now build on the E-CMIRC functions we selected in Appendix C, and in this appendix we will continue 
with the identification of SOC and CSIRT services. We will then map these services to the E-CMIRC functions 
and identify overlaps and similarities. This provides us with a list of services delivering the E-CMIRC functions. 
From this list, we will select and motivate services for the E-CMIRC to realise its functions. At the end of this 
appendix, we will have a list of E-CMIRC services delivering the E-CMIRC functions. The rest of the appendix 
is structured as follows: 
 
Section D1 introduces the SOC services as identified in authoritative sources. 
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Section D2 introduces the CSIRT services identified using authoritative sources. 
 
Section D3 maps the SOC and CSIRT services to the E-CMIRC functions. 
 
Section D4 maps the SOC and CSIRT services to identify SOC and CSIRT common and unique services. 
 
Section D5 introduces the approach we will follow to select services for our E-CMIRC. 
 
Section D6 maps the E-CMIRC functions and defensive domain lifecycle phases to the list of SOC and CSIRT 
common and unique services. This provides us with a list of services for the E-CMIRC. 
 
Section D7 makes a proposition on how to monitor national security technical controls. 
 
Section D8 concludes this chapter. 
 
D2  SOC cybersecurity services  
 
Although SOCs provide a cybersecurity operational function, an overlap of services does exist when compared 
with CSIRTs [201].  In order to identify and select services for the E-CMIRC, the cybersecurity services offered 
by SOCs and CSIRTs have to be identified first. Services common and unique to SOCs and CSIRTs are then                      
determined.  Jacobs et al [190] has identified SOC services, and these are supported by SOC service providers 
[202]; [203]; [204]; [205]; [206]; [207]; [208]; [209]; [210]; [211]. The SOC services are shown in Table 40. 
 
Table 40: SOC cybersecurity services 
SOC Service Description 
Counter intelligence 
 
Cyber counter intelligence is where a nation state uses cyber intelligence as a 
mechanism to identify, penetrate  and  neutralise foreign or hostile nation states. 
It also focusses on collecting foreign intelligence using traditional means as well 
as cyber means [212] 
Surveillance 
 
Cyber surveillance is the surveillance of people, objects or processes, using       
data networks. Nation states will  practice surveillance to gather and analyse 
information, with the purpose of preventing cyber risks and attacks, to determine 
human behaviour, and to locate offensive nation states cyber warriors [213]. 
Providing strategic 
advice and guidance 
and integrated threat 
intelligence 
 
Threat intelligence considers emerging cyber threats to national assets. It 
provides evidence-based knowledge, and actionable advice to inform a nation 
states decision and response to national cyber  threats. It contextualises, at a 
national level, threats, threat indicators, mechanisms and implications [214]. 
Integrated threat intelligence means that the threat intelligence tools and 
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technologies integrates with  other tools such as SIEMs and helpdesk software. It 
includes aspects such as security knowledge management and security pre-
warning. 
Incident response, 
incident 
management 
 
Cybersecurity incidents are unplanned events that threaten the confidentiality, 
availability and integrity of  national or organisational cyber assets and 
infrastructure. It has a negative impact or consequence at organisational level, 
and is operational in nature [72], [215], [216], [217] 
Asset management 
and criticality rating 
 
ITIL v 3 defines asset management as "...the Process responsible for tracking and 
reporting the value and ownership of financial Assets throughout their Lifecycle. 
Asset Management is part of an overall Service Asset and Configuration 
Management Process." [218]. IT Asset management is made up of business 
practices covering all aspects of corporate or national assets, such as inventory, 
risk  management and contractual responsibilities that makes up the lifecycle of 
national assets. It also includes aspects such as tactical and strategic decision 
making [219]. From a cybersecurity perspective, criticality ratings are assigned to 
organisational assets. It is our experience that following an asset management 
strategy, allows organisations and nations to know what assets they have, where 
it is, and  how  important it is. This, in turns, helps with strategic and operational 
decisions, as well as how much to spend on securing critical assets. 
Aggregation and 
analysis of 
intelligence data 
 
Analysing events is to systematically examine and evaluate events and its 
information to discover its causes and effects. Analysis assist with decision 
making in terms of the classification of events as incidents, and the handling of 
incidents [220]. A SIEM tool may facilitate the analysis of cybersecurity events. 
Aggregation in context of the Monitoring and Evaluate function means that all units 
are taken as a whole [221]. As an example, all similar events from the same IP 
address are aggregated, and presented as one event. This may save time and 
storage space, but care should be taken when deciding on the aggregation of 
events since aggregation may negatively affect forensics. 
Correlation of 
content intelligence 
data 
 
Correlation takes place where two or more variables fluctuate together. It implies 
that there is a relationship between two or more events [222]. An example is where 
a source IP address generate an event occurs on a  firewall, and the same 
source IP generates an event shortly thereafter on a database server. 
Workflow automation 
 
Workflow defines, executes and automates business processes to pass 
information or artefacts between  actors. This is done so they can execute 
business processes. Three types of workflows exist, namely, state machine 
workflow, rules driven workflow and sequential workflow [223]. An example of 
automated workflow is where a correlation rule triggers the sending of an e-mail 
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to a security administrator, or executes a script that shuts a system down. This is 
a service that may be offered by the SIEM. 
24x7 monitoring 
 
This service is also sometimes referred to as security information monitoring 
(SIM), or security event monitoring (SEM). This service collects and analyses 
information from critical assets identified and rated  by the asset management 
and criticality rating service. The information and events are monitored to detect 
threats and attacks, allowing actions to be taken on the alerts. In order to be 
effective, and to provide near real time detection of threats, this service should be 
offered continuously, twenty-four hours a day, seven days a week. 
Forensic analysis 
 
This service consists of the processes to uncover and interpret digital data. The 
purpose of this service is to preserve evidence in its original form, while 
simultaneously following a structured investigative process by collecting, 
identifying and validating digital information. Past events can then be 
reconstructed, and used in a court of law, or in other instances [224]. From a SOC, 
and using a SIEM, fraudulent activities or attacks and, at national level, spying 
activities by foreign countries may be detected,. 
In-house research 
 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines research as "...investigation or 
experimentation aimed at the discovery and interpretation of facts, revision of 
accepted theories or laws in the light of new facts, or practical application of such 
new or revised theories or laws [225].”  Cybersecurity research describes research 
in the cybersecurity domain to find solutions with real-world applications that 
strengthen national defence, protect the freedom of individuals, and ensures 
economic resilience and continuity [226]. It  is our experience that in-house 
research refers to an internal organisational service. 
Reporting 
 
Reporting is where a spoken or written account is given on something a person 
heard, did or investigated It is our experience that reporting on cybersecurity 
should include an analysis of monitored traffic, external threats and vulnerabilities, 
remediation’s and recommendations. Other than this, reporting often serves as 
the only way of demonstrating value to clients or organisations. 
Vulnerability 
management 
 
This service consists of the processes used to identify IT vulnerabilities, and the 
risks they pose and national or organisational level are evaluated. Based on the 
evaluation, recommendations can be made, and implemented to correct the 
vulnerabilities, and removing the risks [227]. Vulnerability management is one of 
the remediation activities of an overall risk management strategy and process. 
Risk management 
 
This service entails nations applying the principles of risk management to manage 
IT security risks. it  covers all aspects of owning, operating and adapting the use 
of IT. Risk is defined as the product of the  likelihood of occurrence that an event 
can have on a nation as well as its impact. IT risk is, however, described as the 
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product of the value of the asset, the systems vulnerability to a specific risk, and 
the threat it poses to the organisation [228]. We have proposed a National 
Cybersecurity Risk Management Guide in Appendix H. 
Network and security 
device management 
This service manages security technical controls. Management tasks include 
tasks such as firmware and version updates, operational maintenance, signature 
updates and configuration. The management of these security technical controls 
may be done according to an established framework such as ITIL. 
Security awareness 
training 
Security and awareness training may be delivered as part of SOC services. The 
training may be delivered digitally, as part of induction, or as formal trading 
sessions. 
Consulting Clients are consulted on their current security posture and efforts, typically 
measured against existing standards and frameworks such as ISO/IEC 
27001:2013 or NIST SP 800-53. Consultation can range from the configuration of 
security controls, to solutions and architecture design and business continuity. 
 
Now that we have identified and consolidated the SOC services, we need to identify and consolidate the CSIRT 
services. We will do this in In Section D4, where we will pair the SOC and CSIRT services to the E-CMIRC 
functions (introduced in Appendix C), which is a combination of the SOC and CSIRT functions we have 
identified in Appendix B and Appendix C. The pairing will be done based on our experience.  
 
D3  CSIRT cybersecurity services  
 
ENISA [229] and SEI [230] groups the cybersecurity services provided by CSIRTs into three categories, 
namely,  reactive services in the first place – the reactive services are provided in response, or reaction to an 
incident. Secondly, proactive services consider all cybersecurity services needed for the preparation, 
protection and securing of systems.Thirdly, security quality management services provide cybersecurity 
services to enhance existing cybersecurity services. The three cybersecurity categories with their cybersecurity 
services are listed in Table 41 as described by ENISA [229] and SEI [230]. 
 
Table 41: CSIRT reactive services 
CSIRT Service Description 
Alerts and warnings This service distributes information that describes threats and vulnerabilities such 
as attacks or viruses. It also makes recommendations to remediate these threats 
and vulnerabilities. This information may be created by the CSIRT itself, sector-
CSIRTs, vendors and security experts, to name a few. 
Incident handling This service involves "...receiving, triaging, and responding to requests and 
reports, and analyzing incidents and events." Some of the activities during the 
response phase can include the taking of remediation actions, issue solutions and 
A National Cybersecurity Management Framework for Developing Countries 
 
214 
  
Appendix D: E-CMIRC Cybersecurity Services 
CSIRT Service Description 
mitigating strategies, trace intruder activity and recovery. The incident handling 
service may further be divided into the following categories, and may be offered 
from different types of CSIRTs. 
• Incident analysis 
• Forensic evidence collection 
• Tracking or tracing 
• Incident response on site 
• Incident response support 
• Incident response coordination 
Vulnerability 
handling 
This service receives hardware and software vulnerability reports. It then analyses 
the nature, mechanisms and effects of the vulnerabilities, and develop a response 
strategy to detect and repair them. The following are categories of vulnerability 
handling services that may be provided by different types of CSIRTs: 
• Vulnerability analysis 
• Vulnerability response 
• Vulnerability response coordination 
Artefact handling Artefacts are files or objects form a compromised system. These systems may be 
involved in attacks, or reconnaissance of systems r networks. Some examples of 
artefacts are Trojans, viruses and worms, and rootkits. This service describes the 
handling, review and study of these artefacts. The following categories of artefact 
handling may be offered by different types of CSIRTs: 
• Artefact analysis 
• Artefact response 
• Artefact response coordination 
 
Table 42: CSIRT proactive services 
CSIRT Service Description 
Announcements. This service communicates information about threats and vulnerabilities such as 
intrusion alerts, security advisories and vulnerability warnings to its constituents. 
The purpose of these announcements is to allow the CSIRT constituents to 
prepare for, and protect their systems and networks against these threats and 
vulnerabilities. 
Technology watch. Technical developments, attack methodologies and intruder developments are 
monitored to identify future threats. This service may also monitor socio-political 
threats, as well as the national regulatory and legislative environment. This may 
be done by subscribing to security mailing lists and websites, as well as current 
news and articles relevant to the CSIRTs constituency. 
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Security audits or 
assessments. 
This service analyses and review in detail the nation’s infrastructure based on the 
requirements defined in the nation’s authoritative and normative sources. It may 
also review the nation’s security practices. Depending on the CSIRT type, the 
following categories of security announcements or assessments may be offered. 
• Infrastructure reviews 
• Best practice reviews 
• Scanning 
• Penetration testing 
It should be noted that scanning and penetration testing forms part of a 
vulnerability management strategy. Scanning technologies uses signatures and 
discovers “known” vulnerabilities, while penetration testing discovers “unknown” 
vulnerabilities. 
Configuration and 
maintenance of 
tools, applications 
and infrastructure. 
This service provides guidance, and in some instances perform the secure 
configuration of systems, and infrastructures of its constituency. The configuration 
could be on security controls such as intrusion prevention systems (IPSs), 
firewalls, virtual private networks (VPNs) and authentication mechanisms. 
Development of 
security tools. 
This service develops new cybersecurity tools such as scanners and patches for 
custom software. It may also include “secure build” images that may be used to 
rebuild compromised hosts. Tools or scripts extending the functionality of existing 
tools may also be developed, An example is plug-ins for scanners, and scripts or 
tools facilitating automated patch distribution. 
Intrusion detection 
services. 
This service reviews logs from its own, or its constituents IPS logs. These logs are 
analysed, and the CSIRT responds to events that may indicate threats. The IPS 
signatures are typically configured with thresholds. The CSIRT’s response may 
be governed according to pre-defined service level agreements or operational 
level agreements.  
Security-related 
information 
dissemination. 
With this service, a repository of security information is provided to constituents 
This information should be comprehensive, and readily available. The content 
may be developed and published by the CSIRT, and may include information from 
external sources such as sector-CSIRTs, vendors and security experts. Some of 
the type of information that may be contained in this repository as taken from SEI 
[230] are: 
• Reporting guidelines and contact information for the CSIRT. 
• Archives of alerts, warnings, and other announcements. 
• Documentation about current best practices. 
• General computer security guidance. 
• Policies, procedures, and checklists. 
• Patch development and distribution information. 
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• Vendor links 
• Current statistics and trends in incident reporting 
• Other information that can improve overall security practices 
 
Table 43: CSIRT security quality management services 
CSIRT Service Description 
Risk analysis. This service augments the risk management analysis strategy and process. It may 
improve the nation’s ability to provide a realistic risk assessment of national cyber 
assets that are qualified and quantified. This risk analysis is a sub-function of our 
proposed National Cybersecurity Risk Management Guide we introduced in 0. 
Business continuity 
and disaster 
recovery planning. 
Security incidents may lead to the disruption or degradation of a nation’s services 
and operations. CSIRTs may provide the business continuity management (BCM) 
and IT disaster recovery (IT DR) planning service to help with the recovery of 
national services and cyber operations. This planning may include guidelines on 
how to respond to national incidents and how to ensure continuity. In our 
experience, there is a clear distinction between IT DR and BCM in that IT DR only 
recovers IT systems, while BCM ensures the processes, facilities and people are 
included in the planning. 
Security consulting. With this service, CSIRTs advise and guide states on the best practices, at 
national level, on national cyber operations. This service entails the preparation 
and compilation of recommendations, as well as identifying functional and 
technical requirements for the procurement of new systems or security processes. 
Awareness building. With this service, a CSIRT identifies areas where its constituents require 
information and guidance to allow them to conform to national authoritative and 
normative requirements. Creating awareness improves comprehension of 
security related issues, and allows CSIRT constituents to more securely perform 
their daily activities. A cybersecurity aware constituency may improve the 
constituent’s chance of detecting attacks and threats, and report on those. 
Awareness training may be delivered online, using traditional media, and at 
schools and universities. 
Education and 
training. 
With this service CSIRTs provide security related information regarding 
cybersecurity issues. This information is delivered via courses, tutorials and 
workshops. This training may cover all aspects across the project, detect, report, 
and respond lifecycle of cybersecurity incidents. 
Product evaluation 
or certification. 
With this service, CSIRTs evaluates products, tools, applications or services to 
ensure their inherent security, and effectiveness and efficiency. These tools may 
be open source, or commercial off the shelve (COTS). 
 
A National Cybersecurity Management Framework for Developing Countries 
 
217 
  
Appendix D: E-CMIRC Cybersecurity Services 
 
D4  SOC and CSIRT services to E-CMIRC function mapping 
 
We have now introduced the SOC and CSIRT services researched in the authoritative literature. Furthermore, 
in Chapter 2, we introduced the relationship between cybersecurity functions, services and capabilities, and 
illustrated the relationship in Figure 9. In addition, we explained that functions are made up of services that 
consist of capabilities. In turn, capabilities are made up of people, processes and technologies. We also 
identified SOC and CSIRT functions, and from their functions, made a selection of functions to be included for 
the E-CMIRC. As a reminder, the E-CMIRC functions are: 
 
• Monitoring and evaluation function. 
• Security operations function. 
• Threat and vulnerability management function. 
• Incident handling function. 
 
We will now draw on our experience in planning, building, running and monitoring SOCs and CSIRTs, to map 
the E-CMIRC functions to the SOC and CSRIT services we identified in the preceding appendices. Table 40 
provided a list of SOC services with a description of each service. Table 41 to introduced the CSIRT proactive, 
reactive and security quality management services, with a description of each service. The mapping of               
E-CMIRC functions to SOC and CSIRT services enabling the E-CMIRC functions is displayed in Table 44: 
 
Table 44: E-CMIRC function to SOC and CSIRT services mapping 
E-CMIRC Functions SOC Services CSIRT Services 
Monitoring and 
Evaluation function 
• 24x7 monitoring 
• Counter intelligence 
• Surveillance 
• Risk management 
• Reporting 
• Intrusion detection services. 
Security Operations 
function. 
• Network and Security Device 
Management 
• Asset management and criticality 
rating 
• Configuration and maintenance of 
tools, applications and infrastructure. 
Threat and 
Vulnerability 
Management 
function. 
• Aggregation and analysis of 
intelligence data 
• Correlation of content intelligence 
data 
• Vulnerability management 
• Vulnerability handling 
• Announcements. 
• Technology watch. 
• Alerts and warnings 
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E-CMIRC Functions SOC Services CSIRT Services 
• Providing Strategic advice and 
guidance and Integrated threat 
intelligence 
• Reporting 
Incident Handling 
function. 
• Incident response, incident 
management 
• Reporting 
• Incident handling 
 
It is worth mentioning that this mapping is done purely to ensure that all functions are covered by at least one 
service, or services. This table does not hold the final selection of services for the E-CMIRC. The mapping of 
the E-CMIRC functions to the SOC and CSIRT services illustrates that there may be instances where the same 
service can be used to enable more than one function. An example would be the reporting service that may 
be used as part of the incident handling function, as well as the security operations function.  
 
We now have a mapping of E-CMIRC functions to SOC and CSIRT services that deliver on them. In           
Section D5, we will identify similarities and overlaps between the SOC and CSIRT services. This will provide 
us with a consolidated list of services from which we will make a selection for the E-CMIRC to deliver on its 
functions. 
 
D5  SOC and CSIRT cybersecurity service mapping 
 
The mapping of SOC and CSIRT services will assist us with the identification of common and unique services 
and capabilities. The ENISA grouping of CSIRT cybersecurity services is used as the baseline, as it is a 
consolidation and good representative of the CSIRT specific services expressed by SANS [198], the SEI at 
CMU [143], and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU) [231]. The SOC and CSIRT cybersecurity 
services are grouped as reactive, proactive, and security quality management cybersecurity services to align 
with the CSIRT service grouping.  
 
Our motivation for selecting the CSIRT services as a baseline is because its services are expressed in 
international standards and frameworks, while the SOC services are expressed by organisations, and not by 
any international body, standard or framework.  
 
Table 45 to Table 47 displays the mapping of SOC and CSIRT cybersecurity services. This mapping is done 
using our experience in planning, building, running and monitoring SOCs and CSIRTs. Table 45 displays the 
SOC to CSIRT reactive services mapping. 
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Table 45: CSIRT to SOC reactive service mapping 
CSIRT SOC 
Alerts and warnings Providing strategic advice and guidance and 
Integrated threat intelligence 
Incident handling Incident response, incident management 
Vulnerability handling Vulnerability management 
Artefact handling Forensic analysis 
 
The SOC to CSIRT proactive services mapping is shown in Table 46. 
 
Table 46: CSIRT to SOC proactive service mapping 
CSIRT SOC 
Announcements • Reporting 
• Providing strategic advice and guidance and 
integrated threat intelligence 
Technology watch • Providing strategic advice and guidance and 
integrated threat intelligence 
• In-house research 
Security audits or assessments Security consulting 
Configuration and maintenance of tools, 
applications and infrastructure 
Network and security device management 
Development of security tools  
Intrusion detection services 24x7 monitoring 
Security related information dissemination • Reporting 
• Providing strategic advice and guidance and 
Integrated threat intelligence 
 
The SOC and CSIRT security quality service management is displayed in Table 47. 
 
Table 47: CSIRT to SOC security quality management services mapping 
CSIRT SOC 
Risk analysis Risk management 
business continuity and disaster recovery 
planning for constituents 
Security consulting 
Security consulting Security consulting 
Awareness building Security awareness training 
Education and training  
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Product evaluation and certification Security consulting 
 
Considering the list of proactive services as mapped in Table 46, the service descriptions by vendors  [181], 
[193], [232] and the definitions of SOCs [233] and CSIRTs [140], it can be inferred that services offered by 
CSIRTs are mostly focussed outwards, and towards its constituents, while services offered by SOCs are 
focused internally – in other words, the constituents they reach differ. In addition, the reach differs in that 
national CSIRTs provide a service to the public as a constituent, while SOCs serve customers, but almost 
never the public. SOCs do not provide their services at national level, but rather individual organisations, or in 
the case of MSSPs multiple organisations. The same applies to CSIRTs in terms of serving multiple 
constituents. Our next step is to identify SOC and CSIRT services that are common, and unique. 
 
Before we continue with the comparison of the SOC and CSIRT services to determine its commonalities and 
uniqueness, we would like to reinforce what we have done so far to get to the stage where we can compare 
the services of the two structures. We have started with the identification of SOC and CSIRT cybersecurity 
functions in Appendices B, and C. From these functions, we have identified and motivated functions for the    
E-CMIRC. These functions, however, need cybersecurity services to deliver on them (the relationship between 
functions, services and capabilities were introduced in Chapter 2).  
 
This requirement led us to the identification of SOC services in Section D2, and the CSIRT services in      
Section D3. We have then mapped the SOC and CSIRT services back to the E-CMIRC functions in            
Section D4 to ensure that all the E-CMIRC functions are covered by a service. With this mapping, we have 
seen that there is some overlap and similarity between SOC and CSIRT services.  
 
We will provide a mapping of SOC and CSIRT services in Table 48 to identify SOC and CSIRT commonand 
unique services. The services of these two structures were identified from authoritative literature sources. 
Table 48 is a consolidation of the services captured in Table 45  to Table 47, and the mapping is done based 
on our experience working with SOCs and CSIRTs. This mapping includes the work  done by Jacobs et al. 
(2016) [190]. 
 
Table 48: SOC and CSIRT common and unique services 
CSIRT Unique Common SOC Unique 
Development of security 
tools 
 
Education and training  
 
Product evaluation and 
certification 
Alerts and warnings 
Incident handling 
Vulnerability handling 
Artefact handling 
Announcements 
Technology watch 
Security audits or assessments 
24x7 monitoring 
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CSIRT Unique Common SOC Unique 
Configuration and maintenance of tools, 
applications and infrastructure 
Intrusion detection services 
Security related information dissemination 
Risk analysis 
Business continuity and disaster recovery Planning 
for constituents 
Security consulting 
Awareness building 
 
After analysing the SOC and CSIRT services, we can see that CSIRTs offer the following three unique 
services: 
 
• Development of security tools. 
• Education and training. 
• Product evaluation and certification. 
 
When considering the description of the CSIRTs’ intrusion detection services described in Table 42, and 
comparing them to the SOCs’ 24x7 monitoring service, it is clear that there is a relationship between the CSIRT 
intrusion detection service, and the SOCs 24x7 monitoring service. The SOC, with its 24x7 monitoring service, 
will detect intrusions. No reference to CSIRTs offering 24x7 monitoring as a service could be found in any of 
the authoritative literature. The SOC specific service we identified is: 
 
• 24x7 Monitoring. 
 
In Table 44, we mapped the E-CMIRC functions to the SOC and CSIRT services, and in the process, made 
sure that all the E-CMIRC functions have a service, or services associated with them. In Section D4, in         
Table 48, we compared the SOC and CSIRT services to identify common and unique services. We will now 
continue with our selection of services for the E-CMIRC. Section D6 introduces all the elements we will 
consider during the selection process. 
 
D6  E-CMIRC service selection approach 
 
We have now identified SOC and CSIRT functions, and selected and motivated functions for the E-CMIRC 
from those functions. We then identified SOC and CSIRT services, and their overlaps and similarities. This left 
us with the list presented in Table 48 where we have identified the services that are common and unique to 
SOCs and CSIRTs. We now need to select and motivate services from the list in Table 48 for the E-CMIRC to 
deliver on its functions. The E-CMIRC services selection is informed by the elements we identified during the  
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development of the NCMF. The E-CMIRC structure links intimately with the NCMF, and as such, delivers on 
the authoritative and normative source prescripts, as well as the dimensions, mandates and domains.  
 
It is worth reiterating that the defensive domain lifecycle phases may assist with the identification of national 
cybersecurity structures as well as the structure’s functions and service. This concept was introduced in 
Chapter 2. Together with the E-CMIRC functions, the defensive domain lifecycle phases will have the biggest 
influence when selecting services for the E-CMIRC. This is because the defensive domain lifecycle phases 
are mostly offered from SOCs and CSIRTs, and thus, by definition, the E-CMIRC. 
 
To ensure that the E-CMIRC services are relevant and complete, we will map the SOC and CSIRT services to 
the defensive domain lifecycle phases of prevent, detect, respond and recover in Section D7. This will provide 
us with a complete and relevant list of services for the E-CMIRC that deliver on all its functions. 
 
D7  Selection of E-CMIRC cybersecurity services 
 
We have used the NCMF to identify thirteen of the most general cybersecurity functions, and from those, we 
have selected and motivated the monitoring and evaluation and incident handling functions to illustrate the 
implementation part of the NCMF. We are doing this by developing a new structure called the E-CMIRC. The 
SOC and CSIRT structures were identified as the structures delivering on the monitoring and evaluation and 
incident handling functions. We identified the SOC and CSIRT functions in section D8, and from that list, we 
have selected and motivated functions for the E-CMIRC.  
 
The SOC services were identified in section D2, and CSIRT functions were identified in section D3. We then 
mapped the SOC and CSIRT services to the E-CMIRC functions in Table 44 to ensure that all E-CMIRC 
functions are covered by a service. In Chapter 6, we selected and motivated the critical information 
infrastructure (CIP) and crisis management mandate to illustrate the application of the NCMF implementation 
part. The monitoring and evaluation and incident handling functions deliver on this mandate, and the E-CMIRC 
functions introduced in Appendix C, section C8, in turn, delivers on the monitoring and evaluation and incident 
handling functions.  
 
The dimensions with their actors, as well as the domains and mandates were also introduced in Chapter 3. 
We also selected the defensive domain as the domain of operation for the E-CMIRC, and introduced the 
defensive domain lifecycle phases. We now need to ensure that the E-CMIRC services deliver on the defensive 
domain lifecycle phases. 
 
The defensive domain lifecycle phases were identified in Chapter 3 as protect, detect, respond and recover, 
and these phases were mapped back to the Incident Handling lifecycle. We stated in Chapter 3 that the 
defensive domain lifecycle phases may assist with the identification of cybersecurity structures and the  
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services needed for each of its lifecycle phases. The E-CMIRC cybersecurity services firstly have to ensure 
that they deliver on all the E-CMIRC functions, and this we did in Table 44. Our E-CMIRC must also ensure 
that the defensive domain lifecycle phases are covered, since it is a structure operating in the defensive 
domain.  
 
It would thus be helpful if we do a mapping of the E-CMIRC functions and services with regard to the defensive 
domains lifecycle phases. This ensures that our E-CMIRC functions and their complementary services cover 
all their lifecycle phases. We will use this section to map the services introduced in Table 44 to the defensive 
domain lifecycle phases. This mapping then provides us with a list of E-CMIRC services. During the 
development of the NCMF level 1 in Chapter 2, we recommended that the selection and prioritisation of 
national cybersecurity functions should follow a risk-based approach. During the identification of the thirteen 
general cybersecurity functions in Chapter 4, we introduced the national strategic risk and threat assessment 
function. This function resides at level 2 of the NCMF, and is one of the thirteen general cybersecurity functions.  
 
In order to comply with the recommendation of following a risk-based approach to assist in the identification of 
national cybersecurity functions and services, the risk analysis service is selected to be a fundamental part of 
the E-CMIRC services. The full complement of services we need to make a selection from for the E-CMIRC is 
listed below, as taken from Table 44 and as supported by previous research done by Jacobs et al. (2016) 
[190]. This list contains the SOC and CSIRT unique and common services as presented in Table 48: 
 
• Risk analysis. 
• Development of security tools. 
• Education and training. 
• Product evaluation and certification.  
• Alerts and warnings. 
• Incident handling. 
• Vulnerability handling. 
• Artefact handling. 
• Announcements. 
• Technology watch. 
• Security audits or assessments. 
• Configuration and maintenance of tools, applications and infrastructure. 
• Intrusion detection services. 
• Security related information dissemination. 
• Business continuity and Disaster recovery planning for constituents. 
• Security consulting. 
• Awareness building. 
• 24x7 monitoring. 
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This list includes the services needed to deliver on the E-CMIRC functions as shown in our mapping of                
E-CMIRC functions to SOC and CSIRT services in Table 44. Our list of services however consists of more 
services than those needed to deliver on the E-CMIRC functions. To exclude some of the additional services  
to be offered from the E-CMIRC, we will do a mapping of our list of services to the defensive domain lifecycle 
phases.  
 
We will first map all services delivering on the E-CMIRC functions. It makes sense that the services not needed 
to deliver on the E-CMIRC functions, or the defensive domain lifecycles are excluded. Doing this mapping 
provides us with a list of E-CMIRC services that are relevant and complete in terms of being able to deliver on 
the crisis management mandate, E-CMIRC functions, and also the defensive domain lifecycle phases. The 
services are mapped back to the E-CMIRC functions and the defence domain lifecycle phases in Table 49, 
and this mapping is done based on our experience. We will populate Table 49 with the services we have 
presented in Table 48. We will use the following abbreviations for the functions make the table more readable: 
 
• Monitoring and evaluation function      - ME 
• Security operations function                - SO 
• Threat and vulnerability management function   - TVM 
• Incident handling function       - IH 
 
Table 49: Services mapped to E-CMIRC functions and defensive domain lifecycle 
phases 
 Protect Detect Respond Recover 
ME  24x7 monitoring 
Intrusion detection services 
  
SO  Risk analysis 
reporting 
 
Network and 
security device 
management 
Business continuity 
and disaster 
recovery planning 
TVM Vulnerability 
management 
Alerts and warnings Security related 
information 
dissemination 
 
IH   Incident handling  
 
Table 49 contains the mapping of services across the E-CMIRC functions and the defensive domain lifecycle 
phases. This mapping was done based on our experience, and keeping in mind the monitoring and evaluation, 
and incident handling national functions. This means that we have not considered services such as asset 
management and criticality rating, and security audits or assessments or consulting, as they fall outside the 
scope of the monitoring and evaluation, and incident handling functions. We only considered services relevant 
to the monitoring and evaluation, and incident handling functions. 
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Some services, such as the business continuity and disaster recovery planning fall outside the national scope, 
and it is our experience that this service is something that is delivered at organisational, or critical infrastructure 
level. We have however included this service as it is the only SOC and CSIRT service addressing the recovery 
lifecycle phase. We envision that the E-CMIRC will fulfil an overseeing and advisory role with regard to this 
service. The list of services we have thus identified and selected to be offered by the E-CMIRC is: 
 
• 24x7 monitoring 
• Intrusion detection services 
• Risk analysis 
• Reporting 
• Network and security device management 
• Business continuity and disaster recovery planning 
• Vulnerability management 
• Alerts and warnings 
• Security related information dissemination 
• Incident handling  
 
Most of these services that we have mapped, may overlap the E-CMIRC functions and defensive domain 
lifecycle phases. An example is the vulnerability management service that is grouped under the threat and 
vulnerability management function and the protect lifecycle phase, but this service may also be found as part 
of the security operations function in the respond phase.  
 
There are various standards, frameworks and best practices that may be consulted when considering incident 
handling, security related information dissemination, and situational awareness at national level [143], [126], 
[149], [234], national cybersecurity risk management [235], [236], [10] and business continuity and disaster 
recovery [237], [238], [239].  
 
We could, however, not find any publicly available sources on how to implement the monitoring and intrusion 
detection and prevention service at national level. In section D8, we will make a proposition on how to achieve 
monitoring and intrusion prevention at national level. This is important since 24x7 monitoring and intrusion 
detection are two critical services we propose for the E-CMIRC. 
 
D8  Monitoring and intrusion detection at national level 
 
While incident handling at national level is common, and copious reference literature, frameworks, best 
practices and successful reference implementations exist, it is our experience that the same cannot be said  
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for monitoring, and intrusion detection and prevention at national level. This section explains how monitoring 
of the national cyber domain may be achieved to detect events that may lead to national cybersecurity 
incidents. Our purpose is not to go into technical details, but to propose a high-level national monitoring service 
with current existing technologies and their capacity to show that it is possible to have a monitoring function  
at national level. 
 
Some examples of countries with successful implementations of national CSIRTs offering the national incident 
handling function, are countries such as the United States of America, Belgium and South Korea [240] [241]. 
The ITU reports that there are currently 103 national CSIRTs in existence [242]. The ITU’s list of existing 
national CSIRTs may be accessed at https://goo.gl/dRgktU . 
 
Monitoring the national cyber environment to detect attacks, and responding to those attacks, is one of the 
functions that the E-CMIRC structure will offer. Some characteristics of national cyber-attacks are that they 
could originate from various actors and sources, be aimed at national cyber assets, could affect more than one 
organisation or sector within an industry, and may have effects identical to kinetic attacks. [1]. The national 
cyber-attack characteristics are repeated in the UK’s Cyber Security Strategy document [243]. 
 
In an environment where cybersecurity technical controls are monitored (such as a SOC with a SIEM tool), 
events and alerts are received form the technical controls by the SIEM. Based on a machine or human analysis, 
some of these events or alerts may then be classified as an incident. It is necessary to monitor these events 
to detect attacks.  
 
The monitoring of technical controls forms the tenet or basis by which cybersecurity events and alerts are 
detected, and classified as incidents. Once an incident occurs, it must be responded to. The scenario we have 
just described, the monitoring of security technical controls, the classification of the technical control’s events 
and alerts as incidents, and the response thereto, typically occurs at organisational level. 
 
It is our experience that monitoring and detection at national level is not done commonly. Our experience has 
shown that one of the reasons that nation states do not monitor technical controls at national level, is that 
products are not available that can handle the bandwidth capacity at national level, and neither are there 
national structures from where monitoring and detection of attacks can be done at national level. Nation states 
use a distributed CSIRT model, relying on sector-CSIRTs to detect, and report on attacks. 
 
It must again be noted that we previously stated in Appendix C that no authoritative literature source listed 
monitoring as a CSIRT service. In terms of monitoring at national level, events across all national ingress 
points into a country could be monitored. South Africa, as an example of a developing country, has five active 
cable systems connecting South Africa to the world [244] [245]. These systems and the bandwidth they provide 
are shown in Table 50.  
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Table 50: South African active cabling systems [182] [183] 
System Name Bandwidth 
South Atlantic 2 (SAT-2) 560 Mbits/s 
South Atlantic 3 / West Africa submarine cable / South Africa far east (SAT-3 / WASC 
/ SAFE) 
340 Gbits/s 
SEACOM 2.6 Tbits/s 
East African submarine cable system (EASSy) 4.72 Tbits/s 
West African cable system (WACS) 5.12 Tbits/s 
 
The bandwidth from these systems is then distributed inland to three Internet Exchange Points (INX). There is 
an INX in each of the South African largest economic centers. These INXs are being run and operated by 
Internet Exchange South Africa (INX-ZA), which is an sovereign division of the Internet Service Providers 
Association (ISPA) [246]. The three inland INXs are situated at Johannesburg (JINX), Cape Town (CINX), and 
Durban (DINX) with Johannesburg and Cape Town being multi sites [247]. JINXS provides 8 Gbits/s and CINX 
provides 3 Gbits/s [248], while DINX provides 2 Gbits/s throughput [249]. 
 
It is proposed that the ingress points in developing countries be protected using IPSs. Protection can be 
extended to provide firewalling service, as well as a national DDoS shelter. There are currently carrier-class 
technologies available providing IPS throughputs of up to 30 Gbits/s [250]. This would satisfy the 8 Gbits/s 
throughput at JINX, which is the highest throughput provided across all three INX’s. This strategy is applied 
successfully in South Korea [251]. We further proposed that these IPSs then be monitored from an E-CMIRC-
like structure. This allows for a monitoring and detection service at national level. 
 
D9  Conclusion 
 
The purpose of Appendix D was to identify and select the E-CMIRC services. The SOC and CSIRT services 
were determined in Section D2 and Section D3. We used the following approach to help us during the 
identification and selection of the E-CMIRC services: 
 
• We identified SOC services from authoritative literature in Section D2. 
• We identified CSIRT services from authoritative literature in Section D3. 
• We then mapped the SOC and CSIRT services to the E-CMIRC functions (identified in Appendix C) in 
Section D3. Doing this gave us certainty that all E-CMIRC functions are covered by a service, or more 
 than one service. 
• We identified common and unique SOC and CSIRT services in Section D6. This gave us a list of 
 common and unique SOC and CSIRT services. 
 
 
A National Cybersecurity Management Framework for Developing Countries 
 
228 
  
Appendix D: E-CMIRC Cybersecurity Services 
 
• This list of common and unique SOC and CSIRT services were then mapped to the E-CMIRC functions, 
 and the defensive domain lifecycle phases in Section D7. This provided us with a list of services for the 
 E-CMIRC. 
 
An approach to monitoring and protecting national ingress points were presented in Section D8. In Appendix 
E to Appendix F we will introduce the E-CMIRC structure, and its representative models. The. E-CMIRC 
structure is described using three models, the E-CMIRC CDM, the E-CMIRC OM and the E-CMIRC MM. 
 
Using the NCMF, we have identified thirteen of the most general cybersecurity functions, and we have selected 
two of those as functions for our E-CMIRC. We have identified the existing structures of the two selected 
functions to be used as a reference during the development of our E-CMIRC. The two existing structures are 
SOCs and CSIRTs and we then identified the SOC and CSIRT functions, and selected and motivated SOC 
and CSIRT functions for the E-CMIRC. Following the selection of functions, we then identified the services 
needed to deliver on those functions, and made a selection from them for the E-CMIRC. In Appendices E to 
F, we will describe the “build,” “run” and “monitor” functions of the PBMR organisational approach.
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Appendix E:  E-CMIRC capability development model (E-CMIRC CDM) 
 
E1  Introduction 
 
We have introduced the E-CMIRC functions in Appendix C, and the E-CMIRC services in            
Appendix D In this Appendix, we will develop a generic model that may be used as a reference 
model when developing the    E-CMIRC capabilities. The focus of this appendix is thus to develop 
the E-CMIRC capability development model (E-CMIRC CDM). Our model will be based on existing 
capability development models. The approach we will follow is to develop the E-CMIRC CDM is as 
follows: 
 
• We will identify and analyse existing capability development models. 
• An existing capability development model will be identified and selected to be used during the 
 development of our E-CMIRC CDM. 
 
The E-CMIRC CDM will be combined with the E-CMIRC operations model (E-CMIRC OM) and 
presented as a single, integrated model in Appendix F. We are doing this since there is a correlation 
and overlap between the E-CMIRC capabilities and the E-CMIRC operations in that every aspect 
or element making up the capability development model, has to be considered during each 
operational element. 
 
The rest of this appendix is structured as follows: 
 
Section E2 presents the E-CMIRC in context of the NCMF. Our aim is to illustrate where the              
E-CMIRC fits within the NCMF. 
 
Section E3 Introduces capability models and describes the value they offer during the development 
of a system. 
 
Section E4 is used to introduce publicly available capability development models, and we will select 
a capability development model for the E-CMIRC. 
 
Section E5 describes the capability model that we have selected for the E-CMIRC. 
 
Section E6 concludes this appendix. 
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E2  E-CMIRC structure in the context of the NCMF 
 
To identify national cybersecurity functions, we have proposed a framework that may be used to 
identify cybersecurity functions needed at national level. We introduced this framework, the NCMF, 
in Chapter 3 and Chapter 5 (Chapter 4 was used to identify the most general non-mandatory 
cybersecurity functions). The NCMF provides developing countries with a framework to identify, 
select, prioritise and implement national cybersecurity functions.  
 
During the identification of the general cybersecurity functions in Chapter 4, the monitoring and 
evaluation, and incident handling functions from the National Crisis Management mandate, residing 
in the defensive domain, were selected to illustrate the implementation part of the NCMF. Keeping 
in the fiscal and skills constraints of developing countries in mind, we have motivated the delivery 
of the cybersecurity services on these two functions (traditionally offered from two different 
structures – the SOC and CSIRT) combined, and offered from a new, single structure, the                   
E-CMIRC. 
 
The NCMF national cybersecurity function identification part starts at level 1 and the selection and 
prioritisation of functions are done at level 2. The NCMF cybersecurity function implementation part 
starts at level 3 and ends at level 6. Our E-CMIRC is a newly envisioned, national cybersecurity 
structure that offers the combined services of the monitoring and evaluation, and incident handling 
functions.  
 
All national structures, inclusive of the E-CMIRC, reside at level 3 of the NCMF. The E-CMIRC 
structure, as a national cybersecurity structure, will also have authoritative, normative source 
prescripts. These prescripts will influence the building, running and monitoring requirements of the 
structure. Some of the national structures used by the United States of America are the cyber 
security coordinator (CSC), the United States Computer emergency readiness teams (US-CERT) 
and the industrial control systems cyber emergency response team (ICS-CERT) [68]. Some 
examples of national cybersecurity structures in the United Kingdom, are the Office of Cyber 
Security and Information Assurance (OCSIA), the Cyber Security Operations Centre (CSOC) and 
the Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UK) [68].  
 
In using South Africa as a sample developing country, structures mandated by the NCPF [33] and 
the South African Cybercrimes and Cybersecurity Bill  [34] are the Government CSIRT                  
(ECS-CSIRT) [83], the Cybersecurity Hub [82] serving as the national CSIRT, the Department of 
Defence’s Cyber Command, and the South African Police’s Cybercrimes Centre. The E-CMIRC  
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structure, represented by the cube, in the context of the NCMF is shown in Figure 39 that depicts  
that the E-CMIRC structure resides at level 3 of the NCMF, and that it requires the elements 
captured in levels 5 and 6 of the NCMF.   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 39: Position of E-CMIRC in the context of the NCMF 
 
The E-CMIRC CDM describes what the E-CMIRC’s capabilities should look like, keeping in 
consideration its people, processes and technologies. Levels 5 and 6 of the NCMF serves to guide 
the national structures through identifying applicable legal and regulatory requirements, and 
policies, processes and procedures needed to comply to these requirements, as well as policies, 
processes and procedures needed to deliver on its services and operations. 
 
E3  Introduction to capability development models 
 
The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines the concept of a ‘model’ as “a description or analogy used 
to help visualize something (as an atom) that cannot be directly observed” [252]. The E-CMIRC will 
be described using a model. The E-CMIRC capability development model will be an abstract, visual 
model. The value that a model can provide in representing a system is as follows [253]: 
 
• It allows for the documentation of E-CMIRC requirements and functions. 
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• Enables assessment of the performance of the E-CMIRC structure. 
• Enables cost estimation. 
• Allows for the evaluation of trade-offs. 
• Aids in performance management, decreases risk and manages cost. 
 
The E-CMIRC is a structure, much like a SOC or CSIRT. Considering the value that following a 
model may offer during the planning and building of structures, it would be helpful if there were a 
model that nations can follow during the planning and building of the E-CMIRC’s capabilities. 
Following a capability development model allows the E-CMIRC structure to be broken down into its 
components. It also serves as a blueprint to assist those building the structure to make sure that all 
components are considered and catered for [254]. 
 
E4 Existing capability development models 
 
The E-CMIRC’s cybersecurity services are made up of capabilities, and these in turn consist of 
people, processes and tools or technologies in turn (this was described in Chapter 2). We have 
made a conscious decision to only consider the capability development models of military systems, 
and our motivation is as follows: 
 
• Our research did not produce any existing cybersecurity capability development models or 
frameworks. 
• Teoh (2010) [255] proposed a cybersecurity capability process that describes practices. This is 
not relevant as a reference framework. 
• Our research returned system capability development frameworks, and of those, the military 
system  capability development frameworks were found to be the most comprehensive and 
complete. 
• In Section 1.10 we have recommended that national cybersecurity structures should be 
planned and built as systems, and according to systems engineering principles. In keeping with 
our recommendation, we will thus only consider system capability development models. 
• Our E-CMIRC serves at national level, and may be used to offer functions across the Offensive 
or defensive domains. Although the E-CMIRC development is illustrated in context of the 
defensive domain, our intention is also for a nation state to be able to use it to deliver functions 
in the offensive domain. In our discussion on domains in Section 0, we stated that functions in 
the offensive domain are often military functions, and this resonates with our alignment with 
military capability development models. 
 
The capabilities of South African defence systems are described in a granular fashion [256], and 
can be seen to cover aspects of personnel, organisation, sustainment, training, equipment, 
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doctrine, facilities, information, technology and budget (POSTEDFIT-B) [257] [258]. The 
POSTEDFIT-B capability development model is used in South Africa, by the South African DOD for 
the development of military systems. Other available military capability development models are 
training, equipment, personnel, infrastructure, doctrine and concepts, organisation, information, 
logistics (TEPID-OIL) used by the UK Ministry of Defence [259]. The United States (US) Department 
of Defence (DOD)  uses doctrine, organisations, training, materiel, leadership, personnel and 
facilities (DOTMLF) [260]. These capability development models are the smallest dimensions of the 
people, processes and technology or tools framework [261]. 
 
The POSTEDFIT-B, TEPID-OIL and DOTMLF are all military capability development models. 
Military capability development models are a comprehensive way of defining work deliverables and 
work standards, and they provide a way to measure the work deliverables [262]. In Chapter 2 we 
have described a service as consisting of a capability, or capabilities. The E-CMIRC structure offer 
functions and services to deliver on the monitoring and evaluation, and incident handling functions. 
Furthermore, by definition, the E-CMIRC structure is an information communication and technology 
(ICT) related structure, and at its core, ICT service delivery, has people, processes and technology 
[190] [263]. 
 
E5  E-CMIRC capability development model selection  
 
We have selected the POSTEDFIT-B as the most ideal capability development model for the             
E-CMIRC as it is the most comprehensive model when comparing it against the other available 
military capability development models. It also has a proven track record. An example of where it 
was applied successfully in a developing country, is with the development of the South African 
armoured capability [258].  
 
We found it to have a wider coverage and is more modular when compared against the UK MOD 
and the US DOD capability development models. Another motivational factor is that the other 
military capability development models are developed for, and used by developed countries, and 
the POSTEDFIT-B model is used by a developing country. 
 
A further advantage of the POSTEDFIT-B’s granularity, is that trade-offs can be made between the 
model’s elements. This allows for the optimisation of the E-CMIRC, and allows us to compensate 
for deficiencies in individual elements [257]. A comparative analysis between the UK MoD and US 
DoD capability development models against the POSTEDFIT-B model is made in Table 51. 
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Table 51: Comparison of capability development models 
POSTEDFIT-B TEPID-OIL DOTMLF 
Personnel Personnel Leadership 
Organisation Organisation Organisation  
Sustainment Logistics x 
Training Training Training 
Equipment Equipment Materiel 
Doctrine Doctrine and concepts Doctrine 
Facilities Infrastructure Facilities 
Information Information x 
Technology x x 
Budget x x 
 
The second column in Table 51 shows that the UK Ministry of Defence’s TEPID-OIL model does 
not describe technological or budgetary requirements, and the third column shows that the US 
DOD’s DOTMLF models does not cover sustainment, information, technology or budget. The 
absent elements are indicated with an “x.” 
 
Table 51 makes it clear that the South African military’s South African POSTEDFIT-B capability 
development model is the most comprehensive and granular model. We will now provide a 
description of each of the elements making up the POSTEDFIT-B capability development model, 
and contextualise it for our E-CMIRC. 
 
Personnel 
 
In the POSTEDFIT-B model, personnel describes the required characteristics of the people 
elements [264] staffing the E-CMIRC. In staffing the E-CMIRC, the Skills Framework for the 
Information Age (SFIA) [64] may be considered as a framework that describes the skills needed 
within the E-CMIRC, while the National Initiative for Cybersecurity Education (NICE) National 
Cybersecurity Workforce Framework [265] could be considered to organise, describe and label 
cybersecurity work. Mandatory South African human resource (HR) requirements and conditions of 
employment for staff working in our E-CMIRC may be found in acts such as the Basic Conditions 
of Employment Amendment Act No 11 of 2002 [266]. 
 
Organisation 
 
This capability development element describes the organisational structure of the E-CMIRC. In the 
South African context, and following the NCMF levels, the organisation of the E-CMIRC may be 
constructed from the actors identified using the proposed stakeholders and actor identification 
template we introduced in Section 3.5 in Chapter 3. We have also expressed the requirement of an  
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overall controlling body in Section 5.4. The overall controlling body may be a body similar to the 
Cyber Response Committee [120] and the National Cybersecurity Advisory Council [121] 
introduced in Section 5.4.  
 
The responsibility of the overall controlling body would be to determine the E-CMIRC organisational 
structure. It is proposed that the E-CMIRC be organised according to its constituents, the reason 
being that different skills would be needed for different constituents. The skills required to perform 
the monitoring and evaluation and incident handling functions for CI, that typically uses 
programmable logical controllers (PLC’s) and supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) 
systems, differ from the skills needed to support monitoring and evaluation and incident handling 
functions for the financial sector, or normal data networks.  
 
The E-CMIRC may also be structured across geographic locations, service domains, or across 
business units. An example of a business unit-oriented structure,  is the fact that the South African 
government consists of different departments such as the Department of Justice (DOJ), The 
Department of Home Affairs (DHA), and the Department of Defence (DOD), and the E-CMIRC may 
be structured accordingly. A sample organisational structure is shown in Figure 40. 
 
 
 
Figure 40: Sample E-CMIRC organisational structure 
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In this sample organogram, an overall controlling body as specified in level 2 of the NCMF, will have 
control over the E-CMIRC structure. The E-CMIRC itself is structured to provide services to 
government, and at national level in the defensive domain. This defensive services layer is 
purposefully inserted to illustrate the flexibility of the E-CMIRC - should the E-CMIRC mature, and 
national cybersecurity functional requirements change, it would be easy to add services applicable 
to the offensive domain, such as a cyber warfare service. 
 
The focus of the E-CMIRC is to provide a monitoring and evaluation and incident handling function 
at national level, but any of the thirteen identified general cybersecurity functions identified in 
Chapter 4 may be added, omitted, or nation state specific national cybersecurity functions added, 
as the E-CMIRC structure matures, and as national requirements change. 
 
Sustainment 
 
In the POSTEDFIT-B model, sustainment describes support elements such as financial, logistics 
and personnel support [264]. This element is also known as supply and support [267]. In context of 
the E-CMIRC structure, this element refers to the provisioning of technology, tools and assets the 
E-CMIRC requires to start and continue its operations, as well as the management of its 
configuration, serviceability and availability. It includes aspects such as financial and HR support. 
The technology, tools and assets are discussed later in this Section and include elements such as 
a SIEM tool, and a help desk system.  
 
Training 
 
This element refers to the training for the E-CMIRC staff that is needed. Training requirements need 
to be defined. The defined training should include aspects such as how frequent training will take 
place, the depth and breadth of required skills and competence needed, and also whether 
certification training should be considered. It should be kept in mind that training should be split into 
technical or technology specific training, as well as service specific training such as incident 
handling, and monitoring and analysis training. Legal and management training should also be 
provided. In the identification of skills and required training, frameworks such as SFIA [64] and NICE 
[265], as introduced in Section 3.5.4 may be considered. 
 
Equipment 
 
This POSTEDFIT-B element describes the supporting equipment needed for the E-CMIRC to 
perform on its operational mandate. Equipment include elements such as chairs and tables, office 
and stationary equipment, an equipped pause area, monitoring screens, an equipped visitors area,  
A National Cybersecurity Management Framework for Developing Countries 
 
238 
  
Appendix E: E-CMIRC Capability Development Model 
 
and a war room to name a few. A requirements analysis may be performed to identify all the 
equipment needed. 
 
Doctrine 
 
This element describes the management, control, policy, strategy and regulatory framework of the 
E-CMIRC. This correlates with levels five and six of the NCMF, and governs administration, 
operations and decision making in the E-CMIRC. This element may include sources such as 
national policy, an example is the NCPF, down to technology specific processes and procedures, 
such as a back-up process and procedure. The policies and processes will be developed taking 
into consideration the mandate of the E-CMIRC, and its service offering to stakeholders. 
 
Facilities 
 
In the POSTEDFIT-B model, facilities refer to the physical structure itself, the building and property. 
The facility should be chosen in such a way that it supports the operation of the E-CMIRC. From a 
South African context, the building location may be sited in an area where both municipal and 
national power grids are available to ensure redundancy. The building should also conform to 
physical security requirements such as those expressed by the SAPS minimum physical security 
standards (MPSS) [268], or ISO/IEC 27001:2005 [48]. 
 
Information 
 
This POSTEDFIT-B element describes all information input and output. It covers aspects such as 
cyber intelligence data and its processing systems, the format of presented information or cyber 
intelligence, its timelines and reliability and correlation. The E-CMIRC will use various information 
streams as input, such as the IPS events, and threat intelligence and incidents from stakeholders 
and third parties. It is our experience that these elements are mostly technology dependant, and 
this should be kept in mind when conducting a technology requirements analysis.  
 
Technology 
 
This element describes the technology and tool requirements for the E-CMIRC to perform its 
mandate. Some of the tools that may be needed in the E-CMIRC, are: 
 
• SIEM Tool. 
• Threat intelligence / business intelligence tool. 
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• Supporting services such as terminal servers, file servers, DNS servers, mail server, a public 
key infrastructure and NTP server. 
• Carrier-class intrusion prevention systems. 
• Screens, and workstations. 
 
From a South African context, the tool functional and technical requirements may be identified by 
following a systems engineering (SE) approach. This entails a user requirement analysis, a 
functional requirements specification and a technical requirements specification. These 
specifications should be coupled to measures of effectiveness (MoE’s), and measures of 
performance (MoP’s). In South Africa, from a Department of Defence perspective, the SE process 
is governed by the defence acquisition policy (DAP) 1000 based on SE principles [269]. Staying 
within the context of South Africa, the acquisition of these technologies and tools, will have to 
conform to the Public Finance Management Act of 2012 (PFMA Act) [270] if the acquisition is 
facilitated by state owned companies or government departments. 
 
Budget 
 
This element describes the budgetary requirements. It also addresses the financial model by which 
the E-CMIRC will operate, as well as from where funding will be sourced. This is a political decision. 
To govern financial expenditure, acts such as the PFMA is used, as well as regulations and 
guidelines from National Treasury. 
 
E6  Conclusion 
 
In this Chapter, the POSTEDFIT-B capability development model was selected and motivated for 
use in the development of the E-CMIRC capability development model. Our motivation for selecting 
the POSTEDFIT-B model, is that it is the most complete and granular capability development, and 
its use is proven in a developing country. We provided a description of each of the POSTEDFIT-B 
elements, and explained its use in terms of the E-CMIRC. In Appendix F we will be developing the 
E-CMIRC operations model. The E-CMIRC CDM and the ECMIRC OM will be represented in a 
single, integrated model.
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Appendix F:  E-CMIRC Operational Model (E-CMIRC OM) 
 
F1  Introduction 
 
In Appendix F we will develop the E-CMIRC operations model (OM). The approach that we will follow is to first 
identify and analyse existing operations models.  From the identified and analysed operations models, we will 
select one most suitable for the E-CMIRC, and motivate its use. We will then represent the E-CMIRC CDM 
and the E-CMIRC OM as a single, integrated model. This model may then be used to guide and steer nation 
states when building an E-CMIRC structure. The rest of the appendix is structured as follows: 
 
Section F1 introduces existing operational models. 
 
Section F2 selects and motivates an operational model for the E-CMIRC. 
 
Section F3 Presents the E-CMIRC CDM and E-CMIRC OM integrated model. 
 
Section F4 concludes this appendix. 
 
In Section F2 we will be presenting existing operations models. 
 
F2  Existing operational models 
 
We will first define what an operating model is. An operating model is a visual or abstract representation of 
how customers derive value, or benefits from an organisation. It further describes the way an organisation 
does business. It is not static, and continuously undergoes change [271]. At its core, operating models 
prescribes where and how work gets done across an organisation, or capability. Operating models link 
organisational strategy and organisational design to deliver on organisational strategy [272].  
 
Research done by Ross, Weill and Robertson (2006) has shown that operational efficiency is 31% higher in 
organisations with operating models, and has a 33% higher customer satisfaction rating. Organisations with 
operating models has a 34% advantage during the development of new product and services over their 
competitors [273]. There thus exists a clear benefit for the E-CMIRC to be gained by using an operating model. 
 
Different ways of defining the elements out of which an operating model exists, are possible. One of the most 
common ways of defining operating models is the people, processes and technology framework [274]. Another  
way of defining operating models, is using the process, organisation and technology framework [275]. There 
are many industry standard operating models such as the: 
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• TM Forum’s Enhanced Telecom Operations Map (eTOM), Business Process Framework  [276] founded  
in 1988 [277].  
• Insurance Application Architecture (IAA) [278] 
• The Banking Industry Architecture Network (BIAN) [279],  
• Information Framework (IFW) [280],  
• ITIL [157].  
• COBIT [281].  
 
In 2014, KPMG proposed a next generation IT operating model, consisting of the broker, integrate and 
orchestrate IT, operating model [282], while Cognizant formulated an IT operations model in 2016 with 
organisation and structure, process, technology and tools and workforce and sourcing as core tenets [283]. 
 
We have selected the TM Forum’s  eTOM Business Process framework as an ideal framework to build the E-
CMIRC OM. The motivation for selecting the TM Forum’s  eTOM Business Process framework is that we have 
proposed its use for building SOCs in previous work [19]. It is able to scale to national level, it is a 
comprehensive business process framework, and it is relevant for an IT service capability [19]. For these 
reasons, the eTOM Business Process framework is chosen as the operating model for the E-CMIRC. The TM 
Forum’s eTOM framework is discussed in Section F3. 
 
F3  E-CMIRC operating model selection 
 
TM Forum has over 900-member companies, and is globally the largest trade association. They seek to 
integrate digital ecosystems. Some examples of the digital ecosystems are enterprises, communication service 
providers, and digital service providers. TM Forum has created a set of standards and best practices in the 
operationalisation of capabilities which is accepted by over 900 globally dispersed organisations and 
commercial entities. Businesses globally review, test and validate these standards and best practices [284] 
 
The TM Forum consist of four frameworks. They are the Business Process Framework (eTOM), the Information 
Framework (SID), the Application Framework (TNA) and an Integration Framework (TAM). The frameworks 
are collectively known as the New Generation Operation Systems and Software (NGOSS) [285]. The four 
NGOSS frameworks are shown in Figure 41. 
 
The eTOM Framework is a complete framework addressing marketing and sales, strategy, infrastructure and 
product, as well as operations and enterprise management [280] [286]. It considers all aspects of business, 
and categorizes all business activities [286]. Milham (2004) [287], states that one of the advantages of the 
eTOM Framework is that it establishes a prevalent vocabulary for business processes as well as functional 
processes. For the purpose of developing the E-CMIRC operations model, the eTOM Business Process 
Framework will be used as taken from [284]: 
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Figure 41: The four NGOSS frameworks [284] 
 
The eTOM Business Process Framework is selected as it is the most applicable model for managing 
operations that uses defined processes. TAM provides a model for how business capabilities are deployed 
using applications [288], and SID defines information flows through organisations and their service providers 
[289]. The Integration Framework provides a standard for the integration of management applications and 
platform services [290]. None of these frameworks, however, provides an operational model and business 
process descriptions, except eTOM. 
 
The eTOM Framework branches into three business concepts, called levels. The first levels are called level 0, 
and they are strategy, infrastructure and product (Level 0), operations (level 0) and enterprise management 
(level 0). [284]. The horizontal layers are level 1 processes A description of each is listed below [19],[291]: 
 
• Strategic, infrastructure and product level - includes marketing and offer management, service 
management, management resource development and supply chain development. None of these 
elements are addressed by any of the existing operations frameworks such as COBIT or ITIL. Vertically, 
this level has the following child-levels: 
o Strategy and commit 
o Infrastructure lifecycle management 
o Product lifecycle management. 
 
Horizontally, this level has the following child-levels 
o Marketing and offer management 
o Service development management 
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o Resource development management 
o Supply chain development management 
 
• Operations - includes customer relationship management. In contexts of the E-CMIRC, these would be  
the stakeholders and actors defined in Chapter 2, resource management, operations management and  
supplier / partner relationships. Vertically, this level has the following child-levels: 
o Operations support and readiness 
o Fulfilment 
o Assurance 
o Billing and revenue management 
 
The following child-levels are found in the horizontal layer 
o Customer relationship management 
o Service management and operations 
o Resource management and operations 
o Supplier / partner relationship management 
 
• Enterprise Management - this level addresses strategic and enterprise management, risk management, 
 enterprise effectiveness management, knowledge and research management and financial and asset  
management. Enterprise Management has as child-levels the following: 
o Strategic and enterprise planning 
o Enterprise risk management 
o Enterprise effectiveness management 
o Knowledge and research management 
o Financial and asset management 
o Stakeholder and external relations management 
o Human resources management 
 
The eTOM framework with its horizontal and vertical child-levels are shown in Figure 42. The eTOM framework 
is comprehensive, and the model drills down to four child levels [19]. During the development of the E-CMIRC 
model, the capability development framework (POSTEDFIT-B) was motivated for use, and the TM Forum’s 
eTOM framework was selected and motivated for the operations model. The selection of applicable elements 
from the POSTEDFIT-B framework and the eTOM framework would differ from country to country.  
 
The intention is for the country implementing the cybersecurity service of E-CMIRC structures to select the 
appropriate elements from the eTOM Framework based on the authoritative, normative, and regulatory 
prescripts, and also considering the dimensions, mandates and domains. 
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Figure 42: eTOM framework with horizontal and vertical child levels 
 
F4  Presentation of the E-CMIRC CDM and OM 
 
Our NCMF provides us with a framework to assist with the identification cybersecurity functions. It also provides 
us with a framework to be used during the implementation of national cybersecurity functions. Our NCMF was 
shown to be flexible enough to be applied to organisations and enterprises, and at national level. 
 
The E-CMIRC, as a national cybersecurity structure that offers cybersecurity functions, must comply with 
prescripts expressed in authoritative, normative and regulatory documents. The structure’s capabilities must  
consider all elements that may influence its effectiveness, efficiency and costing. To help with this, we have 
proposed the E-CMIRC CDM. We have selected the POSTEDFIT-B model used by the South African DOD for  
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developing E-CMIRC capabilities. Our decision was motivated by the fact that the model’s application and 
success is proven in the context of a developing country, and it was also found that it is more comprehensive 
than its international counter parts. 
 
The E-CMIRC CDM ensures that all the elements making up the E-CMIRC services’ complementary 
capabilities are considered. Following our E-CMIRC CDM helps to guide costing, and allows for repeatable 
and consistent results during the development of capabilities for our E-CMIRC. To achieve proper governance 
and management of the operational aspects of the E-CMIRC capabilities, we propose the E-CMIRC OM. Every 
single capability has operational aspects coupled to it. This means that the capabilities and operations are 
integrated and tightly linked. There thus exists a relationship between the E-CMIRC CDM, and the                         
E-CMIRC OM. 
 
The E-CMIRC cybersecurity services were selected in Section D4. The complementary capabilities of these 
services will be developed using the E-CMIRC CDM, and the capabilities’ operational aspects will be governed 
by the E-CMIRC OM. The services we have selected for the E-CMIRC are: 
 
• 24x7 monitoring 
• Intrusion detection services 
• Risk analysis 
• Reporting 
• Network and security device management 
• Business continuity and disaster recovery planning 
• Vulnerability management 
• Alerts and warnings 
• Security related information dissemination 
• Incident handling  
 
The E-CMIRC CDM and OM model is presented in Figure 43. The E-CMIRC model is presented as a symbolic 
model in the shape of a three-dimensional cube. The first or upper side of the cube covers the cybersecurity 
services selected in Appendix D. The second side of the cube represents the selected operating model, which 
is the TM Forums eTOM framework with levels strategy, infrastructure and product, operations and enterprise 
management. The intention is for the nation-state applying the E-CMIRC OM model to develop the E-CMIRC 
structure, to drill down to all four levels of the framework, and to identify the applicable eTOM framework 
business processes based on the national cybersecurity functions they have selected.  
 
The third side of the cube represents the selected capability development model, which, in the case of the       
E-CMIRC, is the POSTEDFIT-B framework. The intention is for the entity developing the E-CMIRC to use the 
POSTEDFIT-B framework to ensure that all aspects are considered during the capability development cycle.  
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Figure 43: E-CMIRC CDM and OM model 
 
This granular approach allows for trade-offs to be made between the framework elements to optimise the E-
CMIRC, or to compensate for deficiencies in individual elements [257]. Figure 43 further shows that for each 
of the services capabilities, the POSTEDFIT-B model should be followed during the development of the 
capability. For example, the incident handling capability will be developed following the POSTEDFIT-B 
capability development model. Once the capability is developed and implemented, the eTOM model describes 
its operational aspects. 
 
F5  Conclusion 
 
In the preceding chapters, we developed the NCMF to help with the identification, selection and prioritisation 
of national cybersecurity functions. These tasks are achieved in the first two levels of the NCMF. The  
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identification, selection and prioritisation tasks satisfy the plan function of the PBRM organisational approach, 
which is the overall organisational framework we have selected. The implementation task is illustrated by the 
development of the E-CIRC, a structure that is described using three models. The E-CMIRC CDM, the E-
CMIRC OM and the E-CMIRC CMM. The E-CMIRC CDM satisfies the build function of the PBRM approach, 
while the E-CMIRC OM satisfies the run function of the PBRM organisational approach. To comply with, and 
complete the PBRM organisational approach, the PBRM monitor function needs to be described. To satisfy 
this function, we will develop the capability maturity model for the E-CMIRC, the E-CMIRC CMM in        
Appendix G.
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Appendix G: E-CMIRC Capability Maturity Model (E-CMIRC CMM) 
 
G1  Introduction 
 
The focus of this appendix is on the development of a model that can be used to measure and manage the 
effectiveness and efficiency of the E-CMIRC structure’s capabilities. In Chapter 2, we showed that capabilities 
are made up of people, processes, and technology, and that these are housed in, and offered from a structure. 
The E-CMIRC structure’s capabilities and operations are described by the E-CMIRC CDM and  E-CMIRC OM. 
These two models were presented in a single integrated model since the E-CMIRC services (and its 
complementary capabilities) are linked to its operations.  
 
Now that there is a model to guide and steer the E-CMIRC services’ complementary capabilities, and 
operations, we need a mechanism to baseline, measure and improve the E-CMIRC structure’s capabilities. 
The E-CMIRC CMM provides a mechanism to measure, monitor and manage the E-CMIRC structure, 
capabilities’ effectiveness and efficiency.  We will be spending more time on the development of our                      
E-CMIRC CMM. Our rationale for doing so is as follows: 
 
• Having a capability maturity model available during the early phases of the NCMF implementation,  
allows for the early assessment of existing structures. This early assessment may assist when having to 
make a decision on whether a new structure is needed for the national cybersecurity functions, or whether 
an existing structure will suffice. 
• A capability maturity model may assist with assessments during the implementation phase of  
national structures. Based on the outcomes, corrections and adjustments to the structure capabilities may 
be made early in the development of the structure. 
• Having a maturity model available early on may shape structure implementation requirements. To  
illustrate this, if we know beforehand that we need an incident handling capability with a high maturity 
level, we can start recruiting people with the right skills and experience, and procure the most relevant 
technologies. 
 
The rest of this appendix is structured as follows: 
 
Section G2 introduces the concept of capability maturity models. 
 
Section G3 introduces the approach we will follow for the development of the CMM. 
 
Section G4 introduces some of the publicly available capability maturity models, and here we select and 
motivate a publicly available capability maturity model for the E-CMIRC. 
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Section G5 introduces the process maturity assessment criteria. 
 
Section G6 introduces the technology maturity assessment criteria. 
 
Section G7 presents the E-CMIRC CMM. 
 
Section G8 concludes the appendix. 
 
We will now, in Section G2, introduce and discuss the concept of maturity models. 
 
G2  Introduction to maturity models 
 
Using a capability maturity model will allow for capability elements (people, processes and technology) to be 
baselined, assessed and improved. It also provides a mechanism to measure the effectiveness and efficiency 
of capabilities. In context of the E-CMIRC, the assessment would be the responsibility of the national 
cybersecurity structure management team (E-CMIRC management), and they may report their findings into 
the overall controlling body we have introduced in Chapter 5. 
 
The capability maturity model will further allows management to assess its processes and methods according 
to best practices, or against external standards [292]. Capability maturity models may be used to assess the 
following capability elements: 
 
• People performance 
• Processes 
• Technology.  
 
A well-developed capability maturity model can also asses structures [293]. These are all the elements that 
makes up a capability as explained in Chapter 2. The advantages of having a maturity model to measure the 
E-CMIRC capabilities against, is that a baseline, or benchmark can be easily established, leading to repeatable 
results when building multiple national cybersecurity structures. 
 
A capability maturity model also allows for the determination of an “as-is” and “to-be” states, and provides 
guidance on how to improve the maturity of capability elements. Our intention is to design the maturity model 
flexible enough to cater for all envisioned applications of the E-CMIRC, such as where the E-CMIRC functions, 
mandates and domains change. Some advantages to using a capability maturity model are [294]: 
 
• It can be used as a benchmark to compare the current state of capabilities 
• It provides a model to ensure repeatable results and outcomes when building national  
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cybersecurity structures. 
• It allows for the representation of the progression of capabilities 
• It assists in the identification of capability strong and weak points 
 
When designing a capability maturity model, there are two methods the designer can follow. Following the first 
method as proposed by Becker, Knackstedt and Pöppelbuß (2009) [295], the designer would follow a top-
down approach, and start by specifying a fixed number of maturity levels.  
 
These stages are then substantiated with characteristics that could serve as assessment items. The second 
method as proposed by Lahrmann, Marx, Mettler, Winter and  Wortmann (2011) [296] follows a bottom-up 
approach, in that characteristics and assessment items are first specified, and then grouped into maturity 
levels.  
 
The E-CMIRC capability maturity model (E-CMIRC CMM) will be designed using the top-down approach as 
proposed by Becker et al. [295]. This is an intentional decision since there are many existing, established and 
proven capability maturity models using the top-down approach such as: 
 
• Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) [294]. 
• Building Security In Maturity Model (BSIMM) [297]. 
• Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) [298]. 
• Software Assurance Maturity Model (openSAMM) [299]. 
• ITIL Maturity Model [300]. 
• COBIT Maturity Model [301]. 
 
The existing capability maturity models are explored in the next section, and an existing capability maturity 
model is identified to serve as the basis for the design of the E-CMIRC Capability Maturity Model. Our approach 
to developing the E-CMIRC CMM is introduced in Section G3. 
 
G3  Our E-CMIRC CMM development approach  
 
In Figure 9, in Chapter 2, we introduced the concept that’ services fulfil a function.’ We further illustrated that 
a service is made up of capabilities, and these in turn consist of people, processes and technology. During the 
development of the E-CMIRC, the following concepts need to be understood, and kept in mind. The first 
concept we would like to introduce is the concept of ‘capability elements.’ When we refer to the term “capability 
elements,” we refer to the granular elements making up a capability. These are the people, processes and 
technology that makes up a capability. The maturity of these elements is something that can be assessed and 
measured.  
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The second concept is one of a ‘capability maturity score.’ This is typically a numeric value. The maturity score 
may be anything from a maturity score of 0, to a maturity score of 5. The maturity score typically works on a 
sliding scale, with a score of 0 indicating a low, or bad maturity level, and a score of 5 indicating a high, or 
good maturity level. Most publicly available frameworks and standards’ maturity scores use a similar approach. 
We will explore the available maturity frameworks in Section G4. 
 
The third concept we would like to introduce, is that entailing maturity assessment criteria. The maturity 
assessment criteria describe the capability element being assessed, and is linked to the maturity score. It 
would typically describe that a maturity score of “0” means that the capability element under assessment is 
non-existent, poorly managed, or needs improvement. It may describe a maturity score of “5” as optimised, 
well managed, or advanced. The concepts we have introduced are displayed in Figure 44. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 44: E-CMIRC CMM concepts 
 
Figure 44 shows the now familiar concept that a capability consists of people, processes and technology. We 
have decided to call these capability elements. Each capability element is assessed against a specific 
assessment criteria, and is scored by a maturity score. During the development of our E-CMIRC CMM, and in 
keeping with our decision in Appendix E to follow a top-down approach, we will do the following: 
 
Step 1: As a first step, we will research, and review existing capability maturity models. Our focus will be on 
identifying a maturity score numeric value, as well as the maturity assessment criteria that will be scored 
against the maturity score. 
Step 2: Throughout this thesis we have mentioned that our intention is to combine the processes and 
technologies of different functions to realise a cost and skills saving. In keeping with our intention, we will thus 
determine maturity assessment criteria for E-CMIRC processes and technologies, and exclude the people and  
structure capability elements. Our intention is not to provide comprehensive maturity assessment criteria for 
all capability elements.  
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Our intention is to illustrate how to use our E-CMIRC CMM. The maturity assessment criteria will differ from 
country to country, and from capability to capability. We will illustrate the application of the E-CMIRC with a 
maturity assessment criteria example in Section G5. Maturity assessment criteria need to be developed for all 
the capability elements under assessment. To assist with the compilation of assessment criteria, international 
standards and frameworks such as ISO/IEC 27001:2013 [128], COBIT 5 [302] and ITIL [303] may be 
consulted. 
 
In Section G4 we will introduce existing capability maturity models. We are exploring these so we can discover 
and select a maturity level numeric value, and maturity assessment criteria for our E-CMIRC processes. 
  
G4  Existing capability maturity models  
 
In order to develop a capability maturity model for the E-CMIRC, and as a first step, some existing capability 
maturity models will be considered, and the most applicable existing model will be selected and motivated for 
our E-CMIRC CMM. We will then use the maturity score and the maturity assessment criteria of the selected 
model as maturity scores and criteria for our E-CMIRC processes. As a second step, the assessment criteria 
to be used for the technology capability element assessment will be introduced.  
 
From a cybersecurity perspective, three capability maturity models stand out as they address cybersecurity 
capabilities at national level, and were developed, in some instances, as part of national initiatives. These 
cybersecurity capability maturity models are: 
 
• The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (UK CMM V 1.2) developed by the Cyber Security  
Capacity Center in 2014 sponsored by the UK government to be used by the UK government and  
other governments [53]. 
• The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (US-C2M2) developed in 2014 by the US Department  
of Energy for the electricity sub-sector. In version 1, all sector specific references and terminology were 
removed to make it applicable to all industries and sectors at national level. It was then called                    
C2M2  [294]. 
• The Systems Security Engineering Capability Maturity Model (SSE-CMM) developed in 1998 and 
 reviewed in 2014 by the International Systems Security Engineering Association (ISSEA). This  
resulted  in an international standard, ISO/IEC 21827:2008 [304]. The aim of the standard is to describe 
the  characteristics needed in organisational or departmental engineering process to ensure effective 
security engineering [305]. The standard covers the following, as taken verbatim from [305] in order not 
to detract from the standard’s intention and meaning: 
 
o The entire life cycle, including development, operation, maintenance and decommissioning activities; 
o The whole organization, including management, organizational and engineering activities; 
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o Concurrent interactions with other disciplines, such as system, software, hardware, human factors 
and test engineering; system management, operation and maintenance; 
o Interactions with other organizations, including acquisition, system management, certification, 
accreditation and evaluation. 
 
The three capability maturity models with their maturity scores, and the process maturity assessment criteria 
are compared in Table 52. 
 
Table 52: Maturity model levels and level descriptions [31], [230], [239] 
Numeric 
Score 
UK CMM V 1.2 
Numeric level 
description 
US-C2M2 
Numeric level description 
SSE-CMM 
Numeric level 
description 
0 Start-up Non-existent Not performed 
1 Formative Initial practices are performed but may be ad hoc Performed 
informally 
2 Established Practices are documented. 
Stakeholders of the practice are identified and involved 
Adequate resources are provided to support the process 
(people, funding, and tools). 
Standards and/or guidelines have been identified to 
guide the implementation of the practices. 
Planned and 
tracked 
3 Strategic Activities are guided by policies (or other organisational 
directives) and governance. 
Policies include compliance requirements for specified 
standards and/or guidelines. 
Activities are periodically reviewed to ensure they 
conform to policy. 
Responsibility and authority for performing the practices 
are assigned to personnel. 
Personnel performing the practices have adequate skills 
and knowledge. 
Well-defined 
4 Dynamic  Quantitatively 
controlled 
5 Continuously 
improving 
 Continuously 
improving 
 
The first column describes the maturity score’s numeric value. This value may be provided by the designer of 
the maturity model, or the maturity score values may be selected from existing models. We have decided to  
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use the COBIT maturity level numeric values. The values ranges from “0”, indicating that a process is non-
existent, to “5” indicating a mature, and optimised process [302]. ITIL also uses numeric maturity levels, starting 
at “1” indicating an initial maturity level, to “6,” indicating an optimised maturity level. Since the E-CMIRC is a 
start-up structure, it will happen that capability elements are non-existent, and we need to be able to indicate 
this. We thus resonate with the COBIT maturity score numerical value that indicates a score of “0,” or a “non-
existent” capability. In Section G5 we will introduce the E-CMIRC process maturity assessment criteria. 
 
G5  E-CMIRC process maturity assessment criteria 
 
We want to combine the processes and technologies of different services to realise cost and skills saving. We 
will thus focus our assessment criteria development efforts on the E-CMIRC processes and technologies. 
Furthermore, in Appendix A, the intention was expressed to view the E-CMIRC as a system and to develop it 
using systems engineering principles.  
 
Systems engineering is primarily used to develop capabilities. This complements our decision to use the 
POSTEDFIT-B capability development model for our E-CMIRC CDM. The POSTEDFIT-B capability 
development model was derived from the South African DOD, and it is our experience that the South African 
DOD predominantly uses a systems engineering approach as a methodology when developing systems. 
 
To avoid the use of different and incompatible models, and to compliment the E-CMIRC CDM, we select the 
SSE-CMM as the capability maturity model for the E-CMIRC. The fact that the SSE-CMM is also measurable 
against ISO/IEC 21827:2008 [305] further reinforces, and supports our decision. The maturity assessment 
criteria from the SEE-CMM will be used for the E-CMIRC processes.  
 
These maturity assessment criteria will be mapped back to the COBIT numerical values, and these numeric 
values, together with the SEE-CMM maturity numeric level descriptions will be used for our E-CMIRC process 
assessments. The E-CMIRC maturity level values with the process maturity assessment criteria are shown in 
Table 53. The same table may also be used as a template when assessing the E-CMIRC process maturity. 
 
Table 53: E-CMIRC maturity levels and process maturity assessment template 
COBIT Maturity Level Numeric Value SSE-CMM Process Maturity Assessment Criteria 
Level 0 Not performed 
Level 1 Performed informally 
Level 2 Planned and tracked 
Level 3 Well defined 
Level 4 Quantitatively controlled 
Level 5 Continuously improving 
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We will now provide a sample application of the E-CMIRC process maturity assessment template. We will 
illustrate the template’s application by assessing the incident handling process.  
 
Table 54: E-CMIRC process maturity assessment criteria template application 
Maturity Value SSE-CMM Process Maturity Assessment Criteria 
Level 0 The incident handling process does not exist and is not performed. 
Level 1 The E-CMIRC incident handling process has a low maturity, and is performed informally. 
Level 2 The E-CMIRC incident handling process is planned and tracked. 
Level 3 The E-CMIRC incident handling process is well defined. 
Level 4 The E-CMIRC incident handling process is quantitatively controlled. 
Level 5 The E-CMIRC incident handling process has a high maturity is continuously improved. 
 
Now that we have identified the maturity score numeric value as well as the process maturity assessment 
criteria, we need to consider the technology maturity assessment criteria. The technology maturity assessment 
criteria are introduced in Section G6. 
 
G6  E-CMIRC technology maturity assessment criteria 
 
The next step in completing the E-CMIRC CMM is to develop the assessment criteria against which its 
technologies will be assessed against. The assessment criteria will differ from between national requirements, 
and between technologies. The assessment criteria will be highlighted with a few examples to convey the 
intended usage, but to keep the model as flexible as possible; each developing country will develop its own 
measurement criteria. We will be using the familiar maturity scoring numeric values we selected for the process 
maturity assessment criteria. In Table 55 we propose a maturity assessment criteria template that countries 
may use during the development of the technology maturity assessment criteria. 
  
The maturity assessment criteria column should be populated with criteria against which the maturity of the 
technology deployment will be assessed against. Each criterion will be scored using the maturity score we 
introduced in Section G5. We will illustrate the application of our template by using the event log collection 
capability. This is a technical capability and is delivered by the SIEM technology. The maturity level numeric 
value ranges from 0 to 5. The illustrative application is shown in Table 55. 
 
Table 55: E-CMIRC technology maturity assessment criteria template application 
Maturity Value Maturity assessment criteria: event log collection 
0 No event log collection capability 
1 A technology with a low capability will collect events from a limited number of vendors 
(<10) and device types (<5) using a limited number of protocols. 
A National Cybersecurity Management Framework for Developing Countries 
 
258 
  
Appendix G: E-CMIRC Capability Maturity Model 
Maturity Value Maturity assessment criteria: event log collection 
2 A technology with a low capability will collect events from a low number of vendors (≤25) 
and device types (15) using a limited number of protocols. 
3 A technology with a low capability will collect events from a limited number of vendors 
(≤75) and device types (20) using a limited number of protocols. 
4 A technology with a low capability will collect events from a limited number of vendors 
(≤100) and device types (25) using a limited number of protocols. 
5 A technology with a high capability will be able to collect events from multiple vendors 
(>150) with multiple device types (>25) using various protocols 
 
We have now illustrated the application of the process maturity assessment criteria template, and the 
technology maturity assessment criteria template. These two templates may be used during the maturity 
assessments of the E-CMIRC processes and technologies. We also need to consider the amount, or number 
of capability elements.  
 
The E-CMIRC would not be valuable if it only consisted of the incident handling process capability, and the 
event log collection technical capability. It is thus important to consider the number of capabilities that the E-
CMIRC would offer as well, and include the number of capabilities in the maturity score calculation. So far, we 
have the following elements that we will consider during the maturity assessment: 
 
• The number of capabilities (people, processes and technology) offered by the E-CMIRC. 
• The maturity assessment criteria of each capability element. Capabilities can have more than one maturity  
• assessment criteria associated with it. 
• The maturity level numeric value. This gives us the assessment score per maturity assessment criteria. 
 
In Section G7 we present our E-CMIRC CMM. 
 
G7  E-CMIRC CMM presentation 
 
In alignment with the decision made in Section 0, the E-CMIRC CMM is also presented as a symbolic model 
in a three-dimensional shape. This approach ensures familiarity of use and the application of the models, 
reducing training costs, and ensuring rapid deployment of the E-CMIRC CMM. The E-CMIRC CMM is 
presented in Figure 45. 
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Figure 45: E-CMIRC CMM 
 
The cube displays three sides. The first side displays the maturity score, starting with Levels 0 to 5. The 
maturity scores were introduced in Table 52. The bottom of the cube is reserved for the capabilities. The 
capabilities are presented with the symbol “c.” The right side of the cube is reserved for the capability 
assessment criteria.  This is represented by “cc.” We will now provide a description on how to use the                   
E-CMIRC CMM through an analysis of the South African Cybersecurity Hub’s incident handling process.The 
Cybersecurity Hub serves as the South African National CSIRT, and is used as a sample. The assessment is 
done based on our experience working in the Cybersecurity Hub. The same assessment process will be 
followed for a newly built or existing structure. The process is as follows: 
 
• Identify the capabilities to be measured (the capability we have selected is the Cybersecurity Hub incident  
handling process). 
• Analyse and categorise the process in a maturity level according to SSE-CMM process. Evidence  
supporting the categorisation should be provided. 
• Define maturity assessment criteria, and assign a score.  
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Table 56: E-CMIRC CMM: incident handling service 
Maturity score Capability assessment criteria 
Process maturity score 0 
Not performed 
 
Process maturity score 1 
Performed informally 
The Cybersecurity Hub’s incident handling process is performed informally. As 
proof, e-mails pertaining to incidents are attached as well as reports from the 
incident handling application 
Process maturity score 2 
Planned and tracked 
 
Process maturity score 3 
Well defined 
 
Process maturity score 4 
Quantitatively controlled 
 
Process maturity score 5 
Continuously improving 
 
 
The incident handling process is performed informally, and is thus on maturity level 1. One of the capability 
assessment criteria for the incident handling process was used as an example. The maturity assessment 
criteria for the incident handling process is scored from “0” to “5.” One capability may have multiple maturity 
assessment criteria against which it can be measured..  
 
In this regard, NIST SP 800-61 [72] lists the incident handling tasks as preparation, detection and analysis, 
containment, eradication and recovery, as well as  post incident activity. These can all serve as maturity 
assessment criteria. The number of maturity assessment criteria are determined by the entity building the E-
CMIRC, as well as the nation’s requirements in terms of functions and service capabilities. A sample of a high-
level incident handling capability’s maturity assessment criteria is shown in Table 57. We are using the 
following as maturity assessment criteria: 
 
• Capability assessment criteria 1: The incident handling process is automated. 
• Capability assessment criteria 2: The incident handling process is supported by technology. 
• Capability assessment criteria 3: The number of reported incidents resolved (<15%, <20%; >20%,  
<50% >50%, >75%). 
• Capability assessment criteria 4: National actors are involved. 
• Capability assessment criteria 5: International actors are involved. 
 
As stated, our aim is not to develop a comprehensive list of capability maturity assessment criteria. Our aim is 
rather to illustrate how to apply the E-CMIRC CMM. 
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Table 57: Incident handling capability measurement 
Score Incident Handling process maturity assessment criteria 
0 No incident handling process exists. 
1 Incidents are created manually. 
Incidents are reacted to manually. 
Fewer than 15% of reported incidents are resolved. 
2 Incidents are created manually. 
Technology and support tools are used to investigate the incident.  
Less than 20% of reported incidents are resolved. 
3 Incidents are created automatically. 
Technology and support tools are used to investigate the incident.  
More than 20% of reported incidents are resolved. 
4 Incidents are created automatically. 
Technology and support tools are used to investigate the incident. 
National stakeholders are involved. 
More than 50% of reported incidents are resolved. 
5 Incidents are created automatically. 
Technology and support tools are used to investigate the incident.  
National and international stakeholders are involved. 
More than 75% of reported incidents are resolved. 
 
We will now consider the Cybersecurity Hub’s “incident handling process” as a maturity assessment criteria. 
We have awarded the Cybersecurity Hub’s “incident handling process” a score of “1”. This is because our 
experience has shown that incidents are manually created by using a web portal, or via e-mails. These reported 
incidents are then manually captured in the incident handling application. Less than 20% of all reported 
incidents are resolved by the Cybersecurity Hub.  
 
We also found that the Cybersecurity Hub (at the time of writing)) offers two national capabilities. These are 
the incident handling capability, and the awareness and training capability. These findings are presented in 
Figure 46 using the E-CMIRC CMM. 
 
Figure 46 shows that the Cybersecurity Hub offers two national cybersecurity capabilities. We have assessed 
the Cybersecurity Hub’s incident handling process. We have scored the Cybersecurity Hub incident handling 
process a score of “1” based on our experience at the time of writing. 
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Figure 46: Cybersecurity Hub analysis against E-CMIRC CMM 
 
The E-CMIRC CMM can also be expressed mathematically. This will allow us to assign a weighting to our E-
CMIRC’s capability and its maturity. We will assign a higher weighting for maturity since we view the maturity 
(describing the executability and repeatability of a capability) as more important than the number of capabilities 
and its capability assessment criteria [167]. The mathematical expression as taken from [167], is shown: 
 
𝑆 =
∑ (𝛼𝐶𝑖 + 𝛽𝐶𝐶𝑖)
𝑛
1
0.05 × 𝑛
 
The maturity of a capability weighs more than the effectiveness of a requirement. One could have a capability 
but if the maturity is low, it will not be executed properly.  
 
α = 0.4 
β = 0.6 
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To balance the scoring, and to indicate the higher importance of maturity over the total number of capabilities, 
a α value of 0.4 is selected for the maturity of the capability. This would give the total number of capability 
assessment criteria score a lesser impact than the maturity score. The E-CMIRC score is thus equal to the 
sum of all capabilities and where each capability is scored on its capability assessment criteria. The formula 
will provide a maturity score out of 100. 
 
• Capability maturity score is represented by 𝐶𝑖 . 
• Capability weighting is presented by α..  
• Capability assessment criteria total is represented by 𝐶𝐶𝑖.         
 Capability assessment criteria total weighting is presented by β.   
• Maturity score is presented by 𝑛. 
 
This formula provides a score out of 100. The E-CMIRC CMM may be used to provide a maturity score for all 
people, processes, technology and structures capability elements. We have used the incident handling process 
capability to illustrate the application of the E-CMIRC CMM. 
 
G8  Conclusion 
 
In this appendix, the E-CMIRC CMM was developed and presented. Its application was illustrated by 
measuring the incident handling process capability maturity of an existing structure – the Cybersecurity Hub. 
We did this based on our experience working experience working with the Cybersecurity Hub. A mathematical 
model was also proposed that allows the E-CMIRC capabilities to be represented mathematically. The                
E-CMIRC CMM offers a mechanism through which the effectiveness and efficiency of the E-CMIRC 
capabilities can be measured, baselined and improved on. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A National Cybersecurity Management Framework for Developing Countries 
 
264 
 
Appendix I: Cybersecurity Risk Management Guide 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A National Cybersecurity Management Framework for Developing Countries 
 
265 
 
Appendix I: Cybersecurity Risk Management Guide 
 
Appendix H:  Cybersecurity Risk Management Guide 
 
H1  Introduction 
  
It is our experience that the national strategic risk and threat assessment function is typically composed of a 
risk management strategy, that in turn describes a national risk management approach, which may include the 
development of a national risk management framework. This framework then describes the national 
cybersecurity risk management process. Our research did not produce a national cybersecurity risk 
management framework and process that can be used as a guide.  
 
Considering the importance of the National Strategic Risk and Threat Assessment function during the selection 
and prioritisation tasks, we, therefore, propose a national risk management guide and by combining two 
existing standards. Our proposed guide is not mandatory, but is helpful as guidance where developing 
countries do not have a national cybersecurity risk management framework.  
 
H2  NCMF Level 2 – National Cybersecurity Risk Management Guide 
 
The outcome of the risk management process described in the national risk management guide, will, together 
with the dimensions, domains and mandates, largely dictate the selection and prioritisation of cybersecurity 
functions for implementation. This section proposes a national risk management guide that may be used to 
conduct a national cybersecurity risk assessment, the result of which will inform the selection and prioritisation 
of cybersecurity functions. Based on our experience, the requirements for a cybersecurity risk management 
framework, with its processes to be used at national level, are as follows: 
 
• The risk management process described in the framework should be generic enough for use at national 
level. 
• The risk management process described in the framework must be high-level enough to be used 
nationally, but must be specific to information security. 
• The risk management process described in the framework should be flexible enough to complement 
and enhance existing government information security risk management initiatives. 
• The risk management process described in the framework should be carried out in accordance with the 
nation’s chosen information security standards and frameworks. 
 
H3  Comparing risk management standards and frameworks 
 
We have decided to make use of existing, internationally accepted risk management standards, and from 
these, identify the ones most ideal, and propose a framework using the processes described in them. In 
deciding on a risk management framework to apply at national level, the following exiting ISO/IEC and ITU risk  
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management standards were considered and evaluated.  The risk management standards we have identified 
and evaluated are presented in Table 58. 
 
Table 58: Standards considered for a National Risk Management Framework 
Standard Description 
ITU-T X.1055 - Risk management 
and risk profile guidelines for  
telecommunication organisations 
[306] 
 
The ITU-T X.1055 Recommendation describes the processes, 
techniques and functional profiles for information security risk 
management for telecommunication in support of the ITU-T X.1051 
| ISO 27011 Recommendation and other ITU-T recommendations. 
ISO/IEC 27011:2008 - Information 
security management guidelines for 
telecommunications organisations 
[307]. 
This standard specifies Information security management 
guidelines for telecommunications organisations based on ISO/IEC 
27002.  
 
ISO/IEC 27005:2011 Information 
security risk management [308] 
 
ISO 27005:2011 provides guidelines for information security risk 
management. It supports the general concepts specified in ISO 
27001 and is designed to assist the satisfactory implementation of 
information security based on a risk management approach. ISO 
27005:2011 focuses on information security risk, and does not 
address organisational risk. 
ISO/IEC 31000:2009 Risk  
management -- Principles and 
guidelines [10] 
 
ISO 31000:2009 provides principles and generic guidelines on risk 
management, and can be used by any public, private or community 
enterprise, association, group or individual. ISO 31000:2009 is thus 
not specific to any industry or sector. 
National Institute of Standards and  
Technology (NIST) Special 
Publication (SP) 800-39. Managing 
Information Security Risk [9] 
NIST SP 800-39 address information security risk, but also focuses 
on organisational risk. 
 
 
Considering the requirements for a national risk management framework, and after an analysis of the strengths 
and weaknesses of the identified standards was performed, the following standards were excluded: 
 
• ITU-T X.1055 [306] provides guidelines specific to telecommunications organisations and, therefore, 
does not comply with the requirement of being generic. 
• ISO/IEC 27011:2008 [307] provides guidelines to telecommunications organisations, and also does not 
comply with the requirement of being generic. 
• ISO/IEC 31000:2009 [10] is applicable to any industry risk and thus does not comply with the 
requirement that the risk management process should be information security specific. 
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This left us with NIST SP 800-39 [9] and ISO/IEC 27005:2011 [308] as the only standards that therefore met 
all the requirements.  A strong argument may however be made for the selection of  ISO/IEC 31000:2009 [10], 
since, a comparison between ISO/IEC 27005:2011 with ISO/IEC 31000:2009, shows more similarities than 
differences. Another argument for the use of ISO/IEC 27005:2011 together with ISO/IEC 31000:2009 is that 
these standards are from the same family, and follow a common approach, methodology and terminology. 
Therefore, a strong argument needs to be made for using standards from two different families, such as 
ISO/IEC and NIST. 
 
ISO/IEC 31000:2009 [10] addresses general risk management, covering concepts, definitions and a 
methodology for a risk management process to be applied to any industry or activity. It is broad enough to be 
used by any activity touching the management of risks (in areas and industries such as compliance, oil and 
gas, corporate risks, projects, safety, etc.) and covers all risks to the organisation. It does not focus on IT risk 
management. ISO/IEC 27005:2011 [308] addresses IT risk management. It uses the same framework 
described in ISO/IEC 31000:2009 [10] and applies it to IT needs [309].  
 
Whereas ISO/IEC 31000:2009 [10] follows a generic risk management approach, ISO/IEC 27005:2011 [308] 
describes a distinct process for managing information security risk based on a partial application of the 
principles introduced in ISO/IEC 31000:2009 [310]. A further differentiator when contrasting ISO/IEC 
31000:2009 and ISO/IEC 27005:2011 is that ISO/IEC 27005:2011 addresses vulnerabilities.  
 
National cybersecurity vulnerabilities and threat management will be key when considering national 
cybersecurity functions for implementation. Another difference to consider when having to make a selection; 
is that ISO/IEC 31000:2009 follows a high-level approach and ISO/IEC 27005:2011 following a detailed 
approach [310]. The differences as discussed between ISO/IEC 27005:2011 [308] and ISO/IEC 31000:2009 
[10] are summarised in Table 59. 
 
Table 59: Comparison between ISO/IEC 31000:2009 and ISO/IEC 27005:2011 
 
Considering the above,argument it is clear that ISO/IEC 27005:2011  [308] is the most befitting standard when 
considering its purpose and application in the development of a national cybersecurity risk management 
process. A benefit of employing ISO/IEC 27005:2011 is that it allows system administrators and managers to 
use a common approach and language and come to an agreement on risk. 
ISO/IEC 31000:2009 ISO/IEC 27005:2011 
Generic risk management process Risk management process specific to information 
security 
Broad approach IS domain specific process 
Does not specifically address IS vulnerabilities Address general IS vulnerabilities 
High-level (generic and fast) Detailed (long run and resource requiring) 
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None of the above standards and recommendations however addresses organisational risk at national level. 
NIST SP 800-39 [9] was identified as an appropriate publication addressing organisational risk at national 
level. The characteristic of it being able to address cybersecurity risk at national level, makes NIST SP 800-39 
a candidate framework to consider during the development of our national cybersecurity risk management 
framework.  
 
Organisational risk includes many different types of risks, such as programme management risk, investment 
risk, budgetary risk security risk, supply chain risk and legal liability risk to name a few. Risk to the utilisation 
and operation of information systems can be broken down into different types, of which information security 
risk is one. 
 
SO/IEC 27005:2011 covers risk from an information security perspective, but does not cover organisational 
risk. NIST SP 800-39 correlates with ISO/IEC 27005:2011, but covers organisational risk, mission and 
business risk, and information systems risk. To this effect, ISO/IEC 27005:2011 is proposed to, describe the 
risk management process pertaining to cyber security in detail,, and NIST SP 800-39 used to describe the risk 
management process related to cybersecurity risk at the organisational level. The risk management process 
will thus be developed using a tailored merger between ISO/IEC 27005:2011 and NIST SP 800-39. 
 
H4  Combining ISO/IEC 27005:2011 and NIST SP 800-39  
 
We proposed to make use of a combination of ISO/IEC 27005:2011, and NIST SP 800-39 [9] to formulate a 
risk management framework which can be used, at, and scale to national level. We will now introduce the 
ISO/IEC 27005:2011, and NIST SP 800-39 risk management processes. 
 
ISO/IEC 27005:2011 describes four processes. These are context establishment, risk assessment, risk 
treatment and risk monitoring and review [8]. The NIST SP 800-39 also describes four processes. These are 
risk framing, assessing risk, risk response and risk monitoring. The overlap between the risk management 
processes are shown in Table 60: 
 
Table 60: Process comparison between ISO/IEC 27005:2011 and NIST SP 800-39 
NIST SP 800-39 ISO/IEC 27005:2011 
Risk framing Context establishment 
Assessing risk Risk assessment 
Risk response Risk treatment 
Risk monitoring Risk monitoring and review 
 
Table 60 shows that there is an overlap between the NIST SP 800-39 and ISO/IEC 27005:2011 processes. 
The major difference is between the scope of the NIST SP 800-39 Risk Framing process and the scope of the  
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complementary ISO/IEC 27005:2011 context establishment process. ISO/IEC 27005:2011 establishes the 
context at the information systems level, while NIST SP 800-39 frames risk at all three process layers (listed 
in Table 60), allowing for a much wider scope. This also enables it to scale to the national level.  
 
In tailoring the two standards, we have replaced the ISO/IEC 27005:2011 context establishment process with 
the NIST SP 800-39 risk framing process. During the risk framing process, the scope and boundaries will be 
defined, and the organs of state managing information security risk is established. This approach is shown in 
Figure 47. Figure 47 shows ISO/IEC 27005:2011 risk management processes as taken from [308], as well as 
the NIST SP 800-39 risk management processes as taken from [9]. These processes were introduced in Table 
60. Figure 47 shows that we have replaced the ISO/IEC 27005:2011 context establishment process with the 
NIST SP 800-39 risk framing process. 
 
 
 
Figure 47: Application of NIST SP 800-39 and ISO 27005 [9] 
 
This risk framing process will be tailored with the national view, addressing strategic risk at national level. This 
is done to accommodate the requirement for the risk management process to be generic enough to be used  
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at national level. NIST SP 800-39 addresses organisational risk at national level. ISO/IEC 27005:2011 being 
information security specific, is used to determine the national cybersecurity risk.  
 
Table 61 presents our National Cybersecurity Risk Management Framework. It shows that the ISO/IEC 27005 
context establishment process is replaced with the NIST SP 800-39 risk framing process. The process details 
are described in the individual standards, and may be used as reference by states wishing to implement our 
National Cybersecurity Risk Management Framework. 
 
Table 61: National cybersecurity risk management framework 
National Cybersecurity Risk Management Guide 
Risk framing process described by NIST SP 800-39 to cover organisational risk at national level 
Risk assessment described by ISO/IEC 27005:2011 
Risk treatment described by ISO/IEC 27005:2011 
Risk monitoring and review described by ISO/IEC 27005:2011 
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Appendix I:  NCMF implementation plan for South Africa 
 
It is our experience that the South African government operates at four different strategic levels of control. 
These levels are political, strategic, tactical and operational [1] [311]. At these different levels of government, 
there are different expectations, requirements and outcomes [1]. The Merriam-Webster dictionary defines a 
strategy as “the art of devising or employing plans or stratagems toward a goal” while the Oxford dictionary 
defines it as “The art of planning and directing…”  The purpose of the NCMF is to plan and direct the national 
cybersecurity function management effort. Figure 48 presents the NCMF Implementation Plan. 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 48: NCMF Implementation Framework [42] 
 
Figure 48 shows that the NCMF Implementation Plan should be applied at the strategic level. At the national 
policy and legislative level, national strategy and long-term objectives are defined. This is the responsibility of  
the government that should be held accountable for the establishment of a national strategy, and long-term 
objectives, and structures to give effect to the national policy.  
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The NCMF should be included as part of the national policy and legislative effort, but be executed at the 
strategic level. Responsibility may be delegated, but accountability not [312], [313]. The responsibility for the 
establishment of a national strategy, and long-term objectives as well as the establishment of national 
structures may thus be delegated, by the government, to the overall controlling body that we have established 
at level 2 of the NCMF.  
 
The overall controlling body may then delegate the responsibility and accountability for the actual 
implementation of the national cybersecurity structures to government departments. In the context of South 
Africa, the South African government is accountable to the nation in terms of developing a national 
cybersecurity policy and strategy, but the responsibility is delegated to the CRC and NCAC. They, in turn, may 
delegate responsibility for the establishment of national cybersecurity structures to government departments 
such as the DTPS, SSA, DOD and SAPS. 
,  
I2  Separation of NCMF and cybersecurity functions 
 
Now that the NCMF Implementation Plan has been introduced, and before we start a discussion on the incident 
handling, and monitoring and evaluation of National ICT function’s structures, it is important to understand that 
there should be a clear distinction between the implementation of the NCMF as a framework, and the 
implementation of the cybersecurity functions identified by the NCMF. This distinction and separation must be 
made since the actors and resources needed to effect the implementation of the NCMF and the cybersecurity 
functions are different.  
 
Accordingly,  the actors needed for the implementation of the NCMF could be state and government actors in 
the government dimension, since this is from where the political will, resources and funding would come. Actors 
interacting with the national cybersecurity function implementation, as well as its resources may come from 
state and government actors and organised non-state actors in the international dimension. This separation 
and distinction is needed to allow for the correct actors and resources to be identified and assigned 
responsibility for the implementation of the NCMF.  
 
I3  NCMF implementation critical success factors 
 
The following are critical success factors to ensure a successful implementation of the NCMF.  We assume 
that a nation-state considering the application of the NCMF already has the political will and the financial 
means, skills, capability and capacity to do so. It is our experience that political will and national implementation 
capability are key success factors where it concerns the implementation of frameworks and strategies at 
national level. Before starting with the implementation of the framework, the following critical success factors 
should be considered: 
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• A common national cybersecurity terminology and language should be established. This can foster a 
common understanding of expectations and expected outcomes.  
• The national terminology and language should be aligned with the terminology and language used by 
international peers. 
• A strategy should be devised for the implementation of the NCMF. Identify all stakeholders and actors. As 
an alternative, our NCMF Implementation Plan may be considered. 
• Responsibilities should be assigned to stakeholders and actors. 
• Resources should be identified  and assigned  for the implementation of the NCMF. 
• Existing national cybersecurity risk management frameworks, strategies and processes should be 
Identified if our proposed framework is not used. 
 
The actual implementation of the framework is a sequential process, progressing from one level to the next. 
The outcome of the completed level serves as input into the level following it. This means that the  NCMF must 
be implemented sequentially, and budget and resource allocation needs to be done for each level. 
 
 
